Comments on: Should Science Be Experimenting on Animals? Dr. Bali’s Second Reply https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952 Announcing appearances, publications, and analysis of questions historical, philosophical, and political by author, philosopher, and historian Richard Carrier. Thu, 21 Oct 2021 21:35:47 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.4 By: Richard Carrier https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33386 Thu, 21 Oct 2021 21:35:47 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33386 In reply to Paul Bali.

Richard’s AE would inflict pain on animals if it’s epistemically required.

Morally required. Not epistemically required. I don’t know why you keep doing this, but this is the third time you’ve disregarded this. I refer you back to my first entry, General Objections, §4.

Likewise, super-beings might disregard our personhood if it’s epistemically required.

But not if it’s not morally required. Thus, you are arguing by non sequitur here, completely ignoring the actual pertinent metrics. Beings that disregard moral requirements in favor of epistemic are immoral. And we cannot appeal to immoral agents as moral exemplars. To avoid this fallacy of false analogy, you have to construct a valid analogy: the aliens have to be moral exemplars, if you intend to use them as such in a reductio. But moral aliens would by definition recognize moral agents and treat them as such. Animals, not being moral agents, don’t warrant the same reaction. Humans, being such, do.

You seem to be fallaciously using this false analogy to build a circular argument that completely bypasses the morally relevant distinctions I have drawn based on objective facts about differences in cognition. The same ones aliens of any ability would see as readily as we do.

I like Richard’s metaphor of a “phase shift” [in his final post] but find odd this confidence that there’s no possible shift beyond our ken which could render us exploitable as lab animals. A phase shift is unassessable by those who’ve yet to undergo it.

That’s illogical. It’s like saying because there might be a fifth state of matter, therefore liquids don’t exist, or don’t obey the physics of liquids. Obviously liquids exist, and obey the physics of liquids—no matter how many other as-yet-undiscovered states of matter there might be.

Likewise, moral value derives from self-awareness or the capacity for it. Full stop. Liquids are liquids. It does not matter how many other phase shifts in consciousness there may yet be, they will not change the fact that the emergence of moral worth was already accomplished at step one. That doesn’t “go away” when other steps are achieved.

I find it bizarre that you keep reaching for these wildly illogical rationalizations to avoid acknowledging a point already factually established. This isn’t the only example of that I’ve encountered in this debate from you.

I refer you back to my first entry, Foundations, §1, and the fact that despite my asking you to explain how you are even deriving your premise of moral worth multiple times now (or how it even differs from mine), you have still never answered, much less defended your answer with any kind of evidence-based reasoning.

Are we really so sure that rats “are never self-aware or possessed of any cognitive comprehension” and that all rabbit behavior is “instinctual”? [Richard’s 3rd post.]

Yes. We are. By multiple converging lines of scientific evidence, as I multiply cited there. We have comparative anatomical neuroscience and interactive behavioral studies. By the thousands.

The most recent of his cited research on animal consciousness [Birch et al, 2020] begins with an admission that the field “is young and beset by foundational controversy”.

This is a quote mine. That reference is not talking about what we are. It’s talking about minute details of animal consciousness research; not fundamentals, like whether they have brains capable of building self-models and developing self-reflective knowledge of their experiences and lives. We know for a fact that they don’t.

And even when it comes to minute particulars, there are a ton of studies now, and they all support what I am saying, not the pseudoscientific hope you are expressing. I cited numerous study surveys explaining this point, and even the one you now quote does so. You can’t just ignore all that, and quote something out of context and misuse it to make a point its author never made.

Indeed, you even go on to misquote one section in that same source about apes, and apply it (!) now to mice and rats. Good grief. How many times do we have to explain to you that these are not the same things? Mice don’t pass mirror tests. Nor are mirror tests evidence of self-awareness, as even that article explains. The cognitive capacity of apes is established by a large range of diverse experiments with converging results—all of which mice and rats fail. That’s scientific fact. As even there explained.

There is no hidden person inside a mouse, pretending not to exist—much less one that can exist there with none of the actual neural machinery we know is needed for it.

So you sound like Pythagoras at this point. “We don’t ‘really’ know human souls aren’t inside beans, so we should exercise caution!”

I suspect you didn’t take up this doomed tactic in the formal debate for a reason. Because I tried to get you to address it twice, and you only now attempt it here. And all we get is this updated Pythagorean non sequitur.

Beliefs must be based on actual facts. Not inventions contrary to all observed facts.

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By: Richard Carrier https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33378 Thu, 21 Oct 2021 20:44:29 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33378 In reply to Paul Bali.

I too worry about the risk – indeed the reality – of creating moral Others who are subject to routinized torture, much of which is pointless.

Another emotive fallacy. This mischaracterizes AE entirely. We are not just torturing animals in labs for fun, willy nilly. AE is not pointless. Nor is it done in disregard of humane protocols. We’ve been over this already. Yet you keep acting like we haven’t.

This is also a slippery slope fallacy.

Consider the fictional example of The Rats of N.I.M.H. (the original novel, not the awful Disney cartoon travesty). In that story, certain lab experiments made a collection of rats self-aware, an accomplishment that continued to be disregarded by the lab researchers, leading the rats to successfully plan and effect an escape (they go on to live in hiding, solving the resulting problems of doing so with engineering genius, and not “magic” as Disney vomitously reimagined them doing).

The salient point in this analogy is that the researchers disregarded the fact that their subjects were now morally sentient. They could communicate their status and yet the researchers changed nothing about their behavior. This is fiction. In real life, I am fairly certain that is not how scientific animal researchers would react to such a development. But it is clear that such a reaction in the novel is outrageously immoral, and in precisely the way their behavior before that development was not. In no way whatever are the self-aware rats “just like” their unwoke compatriots in respect to moral status or deserved concern, as indeed (had this been depicted) even they would agree. Other rats would simply be permanently trapped in amoral insentience of their own status as even alive, much less able to have any appreciable thoughts or self-recognized identities, even less enter into any kind of social agreements or participation in the intelligent rat community. That wouldn’t even be something they could do in future (the normal rats were genetically different from the intelligent rats; so nothing could be done to elevate them).

This is why there is simply no analogy to some aliens thinking of us as comparable to insentient rats; they’d either act immorally, or recognize us as comparable to the Rats of N.I.M.H., and thus treat us the same way any moral human would treat the Rats of N.I.M.H. (as eventually depicted in the novel). Because the threshold has been crossed: we are morally aware (or, as infants, actively becoming so). That is not the case for animals, who have no comparable sentience of themselves or their lives.

So there isn’t even a slope here, much less a slippery one. One might make a valid slippery slope claim for certain other animals (e.g. apes), but we already agree we have evaded that mistake by not treating them as identical to either other animals or humans, but as a category morally in between, deserving of its own particular behavioral disposition. Which behavior tracks the actual objective cognitive difference between all three categories of living beings. As all behavior should.

Slippery slopes require disregarding factual differences. No true moral belief can exist that disregards factual differences.

Lab animals are bystanders, non-aggressors, and (largely, at present) non-beneficiaries of the system.

I’ve already explained that this is both false (a lot of AE research is specifically for animal welfare) and moot. We do not perform AE as a punishment on animals, any more than we experiment on kids and infants, or visit morally necessary harms on them (e.g. medicine, discipline, education, safety, health & welfare), as a “punishment” on kids. Nor do we accept, as we do, harms as necessary even for adults; workplace pains and hazards are not “punishments” on workers, so their status as “deserving” has no bearing whatever on this moral calculation. So whether animals are “bystanders” or “non-aggressors” has nothing to do with the purpose or propriety of AE. That is purely an irrational emotive argument that has no place in serious philosophy.

Animals are incapable of even comprehending consent, because they have no comprehension of the moral worth of anything. Nor will ever acquire any. So there is no sense in which they should be “asked” to consent to anything; there is no “they” to ask. Animals are not people. Trying to frame AE as some sort of punishment that therefore must be deserved to be warranted is not only to continue fallaciously and pseudoscientifically anthropomorphize animals, it lacks even internal logic. In no way do we cause or allow harms solely on “those who deserve it.” So “deserving” it is a non sequitur.

The only relevant question is can they appreciate what’s being done to them and what they are being used for and what this means for their lives (or will they ever). The answer is no. Ergo, they can no more be “undeserving” than they can write a novel or run for President. It’s simply a category error. Innocence requires the possibility of intent. Animals lack any comprehension of intent. Thus they cannot be innocent of anything any more than they can be guilty of anything.

And yet, again, that being the case is also irrelevant, as we aren’t experimenting on them to punish them for anything. So their “deserving it” or not is moot.

We are doing it not only for their own good sometimes, but yes, often to save and better the lives of people, beings capable of appreciating all this and thus who are far more valuable to protect from harm than beings that can’t even comprehend harm, beings that lack even a concept of a self that can be done harm, and who will never understand any of their lives, whether it be suffering and dying miserably or horribly in the wild, or mildly micromanaged in a lab.

That is why it is objectively a fact that harm to animals is substantially less significant than harm to humans. And that is why we conduct AE in the first place: to lower the harm quotient of human trials. AE is the canary in a coal mine, better to die to save people from harm, as the death of a canary is orders of magnitude less cognitively significant than even a mere injury to a person.

Many qualities of personhood are extensions, modifications, meta-fiers of, sentience.

This is either an equivocation fallacy (sentience as in self-sentience is personhood, not a basis of it; whereas sentience sans self-sentience is by definition the absence of a person) or not a relevant point. Certainly, because we evolved by natural selection and were not intelligently engineered in a scientist’s garden, our self-awareness (and concomitant ability to engage in conscious reasoning about life and our lives) is built on top of millions of years of cognitive machinery. But that does not somehow magically mean a worm’s ability to feel pain is the same thing as a person’s ability to appreciate and comprehend pain.

Animal cognition has proceeded by building on top of what came before: pain and pleasure (worms, flies, lizards) preceded any emotional life (e.g. rats) or ability to build complex sensory models of one’s causal environment (e.g. lizards); but emotional consciousness and world modeling (which included, eventually, the causal system of social interactions, though at that point still without cognitive awareness of what that even is) were built on top of that simpler pain and pleasure network, in fact expanding the ability to employ it more effectively; and this, in turn, long preceded any self-cognition at all: rational self-modeling, and an ability to appreciate and comprehend emotional experience, are add ons to the underlying inherited architecture of models and emotions sans understanding.

I provided several links to the science of this in my closing, which specifically go into how human cognition has radically transformed what emotions feel like and implicate in our conscious understanding, and thus why animal consciousness will be nothing at all like this, and thus why it is simply a fallacy to act like it is—as fallacious as Pythagoras apocryphally abstaining from beans because he believed they contained reincarnated human souls. Moral behavior must align with factual reality, not false beliefs.

This is why consent requires comprehension—because if it is not informed consent, it is not consent. Thus animals, lacking comprehension, don’t even belong to the category of things we require consent from. There is no “they” to issue consent. They are less cognitively significant than even the infants and children we morally do all manner of things to without their consent. That they are incapable of consent does not warrant our doing nothing whatever to them; to the contrary, we assign the role of consent to their socially assigned guardians, and we then limit what they can consent to for their children only in respect to degrees of child cognition and its future effects on their adult lives.

Extending this same reasoning to animals, who lack even the cognitive capacity of human children, and have no cognitive futures at all, entails even more liberality in respect to what their guardians can consent to allow be done to them and for what reasons; just as when we extend the same reasoning to plants and geological structures, that liberality is extended yet even further, exactly in alignment with cognitive capacity.

To disregard all this is simply pseudoscientific and illogical—the last thing our moral beliefs should be.

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By: Frederic Christie https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33363 Wed, 20 Oct 2021 19:08:30 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33363 In reply to Frederic Christie.

You worry about harming helpless things. I agree, I think this is a relevant concern. But again, this is a trolley problem. People are helpless against cancer and illness. Either way, both some animals and some humans will be in the helpless grip of something, often human-caused or human-aggravated.

I agree that bystanders/non-beneficiaries is a better mode of analysis, but, again, they’re not non-beneficiaries. For one, lab animals get to eat and live, so they get a kind of pay for their keep. More importantly, the insights we get from treating humans also creates a broader biological understanding that will help animals in general. Should we care more about veterinary care and animal control and care in general? Yes, but that’s not the same problem. Frankly, I’d rather us deal with kill shelters than AE, if we have to rank animal welfare priorities! (Which, yes, isn’t, strictly speaking, the debate, but when we are discussing reform as an option, finite political capital does become practically relevant).

And, yes, I would love to have some kind of AE that broadened the horizons of animals (though again that may be anthropomorphism: is being sentient really that great? I mean, I happen to think so, but that could easily be sour grapes about the alternative!) But broadly speaking that isn’t an option. Some creatures will helplessly suffer no matter what we do. At least in one case, some creatures get the chance to have their suffering mean something, even if they can never experience that themselves.

I think that the shift from sentience to insentience is a big Rubicon as well, but the problem is that “It experiences pain” in some dim sense is vastly too broad. Should we stop all carnivores from eating all herbivores, acting as moral agents? Well, then the carnivores suffer. As a Buddhist I firmly agree that we should be concerned about sentient beings, but treating them as identical to us in our moral universe is anthropomorphism: It ignores what makes them different and special. And those meta-filters around sentience matter because they vastly amplify the harm available to those beings. If you have animals that are predisposed to a ton of pain and animals that can help them, isn’t there something grotesque about not facilitating the case where the animals who can’t hurt as much can help the ones who can? You yourself have just explained why it is a corollary of the importance of sentience that personhood is so critical: It is a vast amplifier of the stakes that a creature has. Nothing arbitrary about it.

Consent is more meaningful with your conditions, but it never loses meaning. To be able to consent is to have agency, and deprivation of agency is obviously so harmful as to be crippling. An entity that ignored our consent would be evil. If such an entity could understand that our lack of consent were based on poor thinking, it could explain it to us. Just like real doctors do to their real patients, all the time. This is a straight up rule utilitarian problem: The rule of ignoring the consent of sapient beings is so much more harmful than the rule of not doing so, so you don’t do it.

And you are now positing a Q race that needs medicine. It is vastly more powerful than us but gets sick? And we are relevant analogs to it? Yes, I am nitpicking about hypotheticals, but I think the thought experiment tells us something. If we want to play the game honestly, then we could imagine these beings for whom experimentation on us done within guidelines of immense necessity would be greatly necessary, and so the harms they experience from not having that data are immense and us denying them the help is immensely selfish.

Except we can consent. Which is the key difference. Depriving the right of consent to an animal is depriving it of something it doesn’t have. This is the fundamental flaw. It’s like ripping the eighth legs off of a human: We don’t have those. So the Q people who experimented on us would be crossing a moral Rubicon we are not with animals.

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By: Paul Bali https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33330 Tue, 19 Oct 2021 00:34:07 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33330 In reply to Frederic Christie.

I too worry about the risk – indeed the reality – of creating moral Others who are subject to routinized torture, much of which is pointless.

Yet your concerns about the applicability of ‘innocence’ across species are plausible. Perhaps I should rely less on the concept of innocence and focus on factors like: that lab animals are bystanders, non-aggressors, and (largely, at present) non-beneficiaries of the system.

Factors like: they are helpless, wholly in our power, reduced to pure patiency.

A morally preferable AE would be: in defending our village from a marauding dragon, our kitana quickly vivisects it into total knowledge of life. Ah, to wish. . .

Regarding the inviolability of personhood: isn’t the shift from insentience to sentience the big one? Many qualities of personhood are extensions, modifications, meta-fiers of, sentience. For example, the ability to care about one’s future brings one’s future sentience into present concern, and helps unite the sentient moments into a more coherent stream. Another example: consent just articulates the wish implicit in all sentience to undergo euphoria / avoid dysphoria, and evinces a meta-cognition of one’s subjecthood. Persons may be especially complex and robust subjects of a life, but all sentients are to some degree subjects of a life. So it’s suspicious that the inviolable line should be drawn so close around our recently attained degree of subjecthood, so that we may use almost all of our biosphere neighbors, but are cosmically exempt.

If you draw such a hard line between mice and corvids, we don’t have to imagine that far up the great chain of being to reach our alien Vivisector. Might not even need a phase shift. E.g. consent is more meaningful the more information the consenter has, and the more consistent and truthful they are in speech. To rigorously truthful angels with vast knowledge, our consent may be relatively insubstantial, highly trumpable. We are relatively evanescent subjects of a life, to them.

The phase-shifted being may possess something as different from personhood as sentience is from insentience. They may use us not to save the universe but just to improve whatever their version of medicine is. Nine billion of us for Ninety billion of them.

I wouldn’t ask them to use me only when necessary! I would guess that we’ve met the Demon, and fight back.

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By: Frederic Christie https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33327 Mon, 18 Oct 2021 16:38:49 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33327 In reply to Paul Bali.

You ask, “Frederic, aren’t such societies vile precisely because [in part] they inflict undeserved harms?” In small part, Dr. Bali. But the problem is that the word “deserved” does a lot of work for you. I don’t care if a society routinely tortures only death row criminals or ordinary people: The deeper problem is the routinized torture, which we know is 99.999999% of the time pointless and only serves to stunt our empathy and build collective sadism. What worries me is that your focus on “undeserved” by necessity implies a “deserved” category, and that category has the very real risk of creating moral Others. Yes, in practice we do treat people differently and we do so in part based off of our assessment of their moral history, but that difference must by necessity be small. If there was a horrible, insidious criminal who had done awful things, and was totally unrepentant, but also happened to be near-totally paralyzed, keeping them in a prison instead of a hospital would be perverse.

So “just punishment” actually has much less to do with what the person did and much more to do with the calculus around the possibility for rehabilitation, returning value to the community and reparations to victims, and deterrence. The notion that some people “deserve” retribution is the barbaric idea of our ancestors. I am astonished I have to make this point to an animal welfare advocate!

Because, of course, why are animals “Innocent? One can argue that

a) For an agent to be “innocent”, it has to be part of a moral universe in the first place (we don’t call rocks “innocent”), and animals can be; and/or
b) Animals do messed up things to each other all the time

I don’t think you would think that it would be appropriate to subject a dolphin to a brutal experiment because it attempted rape on a human woman! The only way to rescue that in your framework is to say that “deserved” isn’t some ontological category but a contextual socially-constructed one: The criminal “deserves” punishment not because they are guilty but because we can prove it and because we have a clear understanding of the magnitude of the crime and the ability for us to usefully intervene. But that reveals the game: that construct in turn comes from a set of pragmatically-derived understandings of how we engage with the world and each other, and those understandings don’t support the notion that AE is harmful in the same way animal abuse is. Because it is about more than the suffering of the animal in isolation.

You say that we can remove some of the ugliness from retributivism by demanding positive impact. But…

a) Yeah, we can remove the ugliness from retributivism by making it not retributivism anymore! Again, would you be okay with experimenting on the criminal dolphin as punishment if afterwards the dolphin had medical care to bring it back to health?
b) Retributivism is still bad even when you’ve done this because it has virtue ethics impacts. A constant focus on “getting back” inherently trades off with moving on, forgiving and letting go.
c) You still haven’t talked at all about the rehabilitation of the agent. That’s… worrisome. That’s the biggest problem: Retributivism by necessity reduces one moral agent to an Other, a non-agent. That’s dehumanizing. And I find it bizarre that someone using a deontological framework is also willing to use people as a means to an end without their consent, which is inherent to that idea.

You say that “Richard’s AE would inflict pain on animals if it’s epistemically required. Likewise, super-beings might disregard our personhood if it’s epistemically required”. But this is straightforwardly false. It is a strawman. Notice how Richard excluded from analysis chimps, elephants, etc.? That’s in part because he was uncomfortable, and I agree, with the idea of subjecting animals close enough to us to that kind of harm without some kind of consent. “Epistemically required” is only part of the condition, for both he and I.

And even then, what would be “epistemically required” of Q? Something to save the universe? Then we are dealing with a straight-up “torture the bad guy to save the city” scenario! So your thought experiment actually deliberately hides the key dilemma here: “Epistemically required” isn’t just about our curiosity! We are talking about avoiding real harm and real pain!

The basis of human rights is that we need those rights to be honored to flourish as people. That is an inherent outcome of personhood. The Q Continuum could not deny that we are persons. Period. We can deny that a mouse is a person.

You say “I like Richard’s metaphor of a “phase shift” [in his final post] but find odd this confidence that there’s no possible shift beyond our ken which could render us exploitable as lab animals. A phase shift is unassessable by those who’ve yet to undergo it”. First of all, maybe, but… so what? Let’s say that we are dealing with a power beyond our comprehension that has achieved some level of consciousness that qualitatively beggars ours. It decides to experiment on us. Can we stop it? No. Understand it? No. All we could feasibly ask is that it only did so when necessary… which is what we are suggesting! What could we offer such a being? If such a being made an argument, a logically ironclad one, about why we are morally different from it, could we understand it? If we did understand it, would we assent? Your example seems to be intended to make us worry that we would want to be left alone if we were the animals, but… that is inherently only using half the data.

But, secondly, a phase shift from gas to liquid that then goes on to a phase shift from liquid to solid doesn’t deny that the shift from gas to liquid happened. It is our argument that there is a qualitative change when you hit some kind of personhood. It is exactly the issue at hand to say that this a moral Rubicon. You can’t just invoke hypothetical future ones: You have to show them.

The moral claim being made here is that personhood is the one and only Rubicon. You have to actually address that, not suggest that it could be mistaken.

You say that personhood is relevant but it’s warped by anthropocentrism. To test that, we’d need intelligence at the human scale that isn’t human and differs in some way. We’d need Grays or Klingons or Gorilla Grodd or demons or something. But we are in fact very, very sure that even the more complex animals like elephants, chimps, etc. do not have our sense of personhood and that lower animals certainly don’t, no matter how anthropocentrically you put it. Why?

Well… gee, they didn’t build massive civilizations with complex pathways for communication, novel adaptations to environment, technology being transmitted, language, etc. Yes, you can argue that personhood doesn’t hinge on any one of those things, but as a gestalt that capacity does come from the fact that we have selves that we can first imagine then imagine in a greater context.

When you spend time with animals, you can tell that they are not burdened by our sense of shame, our sense of moral agency, our need to have forward planning. And experiment shows it. Just look at the difference between how a corvid reacts to a mirror and how a mouse does. That is an example of an element of personhood, and why I would be very, very skeptical of any harmful or intrusive research on corvids, no matter how important.

But, again, this is a case where you have a burden of proof. Yes, we could be wrong, but you have to show it. Show that actually mice have elements of personhood that are morally relevant. We could also be wrong about humans having personhood (beyond the Cartesian certainty of having something like it in an individual moment): We could be Boltzmann brains about to flicker away, for example. Trying to justify people having a lower moral standing that way would be perverse. It doesn’t get much better when we do it for animals to justify a higher moral standing.

And you are right that we should tread carefully given science’s history. But… if we take that too far, we shouldn’t do science at all, given that science has also had a history of being racist, and sexist, and reductive, and harmful to environments, and colonialist, and… The solution is to fix those elements. In other words, reform. But it’s clear that there are researchers who work with animals who have tremendous love for them who still recognize that the evidence indicates that they are not persons. And that evidence is strongly dispositive at this point: We know the broad outlines of what kind of brain you need to make a person, and a mouse can’t have it, for the same reason that your smartphone can’t do the same job as a quantum supercomputer or even your desktop or laptop.

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By: Paul Bali https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33322 Sun, 17 Oct 2021 18:41:39 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33322 In reply to Frederic Christie.

Hi guys! Jumping in here, after reading Richard’s final post.

“societies that allow the exploitation, imprisonment, attack upon or confiscation of property of people (and other moral entities) who have done nothing to warrant that will be grossly vile”.

Frederic, aren’t such societies vile precisely because [in part] they inflict undeserved harms? Imprisoning X because X deserves it is a necessary condition of just punishment. We can remove much of the ugliness of Retributivism by also demanding there be good consequences from the punishment [deterrence, protection of society from the vicious criminal, et cet].

“It wouldn’t matter if we encountered Q or other space gods who had capacities we can’t imagine: We have the requisite combination of memory, sense of a continuity of self, and capacity for information processing and engagement with the environment that constitutes a person. They may be super-persons, but we’re not non-persons. Animals are non-persons.”

Richard’s AE would inflict pain on animals if it’s epistemically required. Likewise, super-beings might disregard our personhood if it’s epistemically required.

I like Richard’s metaphor of a “phase shift” [in his final post] but find odd this confidence that there’s no possible shift beyond our ken which could render us exploitable as lab animals. A phase shift is unassessable by those who’ve yet to undergo it.

I don’t think ‘personhood’ is a wholly arbitrary category, but I worry it’s currently warped by anthropocentrism.
Even so warped, I’m not confident about the non-personhood of animals. Are we really so sure that rats “are never self-aware or possessed of any cognitive comprehension” and that all rabbit behavior is “instinctual”? [Richard’s 3rd post.] The most recent of his cited research on animal consciousness [Birch et al, 2020] begins with an admission that the field “is young and beset by foundational controversy”. It argues that consciousness has many dimensions, each of which admits of gradations. It ends with several of the field’s Outstanding Questions, including

“How can we show that animals are consciously simulating future scenarios and consciously reliving episodic memories?”

“How can we go beyond the mirrormark test to find evidence of higher grades of self-consciousness?”

It wasn’t long ago that consciousness of any kind was commonly denied to non-humans! Given Science’s historical direction of inclusion, and given what’s at stake for lab animals, we might adopt a policy of erring on the side of caution.

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By: Frederic Christie https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33321 Sun, 17 Oct 2021 02:49:16 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33321 In reply to Richard Carrier.

Fair enough. Still, there are those who express the sentiment I read (that a range of human behavior toward animals is justified as long as there is even the slightest advantage for us because of evolution or what not), and that sentiment is quite silly.

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By: Frederic Christie https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33320 Sun, 17 Oct 2021 02:47:00 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33320 In reply to Frederic Christie.

Sorry, unfinished sentence: I would say that even the more complex animals (the complex mammals, corvids, octopi maybe) don’t have the same cognitive horizon we do, with meaningful differences.

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By: Frederic Christie https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33319 Sun, 17 Oct 2021 02:46:04 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33319 In reply to Asher Kelman.

Yes, I was also using Dr. Carrier’s definition of “animal” here. Even there, though, it’s fuzzy. How important is an ability to understand the future and relate to it to selfhood, for example? We know from frontal lobe lobotomies in people that it’s not strictly necessary but people who have had them can feel less from that inability. I would say that even the more complex animals (the complex mammals, corvids, octopi maybe)

To say that there are people in the world who don’t possess that kind of reasoning, though, is… silly. Like, I suppose it’s possible that extremely brain-damaged or disabled people don’t. But it’s very easy for us to forget just how complex our ability to navigate social systems is, even compared to chimps. Just the fact that we have such an outsized language ability, let alone capacities to think in terms of honor and shame and duty (which, yes, chimps and primates and dolphins sort of do, but not really), kind of moots that comparison. Our ability to abstract also actually has implications for our understandings of our selves: The same ability we have to do math and complex language has some of the same roots as the ability to talk about our feelings and conceptualize what we are.

The octopus example is a good one: They’re damn smart animals, but the ability to know situation X has some non-obvious element Y and even potentially be annoyed at that unfortunate state of affairs is nothing like the human ability to engage in complex layers of deceit and to be personally and even existentially threatened by that deceit.

But, yes, Richard is right: A fortiori, your point makes mine even stronger. Indeed, the very fact that Richard set aside chimps, elephants, etc. (and I would even be willing to set aside many cephalopods and corvids) is because we, just like hypothetical aliens who exceed our interpersonal benevolence but follow our actual maxims for “lesser” beings, can see the marginal cases and err on the side of caution. So such aliens, even if they were uncertain of our personhood, would still see enough evidence to empathize in exactly the way informed people do about elephants and dolphins, and err on the side of caution.

Which returns us to the fundamental question: Is a mouse a moral stakeholder the way a person is? And I think they’re just not, by the same stakeholder analysis we use for people (so there is no a priori discrimination, only a posteriori differentiation): Mice have much less to lose than people through mechanisms like being experimented upon. (And, of course, because you can use transgenic techniques and examine over the life course, you can get data much more quickly with animals, which in practice actually means you experiment on net fewer organisms).

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By: Richard Carrier https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/18952#comment-33315 Sat, 16 Oct 2021 23:06:05 +0000 https://www.richardcarrier.info/?p=18952#comment-33315 In reply to Frederic Christie.

I got the impression Asher was trying to make the same point (just from a different angle).

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