So if someone is simply not at all “interested” in the well being of others that is not a moral problem (per say)?

No. I said morals always derive from interests but not all interests entail morals. You chose an example of the kind of interests that entail morals. Not all interests do.

[S]omeone could be morally wrong and go through life not “loathing” themselves one bit about it.

Not with true beliefs about themselves and the world. Psychology has demonstrated people can only do that by cultivating elaborate false beliefs.

True morals only follow from true premises. Not false premises.

Worse, the actual effects of relying on false beliefs are to create increasing frustration and dissatisfaction, which the subject falsely credits to others rather than the real culprit, themselves. The end result is a less satisfying life than what they could have had otherwise. The delusional person merely blames others for it.

…people acting immorally will always and necessarily “loathe” themselves.

People acting immorally who rationally arrive at conclusions about themselves from true beliefs.

Other people are simply wrong. By definition: because their conclusions derive from false premises, ergo their conclusions are false.

“Note there is a difference between interests and morals. Morals always derive from interests, but interests do not always entail morals.”

Response: So if someone is simply not at all “interested” in the well being of others that is not a moral problem (per say)?

RC wrote:
“So you have to find that out: if there are no factual or logically valid reasons to deem that immoral, then it simply isn’t immoral, and you are disagreeing simply because you are wrong; and conversely, if there are factual and logically valid reasons to deem that immoral, then you are disagreeing simply because they are wrong.”

Response: Agreed. But I used this example not to point out that there isn’t an ultimate right or wrong answer (with respect to what is morally right). I used this example to point out that someone could be morally wrong and go through life not “loathing” themselves one bit about it. Which seems to contradict your assertion that people will necessarily “loathe” themselves when behaving immorally.

RC Wrote:
“Indeed. We can be badly habituated in our access to empathy or self-respect or stuck with false beliefs or ignorances that lead us to false conclusions about what’s moral.”

Response: Agreed. But once again this seemingly contradicts your previous assertion that people acting immorally will always and necessarily “loathe” themselves.

That is the point that I’m tying to make.

That’s just consequentialism again. I already explain how that proves my case and not his.

Would you not agree that there are certain scenarios where one person finds a specific act to be unconscionable where another person does not?

There are only two ways this can ever happen. (1) One (or both) of you has false beliefs or is reasoning fallaciously, and thus arrives at false moral conclusions (whereas if you both reasoned without fallacy from all true relevant facts you’d actually instead arrive at the same conclusion, not a different one). Or (2) your circumstances are different, such that if you were in the same circumstances they are (and thus aware of the same information and facing the same conditions), or vice versa, you would agree with them after all (and thus your disagreement is merely your or their failure to take into account additional information that alters the conclusion, itself a fallacy—thus reducing the second error to the first).

For example the hunting and killing of animals for sport. Or even the slaughter of animals for food.

Note there is a difference between interests and morals. Morals always derive from interests, but interests do not always entail morals. People who differ in their aesthetic preferences are not morally disagreeing (and this is proved with the condition 2 above: if you were in their shoes, your aesthetics would align with theirs, and therefore your moral judgment must take that into account).

But that aside, condition 1 above applies: there either are factual or logical errors resulting in the conclusion that hunting “for mere sport” is moral, or there are not. There is no third possibility. So you have to find that out: if there are no factual or logically valid reasons to deem that immoral, then it simply isn’t immoral, and you are disagreeing simply because you are wrong; and conversely, if there are factual and logically valid reasons to deem that immoral, then you are disagreeing simply because they are wrong.

So which is it? Are there factually true and logically valid reasons to deem hunting “for mere sport” immoral? Or are there not?

[I]t doesn’t mean that we all have the same moral conscious or that our conscious is always in factual alignment about the facts of the matter with respect to concern for the well being of ourselves and others.

Indeed. We can be badly habituated in our access to empathy or self-respect or stuck with false beliefs or ignorances that lead us to false conclusions about what’s moral. Which the point of moral philosophy would be to call out and correct. That’s simply a restatement of my case.

The problem is that states of mind—like satisfaction—are not always experienced for good reasons and not always tethered to reality.

Indeed. But true morals can only follow from true facts, not beliefs contrary to reality; and consequences extend beyond immediate emotion-states. That’s why actions that disregard long-term consequences to oneself, externally and internally, fail at a much higher rate than actions that regard them. If you only pursue your brain-state in the moment, you will have a lot of shitty brain states and eventually die having lived a miserable existence. Whereas those who act rationally, with regard for the total set of consequences and thus cultivate their future brain states as well as their present ones, both end up living much more desirable lives and living morally. That’s the only worthwhile point of morality.

…on atheism, attributes like guilt, love, hate etc are nothing more than chemical processes over time…

That’s a modo hoc fallacy. It’s as false as saying “my house is just a bunch of bricks, therefore there is no difference between my house and a pile of rubble.” Nothing is “just” the things it’s made of; it’s also the pattern into which those things are arranged and interact and what that then causes in the world (from phenomenology to action).

Psychology and sociology have taught us that your model of what will work is also false. The attitude of “just try to get away with anything you randomly desire” is profoundly destructive of the happiness potential of anyone who lives that way. Satisfaction requires liking yourself. And it requires cultivating good rather than bad odds of getting along well with others. These are realities we cannot wish away. And we ignore them at our peril.

Meanwhile, we have a well developed neuroscience of guilt. It in no way supports any of the superstitious theories you are inventing here, but quite the contrary argues soundly against them.

We don’t actually have that claim from Polycarp himself. And there was frequent confusion between different Johns, mistaking one or another prominent John who wasn’t claiming to be an apostle with the John who was.

There certainly was an Apostle John (Paul attests to that in Galatians 2). But it’s very unlikely Polycarp was tutored by him. Most likely that was just a legend that grew up around Polycarp (possibly even stoked by him; in the same way the Christians may have invented John the Baptist’s endorsement of Jesus, to claim a pedigree giving their teachings authority).

My understanding is that there was no Apostle John.

This theist “can point to something of real consequence” an actual spiritual consequence called guilt. My physical body and brain could care less what I, the spiritual self, does. I think most atheists agree and assert that there is no real spiritual component to our make-up that can possibly continue upon death. From this you can make a deductive case that on atheism, attributes like guilt, love, hate etc are nothing more than chemical processes over time. So if you can get away with it and desire it, go for it. You’ll experience the consequence of satisfaction (maybe). But if you “feel/sense” there’s something wrong with what I just said and that there is an “actual” guilt (and not just an illusion of chemistry) then this should count as internal evidence for something that transcends our “mere” physicality. A spiritual capacity. If you disagree with me then go with Dostoevsky in that “all things are permitted” if atheism is true. He, at least, recognized that if atheism is true then there are no eternal “consequences” for anything you can dream up. Good luck with dealing with the current consequences though.

I take your point about “configuration of brain chemistry”; I should have just said “emotion.” On your theory, the highest good for an individual is to experience a certain state of mind. The problem is that states of mind—like satisfaction—are not always experienced for good reasons and not always tethered to reality. That is one of the points of the pill hypothetical: a brain-state can be induced without anything having been done to earn it. But there are also other counterexamples that are more realistic: people can rationalize, repress, ignore, or simply be unaware of the reasons they have to be dissatisfied with themselves. If those people nevertheless feel the desired satisfaction state, then your moral theory cannot motivate them. You could theorize to them about the need to be “fully rational and fully informed,” but if they have already achieved the (in your view) highest moral end—satisfaction with themselves—what compels them to listen to you?