You argue that we use animals as analogs for us but then don t accord them the same moral standard as us. But I find two key flaws with this argument. One is that by your reasoning we should also treat computer models as if they are persons. We are generally using animals as a living, physically embedded model of the human body. We actually don’t care about their relations to us in a lot of ways: In fact, in many cases, we would be better off if we had a pile of cells that reacted like humans to, say, medicines or cosmetics on a chemical level, but didn’t experience pain or have social systems. In fact, animal experimentation is practically fraught precisely because the analogy isn’t very good.

But, also… if animals are like us morally, is it not also reasonable to argue that they may have collective duties to other moral actors? We cannot know if a rat would want to be able to help us feel better; does it necessarily follow that we must assume it does not consent? We can be very confident that, say, a dog would love to do something to make its packmates feel better; are we not giving it an opportunity to do so? After all, there are humans persons who participate in medical trials without their consent: We call them children. As long as the parents consent and it doesn’t violate standards like being against their best interest, it is considered ethical to experiment on children. Why could we not extend that same logic, but further, to the animals under our control? Obviously this couldn’t be extended in an unlimited fashion, but the problem is it seems as if you are arguing for essentially no experimentation of any kind.

I would point out to you what Murray Bookchin pointed out to the deep ecologists: Too narrowly anthropomorphizing animals is actually insulting to them precisely because they don’t have the same nature that we do. It can debase both man and wolf to act as if they are the same. So, for example, castrating animals just isn’t the same as castrating a person. There are underlying differences in their physiology, their social relations, and their behaviors. Your analysis doesn’t seem to be able to recognize that.

You then list harms that are done to animals. I agree, these should be mitigated. Heck, we can stipulate to you that all such harm should be outright banned legally in order to have this argument. That still doesn’t mean that we end animal experimentation, because it’s transparently obvious that lots of animal experimentation can be done without any such harms. This feels like an emotionally manipulative argument. You spend a lot of your word count on something that is actually ancillary to the core question.

Finally, you tease that you will be basically tossing any utiltiarianism out the window. Perhaps I am overstating your case. I do agree that narrow utilitarianism cannot be allowed: Richard I am sure will agree, as he has pointed out that rule utilitarianism, deontological theory, social contract theory, virtue theory, Foot’s work, etc. all are critical to round out classic utilitarianism because we need to be attentive to a range of consequences. But the problem is that by your reasoning we can never do anything that could ever cause any harm. Unless your position is that, for example, a person who commits a crime has actually acquired a new, lower moral character as a result. (In which case we can just point out that animals can be cruel and awful and they lose the same rights. Dolphin experimentation could be easily justified!)

If we are going to say that there is never any threshold at which you can interact with innocent people in a deontic way, say goodbye to the criminal justice system: It is impossible to guarantee that you will never prosecute an innocent. Say goodbye to any kind of enforcement whatsoever, even of contracts, for the same reason. Even putting aside uncertainty, we could never resolve any trolley problems. We would be paralyzed.

I am curious how you will present a moral ethos that allows any action, whatsoever, in a world where stakeholders have competing interests and no rights can be treated as absolute because all rights held by all moral agents conflict to varying degrees.

Also, dietary, welfare, cognition, and health care R&D for animals (including industrial animals, commercial animals, and pets). This is a question I wanted to get to as well. I had planned to raise it but don’t have word count in my first reply, which had to address broader issues first; but I have material on this prepared that I expect to bring up in coming entries.

I’m curious if you take the same position on testing of animals when it is being done for the betterment of the species being tested. An example might be pet products designed to cure or improve the health of a particular species. But it could also be lab experiments designed to determine the environmental impact or harm being done to a particular species so that lawmakers can be equipped with the information needed (in the form of scientific studies) to improve the long term greater good of that species.

I guess what I’m trying to get it is at the heart of your objection the idea that we’re using other animals to improve our own lives (i.e. self-serving), or if you’re just categorically against the testing regardless of who the beneficiary might be.