Can you be more specific about how a theist reader of Lataster’s book would estimate some probability differently than he does, thereby weakening the force of an argument he makes that relies on a theist agreeing with a certain probability estimate?

Because if there are no instances of that, I don’t see the relevance of your objection to his book.

(Or are you saying he should defend the validity of logic itself? Which seems an unreasonable objection, so I have charitably assumed that isn’t what you meant.)

Not such as you have in mind. It would be an enormous task to figure out which specific thinkers thought which specific things. There are books about whole schools of thought (e.g. “Stoic beliefs”) but even those over-generalize, and there isn’t anything that attempts this for “Christians” (Which Christians? When? You can see the problem). Overall, science education in antiquity was poor for anyone not a scientist, so most laymen, even elites, but especially elites who didn’t get the best educations or bother to check their facts before they pontificate about philosophy (like Tertullian, who is ignorant of even rudimentary brain science of his own day–or Lactantius, who clearly never took a course in astronomy or read a book on it, yet had firm opinions on the subject that anyone better educated of his time knew had been soundly refuted centuries before–a problem with Christian “intellectuals” that Augustine would complain about a century later), had stupid beliefs that actually didn’t line up with the beliefs of people of the same era who knew what they were talking about. This is similar to today–look at the often shocking ignorance of basic science among creationists (even in Congress, people with law degrees, even medical degrees) and you’ll understand why looking at the stupid things Christian intellectuals believed in antiquity won’t tell you about what properly educated intellectuals of the time believed, any more then than today.

Prof Tim McGrew or some other logical epistemic theist might approach BT from a vastly different ontology. It makes sense to me to confront the following in re to the applicability of BT. Is it even possible for a theist to defend to a non theist belief in the historicity of Jesus Christ as being both justified and true? How would you personally trust the logical method of Bayesianism enough to “check your belief system for logical inconsistencies and correcting them”? You trust yourself, the negotiation process and your ontological adversary enough to genuinely question? How would you negotiate probabilities in practice? Is it a logical axiom to presuppose a rational foundation for ontological confirmation bias? Is it a logical possibility to work with a Bayesian theist if you presuppose all theists are the opposite of “reasonable and objective”? Or can you identify a Bayesian theist you personally would trust to be open to negotiation, well informed, reasonable, objective and with whom you would author an academic and peer reviewed paper for a professional journal? Given the ontological divide, is it even possible for a logical theist and a logical atheist to “share the same relevant expert knowledge” – justified true belief – and work together to ascertain physical and epistemic probabilities re a historical Jesus or the existence of a numinous non object?

There seems to be highly problematic variation and elimination in beliefs (evolutionary epistemology) inherent in human nature, such as what constitutes justified belief in the context of a cult of blood? How does fate and contingency factor into trusting logic? Perhaps these problems are not insurmountable. I think that your honest quest for truth in the spirit of megalopsychos and your sharp logic and your research makes you worthy to attempt such a work. Others seem to be sadly lacking.

http://nontheology.com/2013/11/16/episode-37-raphael-lataster/

If I had any problem with the arguments it was that the invoking of Bayesian reasoning smacked of an appeal to authority, rather than a coherent explanation of how the theory applied to the establishment of the claim under discussion. Nevertheless, 4/5 stars from me.

Like the Gabriel McDonald, above, I found the tone switches a little disconcerting at times. Perhaps I have spend too much of my life reading dreary academic tomes and am insufficiently mentally agile. Nevertheless, I enjoyed it, and am happy that a mainstream university in my adopted country tolerates such well-argued heresy.

I look forward to reading the follow-on PhD thesis.

That being said, he sometimes interjects with some uncharacteristically sloppy language that interferes with the tone of the book, and unfortunately makes it harder to take those sections seriously. On page 146 (Kindle version) he is talking about people whose concept of god takes ambiguity to extremes, such as people who say “God is love”, and “that tree over there, that’s God!” Lataster says “Of course, that is not exclusive at all, as it could be an alternative god, or could simply be what it looks like. A tree. With a squirrel on it. Hangin’ a dump. No Consuela, it’s not the ‘holy mother’, it’s a piece of toast.” This part left me wondering what exactly he was driving at.

I would give it a healthy 4/5 stars–very good, but definitely some room for improvement. I think content-wise, Lataster is spot on (for the most part), but the changing tone/character of the book was tough. I definitely look forward to reading his future work.