Of course pseudoscience (both from cranks and bad actors) always does that (flat earth theory, lost cause theory, climate and vaccine denial, creationism, tobacco and pharma and fossil fuel “science,” etc., like you note) so that’s a concern not particular to any one science (like a properly structures science of morality) but to all of them.

We see this when homophobes use fake science to try and argue that homosexuality is “scientifically” immoral. Likewise in the abortion debate and social welfare debate and so on. They are always trying to skew or invent science to prove a falsehood. And really the only defense is rigorous standards in real science that prevent or police its capture or abuse.

Exactly, my thought process evolved as I wrote the comment. Upon thinking about it, the fear is actually a) that pseudo science will replace real science (Thomism, anti-vax ideology, fake history they teach in texas). but thats already happening, so we actually need to double and triple down on using real science b) that bad actors will use science to arrive at anti-ethical conclusions (but again, doubling down on real science and history should hinder that). And thats where philosophy actually helps, because philosophy can be used to continually set the ramps up.

And indeed, Eric, that’s an example of using scientific reasoning to identify false moralities, and replace them with true ones.

For a summary (and breadcrumbs to more) see my latest study: Objective Moral Facts Exist in All Possible Universes.

So the objection is self-refuting: returning morality to an empirical science is the very thing that eliminates immoral absolutisms.

Science not just in terms of physics and bio and chem. But I think the idea is can we derive moral truth from psychology, economics, history. Which I think is a neat idea.

I have hesitation on this subject because it could lead to “absolutes” enforceable by laws. I think history has shown that to be a bad path. But then again, that’s making the case— I’m deriving a moral statement from the study of history.

Why are you commenting on an article that answers that question, and then asking it again as if you didn’t read the article?

Your behavior is not making sense.

Please read the article you are commenting on before commenting on it. Your question is directly answered here (“The easiest way to prove that compatibilism is the semantically correct description of what ordinary language means by free will in practice is to ask a single question…”).

Likewise I just told you what to do if you want more demonstration than the summary here: I already linked you to where I do that.

So, once again:

After reading this article—the actual article you are supposed to have already read—if you still don’t understand why compatibilism is the definition of free will in actual use in the real world, then…

Start at Free Will in the Real World … and Why It Matters. Then move on to Free Will in American Law: From Accidental Thievery to Battered Woman Syndrome.

And then if you still don’t get it, round that off with Dennett vs. Harris on Free Will.

Then you should be up to speed. But if you still need a deeper dive, follow the resources listed or linked in those three articles.

That’s a really good insight. Thank you. I was right in wanting to talk with someone who is heavily educated in this topic.

We don’t need backwards causation to have free will or “responsibility.”

That’s the folly here.

You can’t gainsay that conclusion by simply repeating the folly compatibilists are calling out.

If you set the conditions as “donation only if a later choice made” then you have defined James as responsible for what happened in the past, tautologically (assuming James knows this at the time, as knowledge is required for consent).

So there is no way to get rid of compatibilism here, unless you intend to contradict yourself by allowing the condition to be false (James can do nothing and laugh as the donor was tricked into thinking he would act in future; a straightforward problem in Game Theory). But the condition cannot be both true and false. So you would then be describing a logically impossible scenario. And logically impossible scenarios cannot undermine anything, least of all compatibilism.

Note that this scenario has actually been run in fiction several times (Twelve Monkeys, Tenet), by introducing actual backwards causation to make sense, and still it is obvious the agent has, and openly admits to exercising, their own free will to ensure the past turned out a certain way. That is what free will really is. It is not an avoidance of physical determinism. It is knowledge and consent.

And that is what Swenson and Pareboom (and now you) are failing to understand.

‘Try it yourself. Locate the person in the system Swenson is describing (the causal agent who is a sum of desires, skills, memories, and character traits) and ask: did they (that entity, not some other) consent to the action with knowledge and intent? If the answer is yes, they had free will. If the answer is no, they did not.’

Yes, in this example James would have free will according to your definition. He consented to the action. But here is the problem. James’s actions can’t involve any backward causation. So he wouldn’t be responsible for eccentric billionaire’s decision to not donate. But at the same time, had James raised his hand, the billionaire would have donated. If James had refrained from raising his hand, the billionaire would not have donated. He also had free will per your definition. So James was both responsible and not responsible. This isn’t possible. So we run into a paradox and Swenson says that to avoid this paradox we must reject compatibilism.

It’s the same argument. Thus it falls to the same refutation.

Swenson, like Pereboom, is simply starting from a false premise as to what “free will” even is. The entire argument collapses with that same premise.

Free will is consent of the person with knowledge and intent. Once you define it that way, Swenson has no point to make.

Try it yourself. Locate the person in the system Swenson is describing (the causal agent who is a sum of desires, skills, memories, and character traits) and ask: did they (that entity, not some other) consent to the action with knowledge and intent? If the answer is yes, they had free will. If the answer is no, they did not.

None of Swenson’s handwaving gets around this, any more than Pereboom’s version did.