Comments on: Plantinga’s ‘Two Dozen or So’ Arguments for God: The Onto-Metaphysical Arguments https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681 Announcing appearances, publications, and analysis of questions historical, philosophical, and political by author, philosopher, and historian Richard Carrier. Mon, 24 Nov 2025 21:54:21 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.5 By: Richard Carrier https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-42277 Mon, 24 Nov 2025 21:54:21 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-42277 In reply to Jim Barrows.

Well, of course, they would say: you can’t prove you aren’t contingent, therefore you can’t be necessary (since contingent is the converse of necessary). It’s a sound modus tollens.

The trick is that this is also true of their God, they just deny it by gainsayance rather than admitting they have never proved any god not a contingency and thus even capable of being necessary.

This is where you get all the “we’re totally impressed by the ontological argument” discourse, and wonder at how they can be so bad at this. All ontological arguments to date are such rank fallacies no one should even be talking about them anymore, much less actually impressed by them.

I now take this as explanatory: Christians exist solely because they are bad at this. Were they not, they’d all have left by now. (See my presentation of evidence for this conclusion.)

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By: Jim Barrows https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-42263 Sun, 23 Nov 2025 15:35:40 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-42263 What is there (philosophically speaking) to stop me from claiming I’m the necessary being? It seems like it might be a Reductio Ad Absurdum.

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By: Richard Carrier https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-38190 Mon, 17 Jun 2024 15:37:46 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-38190 In reply to John Cumpston.

That has actually been argued under peer review (by Michael Martin, then Christopher New, and most recently by Stephen Law).

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By: John Cumpston https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-38183 Mon, 17 Jun 2024 08:47:42 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-38183 In reply to Richard Carrier.

“the subjunctive is illicitly switched to the indicative somewhere in the argument, e.g. that God “would” be greater if he existed suddenly gets swapped for God “is” greater if he existed, on which the existential fallacy proceeds” – this is actually where I was explaining about concepts. Putting “existence” into a concept cannot magically create an actual thing. But the way you presented it here makes it clearer.

Also, I smell “begging the question” in the argument, since “the most perfect being” would entail existence by this logic.

I’d like to have fun with another parody for the end:

Evil God is the most horrific being conceivable.

A horrific being that exists is more horrific than an imaginary one.

Therefore, God has an evil twin!

Now, would they actually say that premise 2 is false? If not, perhaps the twins canceled each other, and we are now in a godless universe? 🙂

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By: Richard Carrier https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-38110 Mon, 03 Jun 2024 17:43:19 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-38110 In reply to John Cumpston.

They would indeed say you are “better” than your non-existent twin, in the sense that you have something good that he does not: you exist.

But this does not work (even by their own internal logic) for hell, insofar as its reality would not be good; so what they would indeed say (just as you suspect) is that hell is a good and it is better that it exists than not (because then justice is realized, morality is encouraged, or whatever apologetics they have for hell).

To that point their internal logic is okay. It just fails against external facts (their premises tend to be factually false, e.g. that hell is good) and doesn’t get the conclusion they want (that it would be better for a thing to exist in no way increases the probability of it existing).

This is why the argument was disproved centuries ago with the Perfect Island argument and similar analogies. But those are just a reductio ad absurdum. To get at why the conclusion formally does not follow one has to recognize it is an existential fallacy on a foundation of an equivocation fallacy through amphiboly (the subjunctive is illicitly switched to the indicative somewhere in the argument, e.g. that God “would” be greater if he existed suddenly gets swapped for God “is” greater if he existed, on which the existential fallacy proceeds). All ontological arguments are just different semantic shell games for hiding these errors in different ways and wordings.

You are thus close to the problem. Hence in the original Anselmian formula, or one English rendering (the Latin is more convoluted), “if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God” and then the next premise “we cannot imagine something that is greater than God” is where the amphiboly occurs: the actual sentence “if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God” is only true as a subjunctive (“if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that would be greater than a conceptual God if that conceptual God existed”) and thus does not transfer to the next premise at all (“we cannot imagine something that is greater than God” is only true if God existed, otherwise “we can imagine something that is greater than a merely conceptual God” and that is the only thing we are then doing).

It’s similar to trying to argue that unicorns are mammals, mammals exist, therefore unicorns exist. The subjective has been switched for the indicative. It’s: unicorns would be mammals if they existed, not unicorns “are” mammals. But we are allowed in English to say “unicorns are mammals” in a subjunctive sense, allowing semantic space to “get away” with the error.

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By: John Cumpston https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-38105 Sat, 01 Jun 2024 23:39:08 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-38105 I’d like to add something to the ontological argument discussion which I see omitted in every discussion about it.

I don’t know why people buy this thing that existence is a property which improves a thing.

How can you even compare a thing which exists with a thing that doesn’t exist?

Am I better than my never-existing twin? That doesn’t seem like a legit comparison.

It seems to me discussing a perfect being is inescapably to discuss about a concept of a perfect being, and putting “existence” into concepts seems wrong and even if it weren’t, it would still be only a concept and not the actual thing!

Another thing, I would like to give a counter example (a parody) to show how absurd is the claim that existence is an improvement.

Hell is the most imperfect place (or the worst place there is).

The most imperfect place lacks all possible positive properties and contains all possible negative properties.

Existence is a positive property (an improvement).

Hell (by definition) lacks existence (doesn’t exist).

Any place that resembles Hell and exists is a better place than Hell.

So, if existence is a positive property, the conclusion is that Hell that does exist is better than Hell that doesn’t exist.

Talking about existence improving things!

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By: Richard Carrier https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-25697 Thu, 15 Feb 2018 22:41:09 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-25697 In reply to Ward Blondé.

No. That isn’t how the math works. And your other probabilities don’t matter. If all atheist observed universes are fine tuned (and they will be), and not all observed god universes are fine tuned (and they won’t be, because God doesn’t need fine tuning to make a habitable universe; only godless universes need it), then the likelihood ratio always reduces the probability of God. No other probability matters for this point.

Remember, the number of unobserved atheist universe we will observe is zero. Even if there are billions of them. None will be observed. By definition. Get it? So you can’t count atheist universes that will never be observed. Those are not at issue. Because we are observing a universe. So obviously we aren’t in an unobserved universe.

Since the only way to be in an observed universe on atheism is with fine tuning (since by definition untuned universes can’t produce life and therefore will have no observers and therefore will never be observed), the probability of our universe being fine tuned if there is no God is always 100%. Not 0. 100%. Even if only one in a gazillion atheist universes are ever observed. It’s still 100% of those observed that will be fine tuned.

By contrast, we could be observing a non-fine tuned universe, if God existed. Because God could make any kind of universe, even one supernaturally sustaining us, that used Aristotelian physics for example, that required no tuning, but is universally habitable. And countless other options. So the probability of our observing a fine tuned universe if God exists is not 100%. It necessarily must be less than 100%.

Do you understand now?

Please look at the math in the actual peer reviewed papers. Don’t try to assume you know better than published experts. They’ve already covered everything you thought of. And so did their peer reviewers.

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By: Ward Blondé https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-25696 Thu, 15 Feb 2018 19:52:44 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-25696 You need the reciprocal relative probability of the one you argue for. For example, if only 1 percent of the Fine-tuned universes (F) is a God universe (G), and the other 99 percent are Atheist universes (A), then you would (hypothetical impossibility) have relative probabilistic evidence for Atheist universes, given that we observe F. But instead you make up a statistic about how many percent of the universes are Fine-tuned, given that they are Atheist. You need A|F and you argue for F|A being 100 percent. That is a fallacy. F|A may be 100 percent, but as I showed, A|F is 0. Zero chance on an Atheist universe, since F is a given fact. Q.E.D.

For your convenience I give the full picture. Of all the universes that are Fine-tuned universes:
– infinitely many are God universes
– infinitely many are Atheist universes (namely, according to your irrelevant claim, all the Atheist universes)
– 100 percent is God universe
– 0 percent is Atheist universe
Note that for every Atheist universe, infinitely many God universes can be constructed, e.g., via causally interactive heavens that surround the Atheist universe. So Atheist universes do exist, however, the probability to observe them is 0.

Best regards,
Ward Blondé

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By: Richard Carrier https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-25695 Wed, 14 Feb 2018 21:12:19 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-25695 In reply to Ward Blondé.

That does not correctly or accurately describe my argument at all. Nor is it my argument. It’s the peer reviewed argument of multiple philosophers and scientists.

You do not seem capable of understanding it, apparently. God doesn’t need these things; but all godless universes that are observed, do. All of them. Not some of them. All of them. It is therefore logically necessarily the case that more God-universes (if observable) will not have them, than godless universes will. Q.E.D.

This is not affirming the consequent (which is the technical term for what you are describing). You are failing to grasp this is an argument from relative probability.

So, to do this weirdly with pink yeti bears, you would need something like:

1) If God does not exist, the probability that we will observe pink yeti bears is 100%.
2) If God does exist, the probability that we will observe pink yeti bears is less than 100%.
3) We observe a universe with pink yeti bears in it.
4) Observation (3) therefore decreases the probability that God exists (by exactly the ratio of 100%:[less than 100%]).

Of course, we would not argue something as silly as the latter (1) or (2). But in my argument, what corresponds to (1) and (2) are necessarily true. The exact opposite of silly.

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By: Ward Blondé https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/13681#comment-25691 Wed, 07 Feb 2018 18:48:45 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=13681#comment-25691 In reply to Richard Carrier.

Dear Richard,

Your argument is not valid. It has the following structure:

1) All pink yeti bears are male.
2) Therefore seeing a male bear is always evidence for the bear being a pink yeti bear.

With that you forget that there are many more normal bears than pink yeti bears. Likewise, for every atheist universe with physical constants that are fine-tuned, there are infinitely many theist universes that have the same fine-tuned physical constants plus a series of supernatural laws. Therefore, when fine-tuning is needed for an atheist universe, the probability to observe an atheist universe is zero.

There is a second problem, namely your definition of fine-tuning. You are pushing the problem around by renaming it to ‘complex array of physical constants’ and ‘mechanical’. If you claim that DNA is not needed in a theist universe, then the proteome will be your complex array of physical constants, which will need more fine-tuning than would be the case for DNA. If you also claims to proteins are not needed in a theist universe, then human behavior will be your complex array of physical constants, which will, again, need even more fine-tuning. I think this proves the point that you rely on vague definitions that are deliberately crafted as to apply only to what you believe the observable universe looks like.

You fail to disprove in particular that a reality without parameters that need to be fine-tuned cannot exist. And since a fine-tuned universe needs a fine-tuning mechanism, there is a clear need for something beyond the fine-tuned universe. Ad infinitum, until you reach God.

Best regards,
Ward

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