

Heroic Values in Classical Literary Depictions of the Soul: Heroes and Ghosts in Virgil, Homer, and Tso Ch'iu-ming

by Richard Carrier
Copyright © 2004

The following essay was my senior honors thesis at UC Berkeley for the awarding of the Bachelor's degree in History (minor in Classical Civilizations). It was originally written in 1997. In 2004 I reorganized and numbered its sections, updated its references, revised some sentences, and added some paragraphs, all with the intent to consider publication, but decided I was no longer confident in its core thesis. There are interesting insights and information here, but ultimately the evidence of afterlife beliefs and heroic ideals in ancient Greece, Rome, and China is a little more complicated than this. I am publishing it now only for the sake of what utility and interest it may have. But I no longer fully endorse all of its conclusions, and its treatment of the evidence is not adequately broad to be considered thorough. It's quite good as an undergraduate thesis. It probably won me my doctoral fellowship. But it meets only minimum standards for graduate level work. — Richard Carrier, Ph.D.

1. Introduction

How a society understands the 'hero' affects its understanding of the 'soul'. Eastern and Western views of heroism and the soul reflect this connection, while at the same time differing from each other in notable respects, allowing us to gain perspective on Greek and Roman beliefs when

compared to Chinese parallels. The exploration of this phenomenon can in turn illuminate contemporary differences between Eastern and Western cultures, by tracing their ancient origins.

To this end we will examine three cultural classics, great works that lay at the origin and heart of the Chinese, Greek, and Roman cultures and thus reflect important fundamental differences among them. Western individualism is reflected, even exaggerated, in Homer, against an idealized Chinese communalism in the *Iso Chuan*. Yet Virgil's *Aeneid* reflects a middle ground of tension between both kinds of perspective. In many ways, Roman cultural ideals regarding the hero and the soul were somewhat more like the Chinese than the Homeric, exhibiting an early attempt to reconcile such different ways of viewing the world, presaging modern cultural struggles between materialistic individualism and social responsibility.

2. Why Focus on These Classics?

By “classic” I mean a literary work that is revered and identified as preeminent by the great majority of those who share a culture. It plays a central, universal role in education, becoming familiar to everyone, a treasury of shared analogies, idioms, and lessons, much like the Bible through the Middle Ages to the early 20th century, which still competed fiercely for this position with the classical tradition after the Renaissance, when “to no small extent knowledge of the classical world and acquaintance with the values communicated through the vehicle of classical education informed the mind and provided much of the intellectual confidence of the ruling political classes of Europe” (Turner 1981: 5).

The present state, of a Western culture lacking a universal classic, could be either part cause or symptom of a general state of confusion about our common identity, which has impaired our ability to communicate in a vocabulary of familiar themes, a point forcefully argued by Kopff (1999). Even if we disagree with him on the details, he is describing a real problem. Perhaps television and film are stepping up to fill this gap, however imperfectly—epic sagas such as *Star Wars*, *Star Trek* and *The Simpsons* have actually contributed to our dialogue a

vocabulary and a plethora of allusions that is somewhat comparable to the effect the literary classics once had, but as such things are not shared equally by all generations or subcultures, a valuable continuity is being undermined. The present situation makes it difficult for many to comprehend the forceful relevance classics once had in every great culture.

There is no doubt that Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (written c. 8th century B.C.) were the defining classics of ancient Greek culture. Their central, even overwhelming role in Greek education is undisputed and well-documented (Cribiore 2001, 1996; Marrou 1948), as is the ubiquity of Homeric language, themes and idioms throughout the whole of Greek literature (MacDonald 2000: 4-6). As Hurwitt puts it, the Homeric epics were "storehouses of values and ethics and textbooks of conduct...full of information detailing what it was to be Greek" (1985: 106, 114).

The place of these epics in society was not the least bit undermined even when some elite attitudes regarding how to approach or interpret Homer changed. We can see the most radical examples of counter-cultural critique in Plato's *Laws* (4th century B.C.) and Plutarch's *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry* (1st century A.D.). But mass culture, even among elites, still took to Homeric values and ideals. Some modern interpreters have seen Homer as actually attacking the self-destructive values he is usually seen as glorifying. But Alexander the Great didn't keep a roll of the the *Iliad* under his pillow because he admired Homer's ironic criticism of martial valor. Nor is he likely to have cared much for the moral criticisms of Plato. The fact is, the values presented in Homer remained, in one form or another, dear to the heart of the average Greek. The Homeric epics might exaggerate into extreme relief ideas that were in practice more subtle and complex, but nevertheless pervasive. It is also true that cultures typically enjoy an active debate and a diversity of views, even when one set of ideas continues to signify the reigning zeitgeist. So the fact remains: Homer was everywhere. Even the illiterate heard him sung, or knew his stories by word of mouth and in public art.

Much the same can be said of the *Tso Chuan*, preeminent among the Confucian Classics, which had a central role in Chinese education from as early as the 2nd century B.C. (Cromer

1993: 114). Indeed, the Chinese classical tradition “had been institutionalized in a system of education and recruitment based on an orthodox classical curriculum that took as its core a series of so-called Confucian texts,” which included the *Tso Chuan*, “Just as late modern Europe had accepted the centuries-old belief that a man had only to know Greek and Latin to be educated.” In other words, “If the works of Homer and Hesiod helped to define what it was to be Greek, the *Songs*, *Documents*, and *Tso Chuan* played a similar role in China” (Keightley 1993: 13-15). These classics also played a key role in Japanese and Korean literate culture. The *Tso Chuan* in particular became “one of the cornerstones of a traditional education” having “an immense influence on later Chinese literature and historiography” (Watson 1989: xi).

And this can also be said of Virgil’s *Aeneid* for a traditional Roman education in Latin after its composition in the first century B.C. This work was seen as a kind of synthesis of Homeric and Roman ideals, ripe for comparison and contrast (cf. Juvenal, *Satires* 6.434-56, wr. 1st century A.D.), and it was certainly regarded with the highest reverence as the pinnacle of Roman literature, having “achieved a pre-eminence in the Latin world that was scarcely inferior to the ascendancy of the Homeric poems among the Greeks” (Cary and Scullard 1975: 395). It was also used as a vehicle for spreading Latin culture abroad, justifying “the ways of Rome” to foreign subjects, and ultimately as a textbook for moral education and grammar (Morgan 1998; Gwynn 1926). Virgil consciously attempted to infuse Roman values into a Homeric model, but still could not completely escape the Homeric mind, nor did Homer’s epics lose their attraction or educational role among the Romans, for whom a thorough familiarity with Greek was regarded as essential to the gentleman (Cribiore 2001; Morgan 1998).

As a result, Homer and the Greek mind have remained within the Western psyche to this day, even among those who have never read a word of it. Though perhaps this is becoming less so, still the fundamental mindset persists, and there are certain affinities between the way we think now, and the way Homer and his audience thought then, which do distinguish us from those raised within more “Chinese” cultures. Homer even underlies the Greek cultural springboard of the Western ideals of science: as we see in the *Iliad*, “The key words are

competition, argument, persuasion, and peers—all aspects of what we mean by objectivity and, ultimately, science” (Cromer 1993: 74), and as we see in the *Odyssey*, “The sea is freedom, adventure, wealth, and knowledge—all factors important to the development of science,” in fact “Odysseus has for almost 3,000 years epitomized the solitary adventurer. Washed naked onto the shores of Phaeacia, he must survive on his wits alone” (Cromer 1993: 75), a heroic theme that is ubiquitous in modern Western rhetoric, cinema, and literature today. Yet this stands in conflict with Eastern values. The Chinese culture “suppressed the very elements—the entrepreneurs and adventurers—who have been the instruments of change in the West” (Cromer 1993: 119; see also Lloyd 1990, 1996, 2002). These different approaches have had profound effects not only on our material culture, but our mental culture as well. The *Aeneid*, in contrast, in a sense dipped its toes in both ponds, attempting a synthesis. Modern multiculturalism aims at a similar target.

I have decided to credit the traditional authors here out of convenience, even though there is some dispute in the case of Homer and Tso Ch’iu-ming. The date and authorship of the *Tso Chuan* is even more disputed than the works of Homer (on Homer, see Nagy 1996 and Davison 1962; on the *Tso Chuan*, Cheng 1993 and Loewe 1993). But I shall attribute the *Tso Chuan* to the near-contemporary of Confucius, Tso Ch’iu-ming (c. 6th century B.C.), since it bears his name, and likewise to Homer, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. For these classics have paramount importance as portals into the cultures that produced and revered them, no matter who wrote them, as each was still a product of those cultures and a pervasive influence upon them.

Finally, it might be objected that Homer and Virgil were poets, and Tso Ch’iu-ming a historian, and thus their works cannot be compared due to differences in genre. But this difference is not of great consequence to this study. Each author treated values and beliefs, even regarding heroism and the soul, in the medium most appropriate to his own time and culture: oral drama for the Greeks, prose commentary for the Chinese, and patriotic verse for the Romans (Keightley 1993: 14-15, 37-40). The mode of writing has little bearing on the fact that all these works hold an analogous place to each other as the greatest classics of their place and time, and the primary engines of enculturation.

3. The Classical Hero

As we will see later, Homer depicts the soul as powerless and fleeting, while the author of the *Tso Chuan* portrays it as potent and energetic. Virgil, on the other hand, presents a soul that is partly both. All three authors accomplish this through descriptions of the actions of souls, through the vocabulary used to describe or define them, and through actual metaphysical statements about their nature. These differences correspond in some sense to how each author viewed the hero: for Homer viewed heroism as bodily perfection; Tso Ch'iu-ming, as cultural perfection. Virgil, however, imagined it as the mind overcoming and mastering the body in the service of national destiny—the bloody, senseless struggles that he saw in the world around him echo in his depiction of a corresponding inner struggle between body and mind, a conflict known in Western thought since Plato. Our first object, then, is to examine how these authors portrayed the hero, defined here as “a protagonist of exceptional courage and fortitude who engages in bold and significant actions” (Keightley 1993: 16), an actor who embodies the cultural ideal, someone whom readers are expected to praise or emulate.

As Keightley observes, “It is difficult to generalize about early Greek views of heroism because the subsequent elite culture appears to have been more pluralistic, more given to the preservation and transmission of conflicting views than the elite culture of early China was” or indeed the other more “Asiatic” cultures of the West, such as that of the Hebrews, which was transmitted through Christianity and thus came into direct conflict with the very different Greek culture (Keightley 1993: 23; MacDonald 2000). Once Christianity became ascendant on the coattails of Roman power it put Judaic and Hellenic cultural values into fierce conflict, and it took centuries to find even an uneasy synthesis. Nevertheless, Homeric thinking is always found, even when it is struggled against.

In contrast, early Chinese culture had only one major counter-culture, the intellectual currents of Taoism. But this was never as influential in elite government or education as its

Confucian counterpart, and more importantly it “did not...provide an alternate model for social, political, and military action in the world,” but rather called for inaction and retirement, for removing oneself “from the arena of action” (Keightley 1993: 25). Moreover, Taoism was itself a holistic, counter-individualist philosophy and thus was simply another expression of the same collectivist mindset. Indeed, Keightley continues, “the pluralism of the Greek views and the greater unanimity of the Chinese view is itself significant” as a distinction between the two cultures. Unlike Chinese culture, a love of struggle and conflict is natural to the Greco-Western intellect, even indicative of it.

3.1. Homeric Heroism

In the case of Greece, the evidence begins with the word “hero” itself. It comes from the Homeric word *hêrôs*, “hero,” used by Homer to signify a warrior who excelled in *aretê*, “excellence, manhood, valor, or prowess.” These two words alone give some indication of the Homeric concept of heroism, and we should begin with an analysis of their meaning to Homer’s audience. It is not necessary to establish real etymological links. Since we are dealing with the realm of ideas, it is sufficient, even more important, to know whether the ancients *thought* certain words were connected.

The word *aretê* is derived from *Arês*, the “god of war and slaughter, strife and pestilence,” and an “appellation for war, battle, discord, slaughter, as well as warlike spirit” (Liddell and Scott 1996: 115, 116). In fact, several words denoting goodness in Greek contain the *ar-* root, “the first notion of goodness (*vir-tus*) being that of manhood, bravery in war,” hence our own word *aristocracy*, “rule of the best,” is derived from this. *Hêrôs*, in turn, may have connections with *hôra* (Schein 1984: 69), meaning “the prime of the year, springtime,” and used metaphorically for “youth, prime of life,” as well as “the part of the year available for war” (Liddell and Scott 1996: 906-7, I.2 and IV). Thus, we see that Western heroism is connected at its very root with martial valor and prowess, as well as bodily perfection, and this is

manifest in the Greek fascination with athletics and physical training. Thus Nestor's speech (*Il.* 23.624-50) outlines the bodily expectations of Homeric heroism, which he tells us are lost in old age. Heroism is for the young, the strong, the quick, those who are handy with chariot, spear, or fist. Even outside the context of war, Laodamas tells Odysseus, "No greater is a man's glory so long as he might exist, than whatever he might bring about with feet and limb and hands" (*Od.* 8.147-8). And so, when Patroclus and Hector perish, their fleeing souls weep for the youth and manhood they must leave behind (*hêba* and *androtês*: *Il.* 16.857, 22.363).

The *Iliad* in particular reveals the Homeric emphasis on the body as the symbol and vessel of heroism. We see this in the myriad ways wounds are graphically described, drawing our attention to the anatomy and how its beauty is marred. Yet, when Priam laments the thought of an old man being devoured by dogs, he contrasts this fate with a young warrior killed in battle, declaring that "it is entirely fitting for a youth, once slain in war, to lie stretched out, cleaved by sharp bronze: though dead, everything is beautiful no matter what may be seen" (*Il.* 22.71-3). Thus in Homer even the ugliness of a war wound is beautiful compared to destruction by scavengers, and this is truly revealed by the pervasive concern for preserving the corpse from mutilation by man or dog. The importance of this bodily beauty is so great that the gods go out of their way to preserve Hector's body, going so far as to close his wounds and wash away the bloodstains (*Il.* 24.410-423).

3.2. Chinese Heroism

The matter is quite different in the *Tso Chuan*. There is no word in Chinese that translates exactly as "hero," but the closest analogies are *chieh*, "of surpassing quality," and *chün*, "talented, eminent, great" (Karlgren 1957: nos. 284b, 468t), terms not generally associated with physique. In ancient China, the individual was defined more by their role within their culture than by their individual prowess or glory (Keightley 1990: 20, 1993: 49). Hence we may say that heroism in the *Tso Chuan* is "cultural" as opposed to physical, in that it does not require bodily perfection to

obtain it. “Culture” heroes are heroes serving as cultural ideals, who understand and fulfill vital rituals, ethical customs, or social roles in an exemplary or model way, usually in the face of some challenge or difficulty forcing them to make a choice between the cultural ideal and themselves. And so, while Homer’s heroes brag endlessly of their own martial prowess, the Chinese are chastised for such boasting (*Tso Chuan* 7.16.6 = Legge 1970: 397; Watson 1989: 133). Indeed, “Feats of strength...along with prodigies, disorders, and spirits...was one of the four topics about which Confucius...chose not to speak” (cf. *Analects* 7.20); “Homer, by contrast, sang of them all” (Keightley 1993: 26-7).

Instead, the heroic model that readers of the *Tso Chuan* are urged to emulate is summed up in the words of the warrior Lang Shen when he says, “He who dies doing what is not righteous is not brave,” but “he who dies in the public service is brave” (6.2.1 = Legge 1970: 233). And so here the emphasis is on embodying a cultural rather than a physical ideal: not prowess or physical perfection, but loyalty and honorable action are the goals of the hero. Another exemplary case of this “cultural” heroism is the story of Hsieh Yang, a messenger who is captured by a rival king and condemned to death for refusing a bribe: “A minister counts it a blessing to die carrying out his orders,” Yang tells his captor, for he would rather die “a faithful servant.” His captor is also a model hero: beholding Hsieh Yang’s heroism in simply saying this, he lets him go (7.15.2 = Watson 1989: 105; Legge 1970, 328). And in direct contrast to the treatment of Nestor in the *Iliad* (where Achilles declares Nestor too old, and Nestor agrees), when Mu ignores the advice of the aged Chien Shu for the same reason, he meets defeat (5.32.5, 5.33.8 = Legge 1970: 221, 225; Watson 1989: 68, 70). The obvious moral lesson is that one ought to listen to one’s elders. But more important is that here the concerned and forthright advisor, Shu, represents the heroic ideal, not the war-eager Mu. Although elders in Homer are also respected for age and wisdom, they are just as often belittled by younger heroes and sometimes even themselves, in a way that is never found in the *Tso Chuan*. On this point, Falkner provides an in-depth analysis of the treatment of the elderly in ancient Greek literature, arguing with abundant evidence that there is clearly “an underlying disdain and even contempt

for” old age in Homer (1995: 9-34). In China, we find precisely the opposite. Moreover, whereas war is the means of obtaining glory for Homer’s heroes, for Tso Ch’iu-ming, in the words of the king of Ch’u, “the purpose of military action is to prohibit violence” (7.12.3 = Watson 1989: 99; Legge 1970: 320). Thus glory is won more by ending war than fighting it: in other words, by fulfilling one’s cultural role as a capable and virtuous ruler or servant of the state, not by displaying martial prowess on the battlefield (Liu 1967; Kierman 1974).

This is confirmed in another Chinese classic, which has been called the closest parallel to Homeric epic poetry in China, the *Shih Ching*, an account of heroic kings and dukes who consolidated or governed the Chou empire. From an analysis of this and many other texts, Wang concludes that “The display of martial power (*wu*) is never as worthy as the exhibition of cultural eloquence (*wen*).” Indeed, in the *Shih Ching* itself, the two kings, father and son, are named Wen and Wu, and as one might expect the father is portrayed as a greater hero than the son who completes militarily what his father started culturally. For throughout the epic “the cultivation of *wen*, or cultural elegance, is emphasized,” while “the martial-heroic spirit is kept muted” (Wang 1975: 27). Wen’s virtue lies in his adherence to tradition and his humility and deference, and his corresponding perseverance under a tyrant. As Wang observes, “The wrath of Achilles that leads to heroic action finds no equivalent” in the *Shih Ching*, rather “the heroism of King Wen is in the governance by virtue, by meekness; providing the people with clearings for the growth of food; and standing in awe of his ancestors.” Put simply, “He is pious.” Even the more warlike Wu models this cultural heroism, for after Wu’s conquest, he “ordered his subjects to suppress martial spirit and to cultivate cultural subjects, namely rites and music,” he even ordered weapons to be wrapped and put away and war horses set free (Wang 1975: 28).

One point of sharp contrast between this Chinese ideal and the Roman is the role of warfare: for the Chinese elites, war was an unsavory and dirty business, to be undertaken by others and put aside quickly, never an object of praise or public glory. This does not mean the Chinese were more peaceful than other civilizations, but it was their perception of war. In contrast, the Romans were obsessively and openly militaristic in every aspect of their society.

Members of the elite could not expect to gain any power or prestige unless they engaged in hands-on combat on an annual basis, while the highest public praise was reserved for military glory, as witnessed in the Roman “triumphal procession” for victorious generals and their armies. A martial character is evident in everything from their calendar to their political organization, even their religion (Harris 1979: 9-53). This is a very un-Chinese embrace of militarism, indicative of Rome’s Indo-European roots. As we shall see, Rome’s affinity with a Chinese mindset lies not in their attitude toward war, but in the more basic conception of the role and nature of the hero.

3.3. Roman Heroism

For Virgil, the hero is not an individualist, as in Homer, but one who, embodying the Roman virtue of *pietas*, “dutifulness” in the broadest sense, submits to and serves the national interest. But this is conceived not in terms of a particular ruler, as in the *Tso Chuan*, but in terms of the empire itself throughout all time (*Ae.* 1.279). Nevertheless, Virgil faces a Homeric tradition even among contemporary Roman views of heroism, and his vision competes with this, in the poem as in real life.

The evidence for this again begins with vocabulary. Virgil emphasizes *pietas* beyond any other concept as the defining characteristic of the hero: Aeneas, the principle hero in the epic, is associated with *pietas* or described as *pious* no less than thirty times (Wetmore 1911: 365, 366). Aeneas is compared to Hector, a Homeric hero, who was usually not as idolized as his nemesis Achilles. But it says a great deal that Virgil chose the filial hero of the *Iliad* rather than the more popular martial one. And yet Virgil goes further, telling us that although both Hector and Aeneas “were distinguished in courage and in being superior in arms, Aeneas was first in *pietas*” (*Ae.* 11.291-2).

There are also prominent examples of this *pietas* in the *Aeneid*. There is the famous symbolism of Aeneas first taking upon his shoulders his father, and later the shield representing

the fate of Rome (*Ae.* 2.708, 8.731). There is his decision to place obedience to the gods and the destiny of Rome before his own love and safety in the arms of queen Dido (*Ae.* 4.393). There is also the melee with Lausus, where even that man, an enemy, displays *pietas* in rescuing his father from Aeneas, and Aeneas acknowledges this, even in mid-battle, as an act of heroic character (*Ae.* 10.824-6). All this suggests at least a partial rejection of the Homeric notion of the glory-seeking individualist, here replaced instead with the hero who puts obligations to others, and to destiny, before all else. This is not uniquely Virgilian, but a traditional Roman view of heroism, coexisting with a Homeric view emphasizing martial valor and glory: for just like Greek *aretê*, the common Latin word for heroic “virtue” was *virtus*, the root meaning of which is manliness and valor (Glare 1997: 2073; Lewis and Short 1995: 1997). This Homeric ideal creeps up even in Virgil’s epic, as in the case of Lausus again, where Aeneas declares that his pitiful death would be mitigated by the glory of dying at the hand of “great Aeneas” (*Ae.* 10.830). And in contrast with the usual Roman admiration for the virtue of clemency, Virgil concludes the *Aeneid* with a very Homeric act of vengeful murder.

3.3.1. *Pietas* as the Essence of Roman Heroism

To understand the distinctions we must understand what this virtue meant to Virgil and his Roman audience. In general, *pietas* is the expression or embodiment of the *pius*, acting “according to duty,” especially in reference to performing what is “due to the gods and religion in general, to parents, kindred, teachers, and country.” Expanded in meaning, it can include being pious, kind, good, loyal, or patriotic, but always relates in some way to the proper handling of social obligations (Lewis and Short 1995: 1381, 1374; Glare 1997: 1378, 1384). Cicero wrote that “*pietas* is that through which benevolent duty and attentive reverence is devoted to one’s country and those who are connected by blood” (Cicero, *De Inventione* 2.53.161). Servius, in his 4th century A.D. commentary on the *Aeneid* (1.378; Maltby 1991: 478), claims that the original meaning of *pius* was religious, referring to some kind of ritual purification from sin, and from

there one who was *pius* was *purus*, “pure, clean, faultless,” and *innocens*, “innocent, unselfish,” and hence one who “abstains from every crime.”

This is certainly not a virtue Homer praises his heroes for, yet it is clearly a prominent feature of heroes in the *Aeneid*. Not only is Aeneas routinely described as *pius*, but at key moments of action (e.g. *Ae.* 4.393, 10.826). The importance of this virtue is also established by the fact that when the ghosts of the dead visit the living in the *Aeneid*, it is not to beg for their own burial like Homer’s Patroclus (*Il.* 23.71-2.), but to serve gods, fate, and family by giving advice. Creusa’s ghost, for instance, concludes her visit by wishing her living husband well and urging that he preserve his love for their son (*Ae.* 2.789), both expressions of filial *pietas*. Likewise, in Virgil’s elaborate vision of the afterlife, the hellish Tartarus is a place of the *impia*, while the *pius* go to blissful Elysium (*Ae.* 5.733), thus imagining his entire eschatology in the light of this one virtue. And while Homer lists three sinners being punished in the underworld, all of whom are guilty only of tricking or insulting the gods (*Od.* 11.576-600; w. 5th century B.C.: Pindar, *Olympian Odes*, 1; 2nd century A.D.: Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 2.5.1), Virgil adds numerous crimes punished there, which he calls “monstrous sins” (*immane nefas*: *Ae.* 6.624), all of which are in one way or another violations of *pietas*: hating one’s brother, striking one’s father, deceiving clients, not sharing wealth with kin, adultery, rebellion, selling out one’s country, incest, and breaking a pledge with one’s master (*Ae.* 6.608-627). This is not entirely an invention of Virgil’s, but it is a reflection of a Roman tradition of elevating the role of *pietas* in the cosmic order of things, as we also see in the so-called *Somnium Scipionis* in Book VI of Cicero’s *De Republica*.

Pietas was seen as the essence of heroism by most Romans before and after Virgil. Cicero wrote that it was “the foundation of all virtues” (*Pro Cnaeo Plancio*, 12.29). The Elder Pliny (1st century A.D.) goes further, giving us examples demonstrating the pervasiveness of the Roman emphasis on *pietas* as the greatest of virtues, or at least the most Roman: “It is true,” Pliny writes, “that countless examples of *pietas* stand out all over the world, but there is one at Rome with which all the others cannot be compared” (*Natural History* 7.121), revealing that

Pliny believed *pietas* to be especially Roman, as does Virgil, who has Jupiter promise to his wife that she will see the Roman race “excel both men and gods in *pietas*” (*Ae.* 12.839).

Roman legends bear this up. When Pliny says the Romans exceed all in this virtue, he gives a legendary example from Roman folklore: a daughter visiting her jailed mother was searched to keep her from bringing food, yet she was caught nursing her mother from her own breast, the ultimate act of benevolent duty. This story is repeated, with even greater emphasis on *pietas*, by Valerius Maximus in his 1st century A.D. collection of memorable stories (5.4.7). As in the *Tso Chuan*, such a display of heroism is acknowledged and rewarded by those in power: the mother is released and both are granted a lifetime subsidy (a theme of the “recognized hero” that occurs in the *Aeneid* as well). A temple to the deified Pietas was even erected on the site of the prison to honor the event. Pliny provides other examples, such as the father of the famous Gracchii, who, when given a choice by an oracle between his life and the life of his wife Cornelia, chose to die himself, “to show mercy on his wife, and to consider the public interest” (for she might still bear children to serve the state: Pliny, *Natural History* 7.122). From Roman legend also comes the example of Coriolanus, who ceases his angry assault on Rome in response to pleas from his mother, wife, and children, a change of heart unimaginable for an Achilles (Plutarch, *Coriolanus* 36; Valerius Maximus also presents this as a model of *pietas*, 5.4). Thus, it is clear that *pietas* was viewed as a primary heroic trait in Roman culture generally, and not just in the eyes of Virgil (Saller 1994: 105ff.; Garrison 1992: esp. 263, n. 16; and Shelton 1998: 2-3, 294-6, 370).

3.3.2. The Role of Homeric Heroism in Virgil

In the *Aeneid*, Virgil does not depict Homeric heroism in a very good light. Individualistic heroes end up dead, usually as a direct result of their selfish glory-seeking. Virgil often uses for this lesson the theme of selfishly-sought spoils of war. In the case of Euryalus, his spoils give away his position and slow him down, resulting in his death (*Ae.* 9.364, 373-4, 384-5). Then there is

Turnus, who “celebrates and rejoices” at taking the belt of the slain Pallas, but dies in the end for no other reason than this (*Ae.* 10.500-505, 12.945-948). In a rare narrator’s voice, Virgil specifically denounces this looting, lamenting men who do not know “to maintain a proper measure when elated by success” (*Ae.* 10.501-2), a direct criticism of the Homeric hero, yet a sentiment that would be quite at home in the *Tso Chuan*. In a similar fashion, the arrogant and boastful Numanus gets himself killed by approaching the Trojan battle line to mock them with a classic Homeric taunt. Before meeting his fate, he declares the hero to be one who “is always delighted to collect the spoils and to live on plunder” (*Ae.* 9.612-3), but the real hero that lays him out (Ascanius) issues only a brief and unassuming retort, and “only this” (*Ae.* 9.636), displaying the un-Homeric sense of proper measure that Virgil later praises. A similar sequence occurs in the case of Camilla and Arruns (*Ae.* 11.780-794).

This departure from Homer is also revealed in Virgil’s treatment of the body. Although there are echoes of Homer in the depiction of anatomy in battle scenes (e.g. *Ae.* 12.273-6, 306-8), a regular use of appellations of heroic handsomeness (e.g. *Ae.* 7.107, 1.588-593), and references to wounds defiling the body (e.g. *Ae.* 11.591, 848), Virgil parts somewhat from this Homeric emphasis, leaving these examples to represent conflict more than praise. For instance, there is no parallel in the *Aeneid* to what Laodamas tells Odysseus is the “greatest glory” for a man. The closest comment, issued by Jupiter, does not emphasize physical acts (*Ae.* 10.467-9). Likewise, there is no parallel to Priam’s speech about a body slain in war being beautiful, and there is less focus placed on devouring by scavengers: there are two references (*Ae.* 9.485-91, 10.559-60.), but the gods do not go out of their way to preserve anyone’s body to the extent they do for Hector, and Anchises once even declares, rather un-Homerically, that “the loss of a grave is easy” for him to bear (*Ae.* 2.646). In addition, while the dying souls of Patroclus and Hector weep specifically for lost youth and manhood, in the parallel passages in Virgil, the deaths of Turnus and Camilla, their ghosts still flee, angered or indignant, but offended by exactly what is not specified (*Ae.* 12.951-2, 11.831), a conspicuous omission: Virgil went out of his way not to mention youth and manhood lost, an omission Tso Ch’iu-ming would surely appreciate.

3.3.3. The Context and Cultural Message of the *Aeneid*

The *Aeneid* was written in a period of history that is exceptionally well-documented, compared to the circumstances in which the *Tso Chuan* and Homeric epics were composed. This allows us to understand in good detail the context of the *Aeneid*'s formation. And as it represents an important example of a rising conflict between a Greek and a Chinese-like cultural ideal within the Western tradition, we will benefit from examining the historical context influencing its author.

Virgil was well aware of Rome's immediate history. The republic had ultimately been torn apart by individualism. Men in the 1st century B.C. like Caesar and Pompey, and Sulla and Catiline before them, were more concerned about their own personal honor and glory, and governed, or attempted to govern, through a privately cultivated network of favors, *gratia*, rather like ancient mobsters. Caesar himself wrote that his own reputation mattered more than life itself, and on that pretext refused to surrender his arms for the benefit of the state (Caesar, *De Bello Civili* 1.9.2 and 1.8.3), demonstrating that this kind of thinking was not aberrant, for if Caesar did not consider this a dignified argument he would not have made it. Cicero, of course, had criticized all of these men, and those like them, dubbing them the *audaces* (the reckless, the bold), and the enemies of the *boni*, the "good men." *Audax* and its cognates in Ciceronian political discourse referred to the "subverters of the republic" (*eversorum rei publicae*: Cicero, *Pro Sestio* 86) whose lack of moderation and bloated sense of self-importance would lead to the ruin of good government, and of society itself. Mark Antony would be seen in this role as well, in his selfish refusal to make a compromise for the benefit of the state, and, after Cicero's murder, Virgil would see this individualism culminate in the battle of Actium in 31 B.C. Cicero had, in fact, repeatedly charged Antony, a member of the *audaces*, with being *violentus*, "violent," immoderate, uncontrolled (Cicero, *Philippics* 2.28.68, 5.7.19, 12.11.26).

Virgil does not have much to say about Antony (he is mentioned only once: *Ae.* 8.685ff), though he does indirectly contrast him with Aeneas through the fact that Antony chose to stay with his Dido (Cleopatra) and led alien gods against his own country, while Aeneas rejected the allurements of a Dido for the national interest, and for the preservation of his own household gods. Nevertheless, the influence of Cicero on Virgil seems to be suggested by the retention of his terminology in reference to the principal villain of the *Aeneid*: Turnus. Turnus is specifically identified with the quintessential Homeric hero, Achilles (e.g. *Ae.* 6.89, 9.742), the man with whom Alexander the Great liked to identify himself (in contrast, Aeneas is identified with Hector, as discussed above). Yet Virgil describes Achilles as the “subvertor of Priam’s domains” (*Priami regnorum eversor*: *Ae.* 12.545), showing a hint of Ciceronian terminology. Turnus is also repeatedly described as *audax* (e.g. *Ae.* 7.409, 9.3, 9.126), associating him with Cicero’s *audaces*. Finally, Turnus is attributed with *violentia* on numerous occasions (e.g. *Ae.* 10.151, 11.354, 11.376, 12.45, 12.9), completing the connection between Turnus and the Ciceronian view of men like Mark Antony.

Just as Cicero would see *furor* and *violentia*, as attributes of the *audaces*, bringing chaos and ruin, so apparently did Virgil depict the same thing in his *Aeneid*: the entire epic might be described as depicting a great conflict between chaos and order, the *audax* (Turnus) against the *pious* (Aeneas), on both a human and a divine scale, as is seen from beginning to end, from the role of Neptune as a representative of order (*Ae.* 1.131-56), to when the madness of Turnus, a representative of destructive chaos, persists even when he knows better, and for no other reason than because he does not wish to be seen disgraced (*Ae.* 12.666-8, 12.676, 12.678-680), the very reason Caesar gave for crossing the Rubicon.

In reaction to this villainy, this enemy of peace and order, Virgil apparently seeks to emphasize not the Homeric hero, but the Roman hero: the exemplar of *pietas*. In the process, Virgil’s *Aeneid* acquires many similarities to the *Tso Chuan*, and the view of heroism therein. For instance, the role of boasts is similar: displays of arrogance, though not directly criticized by superiors, are nevertheless a sure sign of impending death, as shown in the cases of Numanus

and Camilla. We also see a similar paradigm of “the recognized hero” in the case of Euryalus, who, similar to Hsieh Yang, is rewarded when he exhibits heroic *pietas*: before going on a risky venture, he asks the Romans to care for his mother when he is away, and this “image of *pietas*” inspires Iulus to promise that Euryalus’ reward will go to his mother and family even if he fails (*Ae.* 9.294 and 9.301-2).

Even more similar is Virgil’s expressed view of the purpose of war: as we are told in the *Tso Chuan* that “the purpose of military action is to prohibit violence,” so we find Virgil stating, in the words of the prophetic soul of Anchises, that the task of Rome will be “to impose moral order upon peace, to spare the subject, and to subdue the proud” (*Ae.* 6.852-3, or with the possible emendation of *pacique* to *pacisque*, “to impose the custom of peace,” cf. Williams 1992: xxxiii, 513). And, in the words of the god Apollo, “all the wars that are fated to come will grow calm with justice” under the Trojan line of Aeneas (*Ae.* 9.642-3, w. 9.259). Virgil also gives us a bold declaration of peace as the aim of the Roman empire, from the mouth of Jupiter himself: “fierce generations, their wars then put aside, will become gentle” (*Ae.* 1.291; see also 1.292-296). Then, in the words of Drances, Turnus’ political opponent, we are told “there is no salvation in war” (*Ae.* 11.362). It would seem that Virgil’s view of war is at least a bit more Chinese than Homeric.

We also see Virgil’s view of heroism take shape in his treatment of the elderly. Unlike in Homer, where the elderly cannot be heroic however respected they may be, in the *Aeneid* they can be powerful exemplars of heroism, just as in the *Tso Chuan*. The parallel between Nestor and Entellus in the boxing match (*Ae.* 5.387-484), provides a prominent example of how Virgil uses the role of the elderly to invert the values of Homer, emphasizing his own view of heroism. In the *Iliad*, Homer depicts a boxing match between Epeius and Euryalus, two young men (*Il.* 23.660-99). Epeius boasts of being undefeatable in typical Homeric fashion, and then overwhelmingly defeats his opponent. In Virgil’s boxing match, however, Dares is the parallel for Epeius, but faced against him is Entellus, an old man who, in direct parallel to Nestor, laments his own lost youth (*Ae.* 5.397-9). But the Homeric plot is reversed: Dares does not win.

The old man, Entellus, although taking a fall like Euryalus (*Ae.* 5.446-9), returns with a fury and overwhelmingly defeats his foe, who is described in the same fashion as the defeated Euryalus in Homer: carried by his comrades and spitting out blood (*Ae.* 5.468-71 vs. *Il.* 23:695-9). Given that Entellus was driven to return to the fight (*Ae.* 5.455) by a sense of shame (*pudor*) and of valor (*virtus*), there may be an echo here of the Roman reaction to their catastrophic defeat before Hannibal at Cannae (3rd century B.C.), such resurgent invincibility being a symbol of Roman heroic character (as in their wars with Pyrrhus, Spartacus, etc.).

The contrasts continue. At the request of Aeneas, Entellus calms his fury and bows out, offering his reward as a sacrifice to Eryx, his god and teacher. After this fitting act of *pietas*, he lays down his gloves in retirement: a symbol of Anchises' entreaty that Caesar be the first to show mercy and "throw down his weapons" (*Ae.* 6.834-5): a prerequisite for any lasting peace, an act here portrayed as heroic. And so we see that Virgil's view of heroism is in some ways closer to what we find in the *Tso Chuan* than in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, although we still have remnants of an emphasis on martial valor and personal glory: Entellus, after all, is spurred on by a personal sense of shame and valor, and since he makes his pious sacrifice to Eryx by smashing in the skull of his prize bull with his fist (*Ae.* 5.468-472), we see he is not ashamed to show off his physical strength—though he directs this display to the public good. The Virgilian hero is thus more subtle and mature than the Homeric.

4. The Classical Soul

Having surveyed the cultural ideal of the hero within a vital Chinese cultural classic, in comparison with the messages of Homer and Virgil, it remains to contrast their visions of the human soul, by which I mean whatever it is that is believed to survive bodily death and to retain some trace of personal memory and identity. The differences in their views of such 'ghosts' reveal important parallels in their different conceptions of the hero.

4.1. The Portrayal of the Soul

The simplest evidence lies in how souls are shown to act, and what they are capable of. In Homer, souls don't seem capable of much at all. Although he describes the souls of the dead as appearing identical to the person when they were alive, thus retaining something of their individuality (*Il.* 23.107, *Od.* 11.36-43), they are unable to be touched or grasped (*Il.* 23.100-3; *Od.* 11.204-8) and lack the strength to grasp others (*Od.* 11.393-4).

The groaning hoard of phantoms creeping up to Odysseus to drink the sacrificial blood is the most moving example of the impotency of the Homeric soul (*Od.* 11.30-130). Most of the ghosts gain their wits only upon drinking the offered blood (thus requiring the aid of necromantic magic). Even then, the dead display no knowledge of the world above, much less the power to affect it, as they cannot even contest Odysseus' sword or work any other evils or blessings upon him. Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: 78) suggests that a statement by Achilles (*Il.* 24.595-6) suggests otherwise, but Achilles says "if only" the dead Hector might know what he was doing, thus it cannot be said Achilles believed Hector *would* know. Likewise, Sourvinou-Inwood suggests that the ability to keep the souls at bay with a sword "implies some sort of corporeal nature" (1995: 83), but this is not so clear: apart from the possible talismanic powers of bronze, if the dead do not have all their wits, then the fact that a sword can't harm them might never occur to them—they may be acting upon the same instincts they possessed when alive. Likewise that they "drink blood" need not entail physical lips and a digestive system in a world of magic, where the mere absorbing of blood's power (its essential life force) may have been imagined instead. And the evidence is otherwise clear: the dead are utterly bodiless and thus powerless and dumb.

Hence Odysseus does not fear the numberless dead approaching "with a confused and wondrous noise" (*Od.* 11.632-5) but only "the Gorgon head of a dreadful monster" that the goddess Persephone might send against him. And Elpenor does not threaten to "haunt" Odysseus (as Walter Shewring translates *Od.* 11.70, cf. Shewring 1980: 129), but merely warns that he might "become the cause of some wrath of the gods" against him (in a manner elaborated by

Virgil for Elpenor's parallel, Palinurus: *Ae.* 6.376-83). Thus, in their actions alone, the souls of the dead are powerless in Homer. Indeed, they are the exact opposite of the living hero, just as we should expect if everything that makes a hero is tied to having a body.

In the *Tso Chuan*, however, the souls of the dead are quite potent, and more than capable of acting upon the world of the living. One ghost returns as a large boar, contributing to the assassination of his opponent (3.8.5 = Legge 1970: 82; Watson 1989: 19). In another story, the spirit of a murdered king turns into a yellow bear, which later torments the duke of Chin in his dreams while he is ill. Only sacrificing to the dead king's spirit cures the duke's sickness (10.7.4.3 = Legge 1970: 617; Forke 1962, I: 214). Even more vivid is the case of Prince Sheng, whose ghost appears to his former carriage driver on the road and converses with him, then petitions "the Emperor of Heaven" to punish the reigning king (5.11.6 = Legge 1970: 157; Watson 1989: 28-29; Forke 1962, I: 203), entailing a much more active role in divine affairs than that of Elpenor. And the most startling tale of all is that of Po-yu, whose ghost goes on a killing spree until appeased (10.7.4.4 = Legge 1970: 618; Forke 1962, I: 208). Souls also return to aid the living, as in the story of one ghost tripping another man's opponent in battle (7.15.4 = Legge 1970: 328; Forke 1962, I: 211). This all makes sense because the body is not essential to the Chinese hero. What makes them great can transcend death, just as their living memory transcends it in the form and process of ancestor worship, a fundamental aspect of ancient Chinese religion.

In the *Aeneid*, we find a blend of what we might call Homeric and Chinese views of the soul. Virgil obviously makes a conscious effort to model his descriptions on the precedent set by Homer, as ghosts are unable to be touched or grasped (*Ae.* 2.792-4, 6.700-3), but he adds to this in several important respects. In Homer, we have only one case of a ghost visiting the land of the living: Patroclus, who only visits (in a dream) to beg for burial. In fact, the only reason he is still around in this world is because, lacking burial, he has not been admitted below (*Il.* 23.75-6). In the *Aeneid*, however, there are numerous visitations, by ghosts who never ask for burial, but visit solely to serve fate and kin. The ghost of Dido's murdered husband is the first mentioned (*Ae.*

1.353-9). Rather than asking for a funeral for his forgotten corpse, he urges her to flee to a new country, and reveals the location of a secret treasure, an “unknown hoard,” to aid her journey (*Ae.* 1.358-9). This displays both the possession of esoteric knowledge (the location of an “unknown hoard”) and an interest in Dido’s future rather than his own burial (yet another example of *pietas*). Then the ghost of Hector visits Aeneas (*Ae.* 2.270-97). He, too, has come to urge flight, to protect the household gods of Troy, and displays supernatural knowledge of Aeneas’ destiny. Shortly thereafter, Creusa’s ghost visits her husband Aeneas as he is searching for her in flaming Troy (*Ae.* 2.771-94), and she also does not mention burial, but rather wishes Aeneas well and reveals secrets about his fate, including knowledge of his future kingdom along the river Tiber.

The most prominent example of this “spiritual activism” is the soul of Anchises. After his death and burial, his spirit visits his son Aeneas more than once (*Ae.* 4.351-5, 5.722-40; cf. 6.695), providing advice and urging him to continue on his fated mission, demonstrating knowledge of worldly affairs, and of the future—such as Aeneas’ earlier conversation with Nautes (*Ae.* 5.728) and the coming war in Italy (*Ae.* 5.731-2). And when Aeneas visits him in the underworld, Anchises is as wise and cogent as Teiresias, but without any ritual of blood magic to regain his wits, and without any footnote about special gifts from the gods. Thus, the souls of the dead are not powerless in Virgil, though they do remain limited and insubstantial. Perhaps because Virgil sees two forms of heroism in conflict, the body-centered vision of Homer and the Roman notion of *pietas*, this conflict plays out in the potency of souls: they are still capable of heroic action, by performing acts of *pietas* from beyond the grave, but lacking bodies they cannot engage in matters of the flesh, such as fighting or loving embraces, a remnant of the Homeric conception of the soul.

4.2. The Vocabulary of the Soul

Having examined the actions of souls as portrayed by Virgil, Homer, and Tso Ch'iu-ming, we must now turn to how the actual vocabulary used to describe and define the soul reinforces their views. In Homer, the basic word for the soul is *psychê*, meaning “breath, life, spirit,” derived from the verb *psychô*, “to breathe” (Liddell and Scott 1996: 903). Homer occasionally uses in place of *psychê*, no doubt by metonymy, the word *eidôlon*, “image, phantom, any unsubstantial form,” from the adjective *eidôs*, “that which is seen; form, shape” (Liddell and Scott 1996: 226, 227). He also compares it to a “shadow” (*skia*: *Od.* 10.495) or a “dream” (*oneiros*: *Od.* 11.222) or both (*Od.* 11.207). All of these words imply insubstantiality, or at most a fleeting corporeality, and Homer emphasizes this by calling souls “senseless” and “feeble.”

For example, Homer once uses the phrase *nekroi aphradeës*, “the senseless dead” (*Od.* 11.475). Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: 80, 84) assumes Homer must mean “witless” in the sense of completely lacking mind or thought, and then shows that ghosts do not behave as if mindless, “proving” that Homer held two contradictory beliefs about the dead. But the dead do not have to be totally mindless to warrant this adjective, merely dull-witted, so “witless” is too extreme a translation of *aphradeës* in this context—or, of course, Achilles may be guilty of hyperbole (see below). Either interpretation is supported by Homer’s use of the same word to refer to the living suitors, who clearly are not totally lacking minds (*Od.* 2.282). The word can be used for “insensate, reckless, senseless, lifeless,” and typically indicates “lacking physical senses” or lacking the ability “to ponder, contrive, design” (Liddell and Scott 1996: 140; cf. also *phrazô*, 870, II), a clear reference not to mindlessness but to powerlessness. Even in Homer, its adverbial (*aphradeôs*) and verbal (*aphradeô*) forms do not entail a total lack of wits (cf. *Il.* 3.436, 9.32; *Od.* 2.282, 7.294).

Likewise, Homer often uses the elegant formula *nekyôn amenêna karêna*, “the feeble heads of the dead” (*Od.* 10.521; 10.536; 11.29; 11.49; etc.). Shewring gives a less literal but clearer translation as “the strengthless presences of the dead.” The word *nekys* of course is

literally the adjective for “dead” and thus means “dead body, corpse, spirit of the dead” (Liddell and Scott 1996: 528), while *karênon* means “the head” of the body, usually in the plural, employed like our phrase “many head of cattle,” a common way of saying “persons” in Homeric idiom (Liddell and Scott 1996: 401). But the key word here is *amenênos*, which means “powerless, fleeting, feeble” (Liddell and Scott 1996: 43; cf. also *menos*, 498), and here in particular, “lacking in physical strength, force,” again emphasizing the lack of heroic virtue, which is lost with the body.

The vocabulary used in the *Tso Chuan* is almost the exact opposite in its implications. Tso Ch’iu-ming employs two words for the disembodied soul without apparent distinction: *kuei* and *shen*. Contrary to modern findings by Arthur Wolf (Wolf 1974: 173-6), the distinction between *shen* as good spirits and *kuei* as bad spirits does not exist in the *Tso Chuan* (cf. Legge 1970: 616, 234; Ying-shih 1987: 380), nor even in the 1st century writings of Wang Ch’ung (Forke 1962, I: 191), so it must have been a later development

Kuei means “ghost” or “spirit” (Schuessler 1987: 216.3). The word may have originated as the name of a “strange anthropoid creature” (Wolf 1974: 174) or some sort of demon mask (Cohen 1971: 34, n. 16; Chien-shih 1936; Suetoshi 1956), but was definitely used to mean “fear” or “something to fear” (Cohen 1971: 18; Ying-shih 1987: 379, n. 35). And so, as Wolf observes, “*kuei*, the name of a corporeal creature, was ‘transferred’ to represent the imagined appearance of a spiritual being, i.e., the ghost of the dead.” (Wolf 1974: 174). Note how this etymology, and the latent meanings the word would then imply, contrasts with that of Homer’s *psychê*: a *kuei* is associated with physical, fearsome things, not breath or fleeting images. This is reinforced by a passage in the *Tso Chuan* (which I’ll soon discuss) stating that the *kuei* of a deceased person, if not appeased, can become *li*, “wicked, cruel” (Schuessler 1987: 374.12) or “biting, grinding, stinging, or vicious” (Cohen 1971: 19).

The other word used in the *Tso Chuan* for souls of the dead, *shen*, means “spirit, heavenly spirit, ancestral spirit” (Schuessler 1987: 534). Its phonetic element means “to stretch, prolong, continue” (Schuessler 1987: 533; Cohen 1971: 16-17) and it is related to the similar-sounding

word for “body, person, physical self” (Schuessler 1987: 533; Ames 1984: 45). Furthermore *shen* is defined as “to extend” by the 1st century philosopher Wang Ch’ung, based on the idea that the spirit is an active principle that “fosters and produces things” (Forke 1962, I: 191). So *shen* also contains latent ideas of corporeality and potency. These implied connections would be on the mind of both author and reader of the *Tso Chuan*, and they make sense in light of their views about heroism and the soul. Other relevant vocabulary confirms this, as we shall see when we discuss the metaphysics of the Chinese soul.

Virgil’s vocabulary, on the other hand, closely mirrors that of Homer. The basic word he uses for the soul is *anima*, “air, wind, breath of life, soul” (e.g. *Ae.* 3.67, 4.242, 5.98, 6.264, etc.), derived from the Greek *anemos*, “wind” (Maltby 1991: 36, 37; Lewis and Short 1995: 123; Glare 1997: 132), so it is effectively the Latin counterpart of *psychê*. And just as Homer also employs the word *eidôlon* for disembodied souls, so Virgil frequently uses the Latin equivalent, *imago*, “imitation, copy, image, likeness” (e.g. *Ae.* 1.353, 2.793, 4.654, 6.480, etc.) and its synonyms *simulacrum* (*Ae.* 2.772) and *facies* (*Ae.* 5.722). Virgil also likens disembodied souls to shadows (*umbra*: e.g. *Ae.* 4.386, 5.81, 6.264, 11.81, etc.), dreams (*somnum*: *Ae.* 2.794, 6.703), wind (*ventus*: *Ae.* 2.794, 6.703) and smoke (*fumus*: *Ae.* 5.740).

Although this vocabulary, as in Homer, implies insubstantiality, Virgil modifies its significance. To begin with, he does not use any terms like *aphradês* (“senseless”) or *amanênos* (“feeble”) to describe the souls of the dead, even though the latter is practically an idiom in Homer. Instead, the splendor of spirits is amplified, as in the case of Creusa’s ghost, which is described as *nota maior imago*, “an image greater than usual” (*Ae.* 2.773). And the *felices animae*, “happy souls” (*Ae.* 6.669), that Aeneas encounters in Elysium include his own dead father Anchises, as well as the *inlustris animas*, or “bright souls” (*Ae.* 6.758) of those awaiting bodies to participate again in the making of Rome’s history. Likewise, reflecting a Roman element of ancestor worship, the deceased spirit of Anchises is hailed with the appellation *sancte parens*, “sacred father” (*Ae.* 5.80, 5.603) and even *divinus*, “divine, godlike” (*Ae.* 5.47; perhaps an allusion to the deification of Julius Caesar).

Virgil also employs an additional term for the soul, one that is traditionally Roman: *manes*, the “spirits of the departed,” a word that does not easily translate (Lewis and Short 1995: 1108; Glare 1997: 1072-3). Though it is often rendered as “shade” without justification (it has no such connotation), it is most probably related to the archaic adjective *mânus*, “good” (Lewis and Short 1995: 1108, 1112; Glare 1997: 1078), although some ancient grammarians proposed other theories (Maltby 1991: 364, 367), such as a derivation from the verb *mano*, “to extend, spread, emanate, arise” (creating a rather notable parallel with the Chinese word *shen*) or *maneo*, “to remain, endure, await.” The alternative hypothesis that *manes* is derived from the Greek *manos*, “few, scanty” (Liddell and Scott 1996: 487) cannot be credited, since the Latin equivalent of *manos* is *rarus*, not *manus*, the declension of *manes* is not what we would expect if it were merely a Latinization of *manos*, and there is no historical support even for a belief in such a connection.

Manes, therefore, is a term that calls to mind, among Roman readers, notions of moral or even physical potency: being good (or malevolent, if the appellation “good” is propitiatory), as well as arising, or extending, and enduring. It is also related directly to Roman ancestor worship, and the popular fear of malevolent spirits. This is revealed by the formula for warding off the angry souls of the deceased, *manes exite paterni*, “ancestral spirits, depart!” (Ovid, *Fasti* 5.443; 1st century A.D.), and by the popular practice of worshipping the dead collectively as the *Di Manes*, ‘Divine Spirits’ (e.g. in the injunction *Deorum Manium iura sancta sunt* in Cicero’s *De Legibus* 2.9.22). In the *Aeneid* altars are erected to the *manes* as if to gods (*Ae.* 3.63, 3.304-7), the *manes* of individuals are called upon or invoked (*Ae.* 3.303, 5.98-99, 6.506, 10.524), and *manes* are capable of sending “false dreams” to the living (*Ae.* 6.896). Thus, Virgil follows the Homeric notion of the soul as incorporeal, but does not emphasize its powerlessness, but rather adds to it a spark of moral force and influence that is typically Roman, and un-Homeric.

4.3. The Metaphysics of the Soul

In addition to depictions and vocabulary, the nature of the soul is more or less stated explicitly by all three authors. Homer gives us three passages that make these metaphysical declarations about the soul. The first is the remark by Achilles, “Yea, indeed, something exists even in the house of Hades, *psychê* and *eidôlon*, yet the *phrên* is not at all present” (*Il.* 23.104). The word *phrên* literally means “midriff, heart, breast” (cf. *Il.* 16.481) but is used metaphorically to mean “the heart” as the source of thought or passion, or “mind, wits, will” (*Il.* 10.10, 22.296; *Od.* 6.147, 10.438; etc.). Most specifically, it refers to “the midriff, the muscle which parts the heart and lung from the lower viscera, the parts about the heart, the breast” and thus “the heart as the seat of passions, mind, wits, will, purpose,” while its negation is frequently used in the same way as our phrases “out of his mind,” “out of his senses,” “out of his wits,” etc. (Liddell and Scott 1996: 871; cf. *aphrôn*, 140).

This is the first indication that the souls of the dead lack, or are weak in, *phrên*. Sourvinou-Inwood again (1995: 78) takes this too far, regarding it as “mind” and arguing that Achilles is declaring that souls completely lack a mind, but this is not plausible. It is absurd to think that Achilles meant the mind of Patroclus was totally absent, after having just had a detailed conversation with him. Thus, *phrên* must mean something subtly different here. For instance, Hammond translates this phrase as “without real being at all” (Hammond 1987: 367). It is also possible that Achilles is guilty of hyperbole—the only two times such extreme views of the soul are offered, both are uttered by the same person: Achilles (see above). But lack of *phrên* does not always correspond to total mindlessness anyway, as we see in Hesiod’s *Shield of Herakles* (89; 7th century B.C.), and its negative, *aphrôn*, usually means “crazed, frantic, silly, or foolish” (Liddell and Scott 1996: 140) which is not the same thing as a total lack of mind.

This concept is elaborated further in the encounter with the dead prophet Teiresias (*Od.* 10.490ff.), whose *phrên* is “steadfast” (*empedos*) since Persephone has furnished him with *noös* (= *nous*), “mind, perception, sense.” Thus, we are told that “he alone is wise” (*oioi pepnysthai*).

Since Homer offers Teiresias as an exception to the rule, we can infer that the *phrên* for the dead in general is not *empedos*—they do not lack *phrên* altogether, only a “steadfast” *phrên*—and that the dead lack wisdom and *nous*—not necessarily “mind” altogether, but a keen mind.

Last but not least, Odysseus gets a lecture on the nature of souls from his own dead mother, though only after she ‘drinks’ the sacrificial blood, temporarily regaining her wits according to the instructions of Teiresias (*Od.* 11.216-23). When Odysseus tries to grasp her and cannot, he asks if she is merely “some *eidôlon*” that Persephone has sent him. She responds:

Persephone, daughter of Zeus, is not beguiling you in any way, but it is the very law of mortals whenever someone dies: for muscles no longer hold the flesh and bones, but the mighty rage of the blazing pyre overpowers these, as soon as life leaves white bones, and the *psychê*, like a dream, having flown away, flutters about (*apoptamenê pepotêtai*).

The closing phrase is very unusual both in its vocabulary and grammatical construction. Recalling that this is poetry, the conspicuously abundant “popping” sounds Homer creates with this phrase call up a link between the soul and the ashes produced by the crackling fire, which do in fact fly away and flutter about, reinforcing the idea of fleeting substance and powerless drifting. Thus, the soul in Homer’s epics is fated to fly away and flutter about, with little more substance than a dream, as the body disintegrates from rot and flame, confirming the notion that the dead lose their heroic potency upon losing their body.

We can contrast this with a single passage on the nature of souls recorded by Tso Ch’iu-ming (10.7.4.4). This paragraph is relatively famous, and may be the most translated passage of the *Tso Chuan* in English. What follows below is an adapted translation stitched together from five different renditions (Legge 1970: 618; Ying-shih 1987: 372; Cohen 1971: 170-2; Forke 1962, I: 209; Smith 1958: 174), no one of them being completely clear or faithful to the original text. After having just appeased the murderous ghost of Po-yu, Tzu-ch’an, a philosopher-statesman of Cheng, had this to say:

When man is born, what is first created is called *p'o*, and when *p'o* has formed, its positive part is called *hun*. When a man is materially well and abundantly supported, then his *hun* and *p'o* grow strong (*ch'iang*), and produce spirituality (*ching-shuang*) and intelligence (*shen-ming*). Even the *hun* and *p'o* of an ordinary man or woman who has met a violent death can hang around the living and do vicious deeds (*li*)....The stuff Po-yu was made of was copious and rich, and his family great and powerful. Is it not natural that, having met with violent death, he should be a ghost (*kuei*)?

The most important point noted here is that a person's spirit can grow strong during life and that, as a result, it is "natural" that it should remain potent after death. This is an assumption wholly different from any in Homer, where spirits are enfeebled by the loss of a body, and drift off like dreams, even if the person dying has a "great and powerful" family, is "materially well" and "abundantly supported," and dies a "violent death." Instead, here, the conditions for generating a powerful spirit happen to be those that generate a potent culture hero: the proper and abundant use of things, and a role within a powerful family with many generations of properly conducted rituals. Likewise, to die a violent death upsets the natural order of things, leaving the hero with unfinished business, usually some offense against ritual or propriety left to be punished. The vocabulary used in this passage also reinforces the points made earlier: a person's spirit, far from being "feeble" and "senseless," is instead described with words like *ch'iang*, "strong, violent, energetic" (Mathews 1943: no. 608), *ching-shuang*, "lively, brisk in spirits" (Mathews 1943: no. 1149.10) and *shen-ming*, having "divine brightness, intelligence" (Mathews 1943: no. 5715.32).

Finally, we are left with the words *hun* and *p'o*, the two aspects of a person's soul. Both words in written form contain the character for *kuei* (ghost) as an element. *P'o* has been variously translated as "soul" or "animal soul" (Legge 1970: 618; Forke 1962, I: 209), "latent soul" (Cohen: 1971: 17), even "brightness of mind" (Legge 1970: 708; Ying-shih 1987: 371) and it also means "white, bright, or bright light," a meaning derived originally from the glowing light

of the new moon, and so used in describing lunar phases (Ying-shih 1987: 370). It is also related semantically and phonetically to words meaning “residual, remain behind, cling onto” (Cohen 1971: 17), connecting it logically with *shen*. And so, again, we have latent connections to concepts of potency. And instead of being connected with darkness (like the “shades” of Homer in dim Hades), it is connected with lunar “brightness.” Though the color white is generally associated in Chinese culture with death, in the same way that black is so associated in the West, *p’o* is associated more with an animate brightness. The same applies to the word *hun*, variously translated as “mind” (Forke 1962, I: 209), “conscious spirit” (Ying-shih 1987: 372), even “essential vigor” (Legge 1970: 708; Ying-shih 1987: 371). It includes the character for “cloud” (Cohen 1971: 15; Smith 1958: 168, 174), and may be related to the word for “whirling water” (Cohen 1971: 32-33, n. 7). So *hun* is also associated with energetic processes and forces of nature, rather than dreams, images, or shadows.

Virgil devotes an even larger passage in the *Aeneid* to a metaphysical explanation of the nature of the human soul. Here he knits together aspects of religion and philosophy from numerous sources in a total conception of the cosmos that is beyond the scope of this paper to examine (*Ae.* 6.724-51). For instance, reincarnation and the view of the body as a prison for the soul both derive from Orphic-style mystery religion via Platonism (Plato, *Cratylus* 400.c; *Phaedo* 66.b-68.e, 113.a-113.e; Herodotus, 2.123.2), while the idea of a world-soul, and the cosmic role of fire, derives from Stoic philosophy (Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus*). Both are Greek in origin (even if developed under the influence of Eastern religions), but notably counter-Homeric, and possibly not commonly believed among Romans generally. But how Virgil uses this novel construct is revealing.

The most important piece of the puzzle is the notion that the body is a burden to the soul, and that the soul is purer, even “better,” without its body. Although this is coupled with the idea that the body is still necessary to participate in physical action, it is still a notion that stands in opposition to Homer’s glorification of the body and diminishment of the soul. This, in fact, may explain in Virgil’s mind, and in cosmic terms, the reason for the conflict between the two forms

of heroism: the body is a necessary part of the order of things, but it impairs the soul with emotions and other burdens and thus gets in the way of the pure embodiment of *pietas*, which is the true expression of heroism. Such a view is similar to that of the New Testament, wherein the body is a burden and a source of sin, but the spirit can be pure and eternal.

For Virgil, the dissertation by Anchises about the nature of the soul is the most explicit demonstration of this view. He explains that in all living things—men, cattle, birds, fish—there is a “fiery force” that is of divine origin (*igneus vigor* and *caelestis origo*: *Ae.* 6.730.), at least “insofar as their harmful bodies do not slow them down and their earthly limbs and mortal members are not sluggish” (*Ae.* 6.731-2). To explain what this means, he continues:

Because of this, men fear and lust, feel pain and joy, and, locked up in darkness, a blind prison, they do not see the light. In fact, even in the end, when life abandons the light, every evil still does not withdraw from the miserable, nor entirely do all the bodily plagues, for it is necessary that many things, compounded at length in astonishing ways, should implant themselves through and through. (*Ae.* 6.732-8)

And thus these tainted souls go through a process of purgation, and after a period of time this “removes the compounded stain, and leaves clean the ethereal consciousness, and the fire of pure air” (*Ae.* 6.746-7). Recall above the ancient equation of *pius* with *purus*, here translated as “clean.” The total message seems to be that the body, far from being the focus of the hero, is actually a burden that gets in the way; and the soul, rather than being a feeble vestige of a once-glorious life, actually represents something that is purer, more divine (as implied by the adjective *aetherius*, “ethereal, heavenly”), and it is associated more with fire and energy than dark, faint images. Virgil’s cosmic scheme ranges far wider, including different and longer processes for the progressively more wicked, with a system of reincarnation for those too tainted to yet be purged, but the central notion of the body as burden, and the soul as something purer, stands out. Though

providing a Hellenistic superstructure, Virgil is no doubt working from a native Roman belief, as seen earlier regarding the *manes*.

This conception of the soul is supported by other passages in the *Aeneid*. When Aeneas expresses amazement at the idea that the souls of the dead might actually desire new bodies in the scheme of reincarnation explained by his father, he asks if it must be believed that “souls would seek to return to sluggish bodies” (*Ae.* 6.720-1), again using the denigrating term *tardus* to refer to the body. Likewise, he earlier declares that “the spirit rules these limbs” (*spiritus hos regit artus*, *Ae.* 4.336), where the soul (*spiritus*) is treated as superior to the body, unlike in Homer where the seat of thought and will is associated with the body (per the physical associations of *phrên* noted above). Likewise, Virgil tells us that, when Aeneas is faced with Dido’s protests, “worries are deeply felt in his great heart (*pectus*), but his mind (*mens*) remains unmoved” (*Ae.* 4.448-9; *pectus* is anatomically the Latin equivalent of *phrên*), conveying the idea that emotions are of the body, and get in the way of heroic conduct, while thought, and thus righteous action, are mental, and thus to be associated with the soul. Likewise, when Iris is sent to end Dido’s life, her mission is to “free her struggling soul and her fettered limbs” (*Ae.* 4.695), another body-as-burden metaphor. An additional example, though less direct, is when Alecto’s magic drives Amata insane: the terminology describing the progression of her madness emphasizes the body (*praecordia*, another Latin synonym of *phrên*: *Ae.* 7.347; *pectus*: *Ae.* 7.349; *ossibus*, “in her bones”: *Ae.* 7.355), but her soul (here, *animus*, “intellect,” a masculine cognate of *anima*) all the while does not yet perceive the fire raging through her heart (*pectus*: *Ae.* 7.356). Thus, Virgil’s vision, in part reflecting his own time and culture, has departed from Homer, indeed even reversed the Homeric view, by portraying the body as getting in the way of man’s better half: his soul.

Virgil’s portrayal of the soul is far more complex than either that of Homer or Tso Chiu-ming. Souls are described as shadows and phantoms, yet they are not senseless, nor necessarily miserable. They cannot terrorize the living, except collectively, nor do they have the ear of the gods, yet they still play a vital part in the universe—indeed, they possess the ability to know

about and influence the land of the living, just not physically. And though the soul is purer than the body and retains a certain vital energy, it is not powerful in the sense that the Chinese soul is seen to be. This complexity derives from the fact that Virgil views the body as a burden to the hero, though still an essential part of the working of fate toward a worldly destiny. Thus the dead gain in wisdom but lose the power to act in the physical world, a view that seems to find a middle ground between the extremes of the Homeric and Chinese views. Virgil's hero, in other words, is one who must overcome the body to be a hero, but who must have a body to be a primary actor in the making of history.

This represents an intellectual struggle that actually began in Classical Greece, gradually changing even the Greek perception of the dead (and the hero) toward more Virgilian lines a few centuries after Homer and before Virgil. As one might expect, this evolution has been traced as a result of increasing need for a more communal social cohesion (Johnston 1999). But this transformation still took place within the context of a Western mode of thought that could never really do away with its obsession with the physical and the particular, with individualism and glory-mongering, whose roots are exposed in Homer, and never really banished by Virgil. As in the *Aeneid*, only a compromise could be reached rather than a victory. Homer lurks still.

5. Conclusion — with Related Speculations from Cultural Science

Everything points to the same conclusion. Homer saw heroism as involving bodily accomplishment and perfection, which was also by and large the most popular view among the early Greeks, and remains to a lesser but still notable extent in modern Western culture. The two most idolized types in the West today are the celebrity and the athlete, who each achieve their status through physical beauty or prowess, while in film and fiction the ultimate hero is not the wise elder, but the handsome loner righting wrongs through gratuitous displays of righteous force. Homer would approve.

But Homer also perceived the souls of the dead as feeble and fleeting. And this idea was strongly connected with the lack of a body, even with words implying the opposite of “body,” such as “image,” “shadow,” “dream,” or the lack of *phrên*. Even exceptions—such as the land of Elysium (*Od.* 4.561-69), Castor and Polydeuces (*Od.* 11.300ff.), the sage Teiresias—occur rarely and only as special favors from the gods. This does reflect the Western obsession with individualism and materialism, and in Homer we see the exaggerated roots of this mindset. However, our modern view of the soul has followed more in the footsteps of Virgil. Most Westerners imagine the dead as ‘better off’, free from the travails of the flesh, their souls perfected in heaven. Yet, like Virgil’s ghosts and unlike Chinese spirits, they are hardly able to meddle in earthly affairs.

In contrast, Tso Ch’iu-ming saw heroism as involving a “cultural” accomplishment and perfection rather than bodily perfection. He also perceived the souls of the dead as potent and energetic, an idea connected with the cultural role of the hero in his society, and his submission to communal duty. Thus, there is an evident connection in Homer and the *Tso Chuan* between the concepts of heroism and the soul. Even when other factors are at work, such as the ideology of ancestor worship in China (paralleled to a lesser extent in Rome), which logically entails a belief in the potency of departed spirits, we might expect a culture’s view of heroism and the soul will approach a logical consistency.

Distinctive elements of contrast between the Western and Eastern mindset, as explored by contemporary cross-cultural psychology, might illuminate this finding (Shea, 2001; and Bower 2000, 1998, 1997; summarizing: Ji, Schwarz, and Nisbett, 2000; Nisbett, Ji, and Peng, 2000; Keller 1998; Kitayama, 1997; Heine and Lehman, 1997a and 1997b; Bond, 1996; Moser, 1996; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989; Hansen, 1983; Hsu, 1981; Nakamura, 1964). If we are willing to tentatively consider this possibility, we should first observe that these differences have ancient roots. Nisbett observes that “East Asian societies such as China’s were until recently based on agricultural economies in which cooperation is crucial and hierarchical political organization requires obedience,” eventually relying on large-scale irrigation works and

command supply-management systems, whereas “European economies were based on hunting and herding to a much later period” (Nisbett, Ji, and Peng 2000: 953). For the early Indo-Europeans were nomadic warriors, not agriculturalists, and they influenced virtually all Western cultures, most of whom still speak derivations of their language, “and, uniquely among the great ancient civilizations, that of Greece was not based on agriculture but [primarily] on animal husbandry, fishing, and trade.”

The Romans, in contrast, were always much more agriculturally oriented (Shelton 1998: 149, 160), so if the environmental thesis should turn out to be correct, we might expect early Roman culture to lean more toward Asian principles than Greek, although Rome’s Indo-European roots, intense contact with Greek culture, and militaristic society would provide Roman culture with a more “Western” mind overall. (On Mesopotamia and Egypt, see Johnston 1999: 86-95). These Greek and Chinese differences in origin have been linked to different modes of thinking by several scholars, including Cromer (1993), Lloyd (1990), Witkin and Berry (1975), and Nakamura (1964). And there is some scientific support:

Cross-cultural research indicates that hunting and herding peoples, as well as people who live in the relative freedom of modern wage economies, emphasize autonomous functioning in child rearing and have a relatively loose social structure [whereas] sedentary agricultural groups stress interpersonal orientation and conformity in child rearing, and they have a tight social structure, in which group members need to accommodate each other and strive to regulate one another’s behavior. (Nisbett, Ji, and Peng 2000: 953, in reference to Barry, Child, and Bacon 1959, and Whiting and Child 1953)

Furthermore, “Farmers, who are required to attend to the social environment, are more field dependent,” that is, more holistically-minded, “than either hunters or industrialized peoples [who] are relatively free to focus on their own goals in relation to an object rather than having to

coordinate their actions in relation to a complex social world” (Nisbett, Ji, and Peng 2000: 953), an idea well-argued by several others, including Keightley (1983, 1985, 1990), Hui and Triandis (1986), Witkin and Goodenough (1977), Berry (1976), and Berry and Annis (1974). All of this is relevant to modern cultures:

Our Western conceptions of man and art, of the individual and the body, of the epic and heroic in both life and literature, and of man’s place in the cosmos, still resonate, whether we like it or not, in sympathy with the powerful, imaginative creations of the early Greeks [while] early Chinese conceptions of man and art have stirred, with equal profundity, the elites of traditional China for a period of some two millenia. (Keightley 1993: 51)

In light of such research, from psychology and anthropology, the Chinese definition of the self in terms of the group rather than the individual, and the Chinese idea of substances as interpenetrating, rather than broken up into different pieces with different powers, may perhaps lie at the heart of the Chinese notions of heroism and the soul. Hence the body becomes irrelevant, and cultural perfection everything. In contrast, the Western definition of the self in terms of bodily attributes, individual goals, and physical achievements, and the Western propensity for division of substances, powers, and properties, might be connected to Homeric views of heroism and the soul. The body becomes preeminent, and materialism elevated.

This connection might also be argued in Virgil’s *Aeneid*. For Virgil heroism is a form of cultural perfection, where a soul embracing *pietas* overcomes bodily desires and associations, which, being individualistic and near-sighted, do not see the big picture of cosmic destiny, thus leading to ruin and chaos. And so, the souls of the dead retain some power and importance by retaining their moral or intellectual potency, but not the ability to act in the physical sense—thus losing both the advantages *and* the burdens of a body. This is consistent with the fact that Roman

ancestor worship was not as complete or as extensive as in China, yet still far greater than among Greeks, leading to a patriotic and religious vision in the *Aeneid* somewhere between the two.

Whether we accept the anthropological hypothesis or not, it is still apparent, and I will conclude with this, that Virgil perceived a conflict in his own day between Homeric and Roman heroism. He saw that a solution required a bigger vision encompassing and explaining both. This solution justified Virgil's very Roman ideas, as being aligned with fate and the divine order, while criticizing the Homeric view as near-sighted and disastrous. Yet it does not appear his message has quite transformed its audience. For the same ideological and metaphysical conflict, between individualism and obsession with the body on one side, and communal duty and praise of the mind on the other, persists within Western cultures even today.

Bibliography

- Ames, Roger T. 1984. The Meaning of Body in Classical Chinese Thought. *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24(1): 39-53.
- Barry, H, I. Child and M. Bacon. 1959. Relation of Child Training to Subsistence Economy. *American Anthropologist* 61: 51-63.
- Berry, J. 1976. *Human Ecology and Cognitive Style: Comparative Studies in Cultural and Psychological Adaptation*. New York: Sage.
- Berry, J. and R. Annis. 1974. Ecology, Culture and Differentiation. *International Journal of Psychology* 9: 173-93.
- Bond, M, ed. 1996. *The Handbook of Chinese Psychology*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Bower, Bruce. 1997. My Culture, My Self: Western Notions of the Mind may not Translate to Other Cultures. *Science News* (18 October): pp. 248-9.
- . 1998. Teens Put Cultured Spin on Friendship. *Science News* (8 August): 84.
- . 2000. Cultures of Reason: Thinking Styles may Take Eastern and Western Routes. *Science News* (22 January): 56-8.
- Cary, M. and H.H. Scullard. 1975. *A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine*, 3rd ed. Hong Kong: St. Martin's Press.
- Cheng, Anne. 1993. *Ch'un ch'iu, Kung yang, Ku liang and Tso Chuan. Early Chinese Texts*. Michael Loewe, ed. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies. 69ff.
- Chien-shih, Shen. 1936-7. An Essay on the Primitive Meaning of the Character [Kuei]. *Monumenta Serica* 2: 1-20.
- Cohen, Alvin P. 1971. *The Avenging Ghost: Moral Judgement in Chinese Historical Texts*. Dissertation: University of California at Berkeley.
- Cribiore, Raffaella. 2001. *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- . 1996. *Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
- Cromer, Alan. 1993. *Uncommon Sense: The Heretical Nature of Science*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Davison, J.A. 1962. *The Homeric Question. A Companion to Homer*. A.J.B. Wace and F. Stubbings, eds. New York: St. Martin Press. 234-265.

- Falkner, Thomas M. 1995. *The Poetics of Old Age in Greek Epic, Lyric, and Tragedy*. University of Oklahoma Press.
- Forke, Alfred, tr. 1962. *Lun-Heng: Philosophical Essays of Wang Ch'ung*. New York: Paragon Book Gallery (unaltered reprint from 1907).
- Garrison, James D. 1992. *Pietas From Vergil to Dryden*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Glare, P.G.W. 1997. *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. Oxford University Press.
- Gwynn, Aubrey. 1926. *Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian*. New York: Russell and Russell.
- Hammond, Martin, tr. 1987. *Homer: The Iliad*. London: Penguin.
- Hansen, C. 1983. *Language and Logic in Ancient China*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Heine, Steven and Darrin Lehman. 1997a. The Cultural Construction of Self-Enhancement: An Examination of Group-Serving Biases. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72(6): 1268-83.
- Heine, Steven and Darrin Lehman. 1997b. Culture, Dissonance, and Self-Affirmation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* April: 389-400.
- Hsu, F. 1981. *Americans and Chinese: Passage to Differences*, 3rd ed. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Hui, H. and H. Triandis. 1986. Individualism-Collectivism: A Study of Cross-Cultural Research. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 17: 225-48.
- Hurwitt, Jeffrey. 1985. *The Art and Culture of Early Greece: 1100-480 B.C.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ji, Li-jun, Norbert Schwarz, and Richard Nisbett. 2000. Culture, Autobiographical Memory, and Behavioral Frequency Reports: Measurement Issues in Cross-Cultural Studies. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 26(5): 585-93.
- Johnston, Sarah Iles. 1999. *Restless Dead: Encounters Between the Living and the Dead in Ancient Greece*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Karlgren, Bernhard. 1957. *Grammata Serica Recensa*. Stockholm: Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities.
- Keightley, David N. 1983. *The Hero, Art, and Culture: Early China and Early Greece*. Unpublished manuscript.

- . 1985. *Dead but not Gone: Cultural Implications of Mortuary Practice in Neolithic and Early Bronze Age China, ca. 8000 to 1000 B.C.* Unpublished manuscript.
- . 1990. Early Civilization in China: Reflections on How it Became Chinese. *Heritage of China*. Paul Ropp, ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 1993. Clean Hands and Shining Helmets: Heroic Action in Early Chinese and Greek Culture. *Religion and the Authority of the Past*. Tobin Siebers, ed. University of Michigan Press.
- Keller, M. et al. 1998. Reasoning About Responsibilities and Obligations in Close Relationships: A Comparison Across Two Cultures. *Developmental Psychology* 34(4): 731-41.
- Kierman, Frank Jr. 1974. Phases and Modes of Combat in Early China. *Chinese Ways in Warfare*. Frank Kierman, Jr., and John Fairbank, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 27-66.
- Kitayama, Shinobu et al. 1997. Individual and Collective Processes in the Construction of the Self: Self-Enhancement in the United States and Self-Criticism in Japan. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72(6): 1245-67.
- Kopff, E. C. 1999. *The Devil Knows Latin: Why America Needs the Classical Tradition*. Wilmington, Delaware: Intercollegiate Studies Institute.
- Legge, James, tr. 1970. *The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen. The Chinese Classics: With a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes* 5. Hong Kong University Press (updated reprint from 1872).
- Lewis, C. and C. Short. 1995. *A Latin Dictionary*. New York: Oxford University Press (reprint from 1879).
- Liddell, H.G. and R. Scott. 1996. *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. New York: Oxford University Press (reprint from 1940).
- Liu, James. 1967. *The Chinese Knight-Errant*. University of Chicago Press.
- Lloyd, G.E.R. 2002. *The Ambitions of Curiosity: Understanding the World in Ancient Greece and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1996. *Adversaries and Authorities: Investigations into Ancient Greek and Chinese Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1990. *Demystifying Mentalities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Loewe, Michael, ed. 1993. *Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide*. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies.

- MacDonald, Dennis R. 2000. *The Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Maltby, Robert. 1991. *A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies*. Leeds, Great Britain: Francis Cairns.
- Markus, H. and S. Kitayama. 1991. Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation. *Psychological Review* 98: 224-53.
- Marrou, Henri. 1948. *Histoire de l'Éducation dans l'Antiquité*, 3rd ed. (tr. as: *A History of Education in Antiquity*, 1986. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Mathews, R.H. 1943. *Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary*. Harvard University Press.
- Morgan, Teresa. 1998. *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moser, D.J. 1996. *Abstract Thinking and Thought in Ancient Chinese and Early Greek*. Dissertation: University of Michigan.
- Nagy, Gregory. 1996. *Homeric Questions*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Nakamura, H. 1964. *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Nisbett, Richard, Li-Jun Ji, and Kaiping Peng. 2000. Culture, Control, and the Perception of Relationships in the Environment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 78(5): 943-55.
- Saller, Richard P. 1994. *Pietas and patria potestas. Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family*. Cambridge University Press.
- Schein, Seth L. 1984. *The Mortal Hero: An Introduction to Homer's Iliad*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schuessler, Alex. 1987. *Dictionary of Early Zhou Chinese*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Shea, Christopher. 2001. White Men Can't Contextualize. *Lingua Franca* September: 44-51.
- Shelton, Jo-Ann. 1998. *As The Romans Did: A Sourcebook in Roman Social History*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shewring, Walter , tr. 1980. *Homer: The Odyssey*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, D. Howard. 1958. Chinese Concepts of the Soul. *Numen: International Review for the History of Religions* 5(3): 165-179.

- Sourvinou-Inwood, Christiane. 1995. *'Reading' Greek Death to the End of the Classical Period*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Suetoshi, Ikeda. 1956. *Revue bibliographique de Sinologie* 2: no. 525.
- Triandis, H. 1989. The Self and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural Contexts. *Psychological Review* 96: 506-20.
- Tucker, T. G. 1931. *A Concise Etymological Dictionary of Latin*. Halle, Germany: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
- Turner, Frank. 1981. *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Wang, C.H. 1975. Towards Defining a Chinese Heroism. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 95(1): 25-35.
- Watson, Burton, tr. 1989. *The Tso Chuan: Selections from China's Oldest Narrative History*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wetmore, Monroe Nichols. 1911. *Index Verborum Vergilianus*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Whiting, J. and I. Child. 1953. *Child Training and Personality: A Cross-Cultural Study*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Williams, R. D., ed. 1992. *The Aeneid of Virgil: Books 1-6*. Thomas Nelson and Sons.
- Witkin, H. and J. Berry. 1975. Psychological Differentiation in Cross-Cultural Perspective. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 6: 4-87.
- Witkin, H. and D. Goodenough. 1977. Field Dependence and Interpersonal Behavior. *Psychological Bulletin* 84: 661-89.
- Wolf, Arthur. 1974. Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors. *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*. Arthur Wolf, ed. Stanford University Press. 131-182.
- Ying-shih, Yü. 1987. 'Oh Soul, Come Back!' A Study in the Changing Conceptions of the Soul and Afterlife in Pre-Buddhist China. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 47(2): 363-395.