I know you did not accuse me of saying this, but I’m not suggesting that some physical structure of our spacetime manifold would generate a non-physical spirit or substance. Rather, a non-physical spirit or substance would come into existence without any efficient or material cause (and this includes our spacetime).

That requires that to be possible. My point is that there is no evidence that it is. See:

The God Impossible

The Argument from Specified Complexity against Supernaturalism

So we cannot infer that as an expected outcome. We can only infer entities we know to be possible; not entities we do not know to be possible.

In Bayesian terms, my theory predicts observations with no new assumptions (other than ones the theist is already compelled to adopt). Adding the assumption “supernatural things can exist” fails at this (it is falsified in observations). So without additional evidence supporting it, that is a failed theory, not a competing one. This being so cannot be used as evidence against the successful theory. The succesful theory already predicts the observation of nothing supernatural. That is the opposite of evidence against it. That’s evidence for it.

I also don’t require Platonism. Just physical geometry: space and time, and all the ways it can be twisted up. See for example:

Superstring Theory as Metaphysical Atheism

The Argument to the Ontological Whatsit

Again, this does not mean I have to assume this. Rather, that I don’t have to assume Platonism. My conclusion follows from no assumptions being made at all, but those stated (which are the theist’s assumptions). To “add assumptions” reduces the probability of any competing conclusion, unless you have evidence those assumptions are true. Platonism has no such claim to make.

Yes, Richard. And this “something” is physical. Therefore, it only governs/constrains the physical. We shouldn’t expect it to have any causal influence on potential non-physical objects. Or are you suggesting that the physical can in fact influence and constrain the non-physical?

There are no non-physical objects. So it is moot what influence anything would have on them (or they on anything). But back to the “possibility” of such things, per above, it bears no probability. You can’t get a more probable theory by adding a less probable premise to get to it. So we’re back to my conclusion, following on the facts as we observe them, and only the assumptions of theists, e.g. past finitude, and that nothing must mean nothing.

Or that things can’t come into existence without a cause.

This is a non sequitur. You can’t get from the observation of no supernatural things that pre-existent eternal causes are needed for anything. Those two things aren’t in any way logically related. Draw the logic box of all possibilities and you’ll realize what I’m telling you.

Perhaps you don’t understand what you need to establish something to be (or even probably be) logically impossible; or that failing to do this leaves it left over as logically possible. And the logically possible can never be declared impossible (your word “can’t”).

The simple fact is, the impossibility of the supernatural poses no logical contradiction with the existence of uncaused events. So in no way can it warrant concluding the latter “can’t” exist. You just can’t get there from here.

Thank you for your response. And thanks for sharing the other article in which you defended this ex nihilo thesis! I printed it.

You replied:

“If the physical structure we randomly got could generate supernatural things, we’d have observed that by now.”

I know you did not accuse me of saying this, but I’m not suggesting that some physical structure of our spacetime manifold would generate a non-physical spirit or substance. Rather, a non-physical spirit or substance would come into existence without any efficient or material cause (and this includes our spacetime). Moreover, I don’t think the suggestion that spacetime (and its causal operations/function) prohibits this from happening is intelligible, and the reason is simply that physical laws by definition only govern the physical world. Nobody expects that the law of gravity will apply to angels. Likewise, why should we expect the law of causality (which is just a function of the physical world) to govern or constrain the non-physical?

Unless causality is a kind of a Platonic object or relations among universals (like in David Armstrong or Michael Tooley’s theory of laws of nature), of course. It is not full-blown Platonism. One would just accept causality as a Platonic law. It is very limited and modest version of Platonism/realism about laws.

And, indeed, your observation is very pertinent: we have never observed any concrete non-physical beings by now! We should’ve observed some if they popped into existence without any cause. That could be used as evidence that no thing can do so.

You replied:

“we now are in a region that forbids and allows only specific things to happen, as limited by the structure of the ‘something’ we are in”

Yes, Richard. And this “something” is physical. Therefore, it only governs/constrains the physical. We shouldn’t expect it to have any causal influence on potential non-physical objects. Or are you suggesting that the physical can in fact influence and constrain the non-physical?

You wrote:

“IMO, this is in turn evidence that you can’t get such things (that the supernatural is logically impossible)”

Or that things can’t come into existence without a cause. And, indeed, if my conceptual analysis is correct, then it this conclusion seems inevitable.

Don’t get me wrong, Richard. I don’t endorse apologetics — apologetics is dishonest. I’m against cosmological arguments and all this incoherent stuff. I just want to offer some constructive critique!

I cover accidental supernatural things in The God Impossible.

Also, be aware, I have updated the article you are commenting on with a clearer formulation in The Problem with Nothing.

But to directly answer your point, Platonism is false (and, frankly, incoherent). So no, I am not assuming any Platonic physics here. Causation is not just some magical unexplained random thing that happens. It is a function of the physical structure of the universe that arises (which most likely reduces to some geometry of spacetime: only things our spacetime can be configured into can exist here). If the physical structure we randomly got could generate supernatural things, we’d have observed that by now. So we know that we didn’t get such a physics (unlike a “nothing” state, we now are in a region that forbids and allows only specific things to happen, as limited by the structure of the “something” we are in).

IMO, this is in turn evidence that you can’t get such things (that the supernatural is logically impossible), but that is not an a priori argument (we have no formal proof as yet), only an a posteriori one (we observe it to be the case, and that would be hard to explain but for the conclusion; see The God Impossible).

(1) If your view is that the law of causation is a feature/property/description of the physical world, then it only holds (i.e., governs) “inside” of the physical world. That means other physical things could indeed begin to exist without a cause “outside” (for lack of a precise word) of our physical spacetime. [Unless the universe is spatially infinite; in that case there is simply “nowhere” for the law of causation to not hold.]

(2) If the law of causation is a property of the physical world, then it doesn’t govern potential non-physical substances. Non-physical spirits could still begin to exist without a cause inside and outside of spacetime. And some of these spirits (if sufficiently powerful) could interact with the physical world. Why haven’t any interacted with it by now? In addition, if these spirits exist, that would be a problem for naturalists who reject the existence of concrete non-material things.

One possible way to get around this is to say that this law of causation is a kind of Platonic thing (or some similar object) that is contingent on the physical (and thus began to exist with the physical), but has its own existence (it is not just a description of the physical). This could potentially solve these problems, but are materialists ready accept the existence of a Platonic law? I doubt.

So, I really hope I’m wrong because I loved your post, but I can’t find any flaw in my reasoning.

It would be ∅ |= ◻ ◇ q, where q would be a random selection from the set of all possible sets, i.e. “anything can happen,” i.e. no law governs what will happen, so it is not possible to predict what will happen. To be able to predict what will happen requires something additional to ∅.

Thus, if ∅, then ⊥(z) where z is “nothing can only remain nothing,” as that is a specific prediction, which is logically impossible when ∅. However, it would not be the case that ⊥(y), where y is simply “remains nothing,” as one of the possible outcomes of nothing. And when nothing governs the value of P(n) where n is any possible outcome (from every possible outcome set), all P(n) are equal. Because that is the only logically possible condition on which it is true that m, where m is “nothing makes any P(n) larger or smaller than any other P(n).” And ∅ |= ◻ m.

Even if you imagined it such that the value of P(n) itself is random, the completed condition is identical mathematically (the one just logically reduces to the other). It follows that P(y) equals 1/(infinity), if it is the case that there are infinitely many possible outcome sets. Ergo ∅ |= ◻ (P(y) = infinitesimal).

I’ll remind you again though that it’s semantically misleading to say “logical laws are present,” as that implies they are a thing that applies a force and that they can be removed; logical laws are not “laws” in that sense but simply a description of the state. Since no state can exist that is not described by logical laws (i.e. you can never have any state that disobeys logic, i.e. there is no possible state in which the logically impossible can happen), the “presence” of logical laws can mean nothing more than “no logically impossible thing can happen in the given state.” No “thing” has to be “present” for that to be the case; no “force” or “power” has to be applied to make that the case. And this is why the empty set still entails the logic set. There can be no realizable set empty of logic. That is, literally, logically impossible.

Conversely, adding anything that makes an outcome predictable, negates the condition ∅, i.e. you then no longer have nothing, but you have posited the arbitrary existence of something, a something which is not logically necessarily the case. Which amounts to asserting P(x), where x is whatever law (in this case an actual substantial governing force of some kind) that you are adding above and beyond what is logically necessary, equals 100%. As that value for P(x) follows from no logical necessity (e.g. it is logically possible that P(x) is not 100%, therefore it cannot be necessarily the case that P(x) is 100%), it can only follow by adding something to ∅, which is then no longer ∅.

When instead you work out what is logically necessarily the case when nothing exists to determine the value of P(x), the value of P(x) logically necessarily can only be the same as P(n): every outcome is equally likely. That follows with logical necessity, and thus is always true on ∅. Whereas any other value for any P(n) does not, and thus cannot follow on ∅. Ergo ⊥(P(x) >< 1/[the sum count of all possible outcome sets]); ergo if x is possible, then necessarily, P(x) = 1/[the sum count of all possible outcome sets].

Isn‘t that formalized something like: ∅ |= ◇ q, where q is arbitrary and the empty set symbolizes that only logical laws are present, nothing else?

I’ve explained this to you multiple times now. If you cannot comprehend basic concepts or simple logic, I cannot help you.

For the last time:

If no laws govern what specific thing will happen, then it is logically necessarily the case that any thing can happen.

If it is the case that any thing can happen, and no laws govern which will be more likely to happen, then it is logically necessarily the case that every thing that can happen is as likely to happen as every other thing that can happen.

It is logically impossible for any other thing to be the case.

For example, if some one thing has a higher probability of happening than some other thing, some law or force or entity must be dictating which thing is more probable and by how much. Therefore, by modus tollens, “if p, then q; ~q, ergo ~p”: if [one thing is more probable than another] then [something exists causing that to be the case], ergo if [nothing exists causing that to be the case], then [one thing is not more probable than another].” The statements “one thing is not more probable than another” is tautologically identical to “every thing is equally probable.”

Since “nothing will remain nothing” entails one thing is more probable than all other things (“nothing” then has an outcome probability of 100%), by modus tollens, “nothing will remain nothing” cannot be true when nothing exists to make one thing more probable than another.

I just write with the same right: Now, when nothing exists (except that which is logically necessary), then nothing can happen.

No. You can’t. Because you are declaring something exists: this new law you invented, whereby “nothing can happen” in that condition. You just declared it; you did not deduce it from any logically necessary fact. I am the one removing all such laws and describing what remains. You keep trying to invent laws and declaring them logically necessary. That’s logically invalid. I am describing what logically necessarily follows from the condition “no laws govern what will happen.”

You seem to not understand this. Asserting a single specific thing will happen is asserting a law. Asserting no single specific thing will happen is describing what logically follows in the absence of any laws. Only one of those constitutes a formal logical deduction from a state of absolutely nothing.

But couldn’t I just write with the same right: Now, when nothing exists (except that which is logically necessary), then nothing can happen. Because the only way to start something to happen, is to have some law or force or power or object or agency, in other words some actual thing, that starts it. If you remove all potential, you disallow all possibilities. This is a logically necessary truth.

Both seem equally acceptable. But in the last version you’d need God.