Keith- Looks like you’re the “last man standing” in the comments section! Let me take your replies above in turn.

(1) To my statement, “We can easily imagine the group deciding against a UGR [Universalized Golden Rule] in favor of a limited Golden Rule (LGR) favoring the flourishing of the ‘highest types’ of humanity,” you object that a hypothetical group of informed, rational (atheist) persons would “never get to the idea of higher or lower types of humanity.”

But why would this be the case? Obviously humans aren’t all equal in their abilities, talents, intellect, moral character, etc. The theist can appeal to an essential equality that is due to everyone being created in the image of God and having an immortal soul capable of attaining moral perfection in “the life of the world to come,” and to us all standing guilty before the bar of divine justice (I would argue that these are in fact the historical sources of the West’s belief in the equality of mankind). But what can the atheist appeal to in order to establish a radical (root) equality among human beings?

(2) To my statement, “[W]e can easily imagine the group attributing Nazism’s failure to a combination of accidents of history, choosing the wrong targets (namely the most cognitively advanced group in the world), its violent and extreme nature, etc., and thus proposing a more ‘benign’ version,” you reply that this would be to “ignore the actual nuance of history,” something a rational, informed person wouldn’t do.

But you don’t provide any elaboration of this claim. My statement is precisely about the nuances (and accidents) of history that might factor into the thinking of this hypothetical group.

(3) You say that moral claims “are indistinguishable from emotional claims.” This is to mistake a frequent concomitant of moral judgments with the moral judgment itself. We often make moral judgments without any attendant emotion, and most philosophers recognize that an emotional aversion is not the same thing as a moral judgment.

For example, we might find a certain practice disgusting (say, eating one’s dinner while on the toilet) and have a strong emotional aversion to that practice, without thereby thinking that it is a moral evil to engage in such an odd habit. Indeed, one of the topics evolutionary psychologists write about is how the development of moral judgments provided more survival and reproduction advantages that mere emotional aversion was capable of.

Finally (4), you remark that you “still don’t understand how morals are not consequential, even from a theistic perspective.” Here I just want to reiterate that in multiple places I stated that from a theistic perspective, moral actions have bad consequences. Indeed, I think a theist will have a more expansive list of these consequences than an atheist will, and will also be able to provide a tighter link between morally evil actions and bad consequences.

My claim, however, is that moral obligations are not reducible to these consequences but are binding upon us regardless of our calculations about consequences. This will become clear from any careful analysis of how human beings experience moral imperatives and enjoin those imperatives on others.

“Dr. Marshall, I wanted to thank you for taking the time to have this conversation.” — Thanks to you as well, Keith. You’ve been a thoughtful commenter throughout, and I’ve learned from this debate as well. Hopefully Dr. Carrier and I will find time later in the year to carry on with the remaining arguments each of us has, and if so, I look forward to interacting with you in the comments section again.

This is untrue. If you are starting with a group of INFORMED, RATIONAL people, then you could never get to the idea of higher or lower types of humanity. That can only be a result of cognitive biases and false beliefs, which is defeated by the definition of the persons involved.

“[W]e can easily imagine the group attributing Nazism’s failure to a combination of accidents of history, choosing the wrong targets (namely the most cognitively advanced group in the world) [1], its violent and extreme nature, etc., and thus proposing a more “benign” version.”

Once again, this is untrue. Rational and informed persons would not make such an attribution error. From above, they would not be looking for higher/lower types of humanity in the first place. But further, the attributed reasons you state only hold if one ignores the actual nuance of history (something a rational and informed person wouldn’t do).

“When someone says, “It is evil for you to steal from the poor!” (transgression), it is a different thing from the prudential counsel, “If you steal from the poor, there will be be bad outcomes for you and others.” Even very young children are able to distinguish moral norms from prudential norms.”

I don’t think you understand that the moral (as separate from consequential) claims people make from your view are indistinguishable from emotional claims. Moral outrage and guilt are emotions. “X is evil!” is indistinguishable from “I hate when people do X!” Why do they feel that way about X? Because they have been taught (or learned) that X has consequences they don’t like. Their emotions have been calibrated to recoil at certain actions. Emotional consequences are STILL consequences. If I do something I’ve been taught is wrong, I’m emotionally primed to feel guilt. Guilt is then a consequence of my action and one that can (and does) alter my behavior.

Dr. Marshall, I wanted to thank you for taking the time to have this conversation. Though I haven’t been on your side in most cases, I did learn a great deal. You’ve helped me more clearly understand the discussion as well as helped me better formulate my own view.

One request, if you are interested, is a link to a more thorough understanding of the separation between morality and consequences. This I feel was what made this last argument impossible to accept. I still don’t understand how morals are not consequential, even from a theistic perspective.