Note you might want to read my most recent article first: The Other Problem with Nothing. It corrects many of your misapprehensions and answers many of your evident questions already.

The details are there. But in sum (go there for the why):

1) The Nothing I am dealing with is the most nothing nothing that is logically possible. Nothing more nothing than that can exist (because it entails logical contradictions) and thus we don’t have to address it. There will never have been such a state. Explained in Other Problem.

2) The “How” is existential necessity. When nothing exists to make any outcome more likely than any other, logically necessarily every outcome is equally likely. The rest follows. In other words, this power is a logically necessary property of any logically coherent state of nothing. Again, further explained in Other Problem.

3) Geometric points are locations. This is geometry 101. An infinitesimal point is a place. And there is no way to get rid of it. It is not possible to have less space or time than zero space or time. And yet t = 0 is a time. And x = 0 is a place.

Hence:

I’ve never put my phone on my officemate’s desk, so my phone’s existence on my officemate’s desk has no duration in time. What location of time would my phone be on my officemate’s desk?

Your phone still exists in time even when it is not on his desk. So your analogy makes no sense.

Here’s a better analogy:

At the event horizon of a black hole, time stops. If you threw your phone at a black hole, it would be frozen in time at the event horizon. Your phone then has “zero” time. It is located in time only relative to existing other times. But if all that existed was that event horizon, your phone would have zero extension in time—it did not exist at any other time and has never had any other location in time—yet exists at that one geometric point of time (the zero-point of the horizon). So there is no time there, yet it is still there. If there were no other times (if all that ever existed was a phone experiencing zero passage of time), that would still be the time the phone was at: t = 0.

A better analogy is to get rid of the confusing idea of phones existing when nothing exists and talk about when nothing existed. If everything started to exist suddenly, the time before it when nothing existed is still a time: the time when nothing existed. If there was no time at which nothing existed, then there can’t have been nothing preceding anything, and it would be time and stuff all the way back forever. The only way for there to have ever been a beginning is for there to have been at some time nothing and the only way there could be “at some time” nothing is if there was a time at which there was nothing. That time will have no extension (it will be a geometric point, a place in time, not a duration of time).

More explained in Other Problem.

Likewise:

Is the rule ex nihilo nihil a physical law or a logical necessity?

As noted in the article you are commenting on, no one has ever proved its falsity logically impossible (no logical contradiction is produced by “ex nihilo nihil” being false). So “ex nihilo nihil” is not a logical necessity. The rest follows.

How can we definitively say that Nothing isn’t outside of the universe?

Because if there is a universe, there is something. Therefore, a state of nothing no longer exists. That was obliterated the moment anything came into existence.

The properties of an absolute nothing only obtain when there is absolutely nothing. After that, that state of affairs has been replaced by another, which does not have those properties.

The opportunity for that state of nothing to continue was already passed when there was the 1/infinity chance of it being what was randomly selected to exist and it was not selected. From that moment on, that state of nothing ceased to exist.

We don’t know if it is logically possible for Nothing to cause something.

I just proved it is. That’s the actual argument.

But note, I already mention the possibility case where nothing can’t exist: then there is always something, and discussing the properties of a nothing is moot. The argument here is a conditional argument. It does not argue that this is what happened. It argues that if certain conditions are true, then this is what happened. We don’t know whether those conditions are true. But they are certainly epistemically possible, exactly as proved here. And they weirdly predict all strange observations today, which counts as evidence for the conditions having been met. And that’s the point. (I also mention the extension of this point to past eternal series, but I discuss that more directly in Other Problem too.)

If you can formally prove a state of absolutely nothing is logically impossible (and therefore, logically necessarily, something must always have existed) I’ll revise. Until then, appealing to a proof no one can find is special pleading and thus not a valid objection to anything.

We find that we should expect our universe to go through drastic change constantly

That does not follow. Because the state in which all states are equally likely only exists once. Once it collapses into another state, that other state dictates what continues thereon.

In other words, at “nothing” every state, including remaining nothing, is equally likely. But every other state is something, not nothing. So once a state is selected, its properties (the properties of the selected state) then dictate what happens after that. Not the properties of a nothing-state. Because that was de-selected (and thus chosen to no longer exist) when the nothing-state collapsed into another state (one of the infinitely many states it could have).

I discuss this more, including the aspects of cardinality and permutation theory, in Other Problem.

So it seems you’ll want to read that.

This response is pretty late, so I don’t expect anything from it, but I thought I’d add it anyway. I’ve listed concerns/questions I have about some of the claims made, some more rigorous than others.

Note: This isn’t a question, just a clarification. You reduce “absolute nothing” to Nothing (which is actually something) very quickly. I only note this to say that we are NOT actually talking about absolute nothing. This severely weakens the conclusion that ex nihilo nihil doesn’t hold since the Nothing of nihilo is actually not absolute nothing. You’re proposed Nothing is more akin to a minimal something.

1.) In defense of proposition 2, you claim that Nothing has no duration of time (nor space), but must have a “location” of time. I don’t see why having a 0 duration of time implies that its location exists. I don’t see the contradiction of going a step further by saying that it also has no location of time. If it was logically necessary that it has a location of time, does this mean that space-time already exists (although, maybe not as we know it)? This would mean that space-time is not constrained by a universe. This also wouldn’t mean that nothing caused space-time. (It might be the case that only space and time are necessary, but the same concerns hold.)

Here’s an example. I’ve never put my phone on my officemate’s desk, so my phone’s existence on my officemate’s desk has no duration in time. What location of time would my phone be on my officemate’s desk?

Maybe I don’t understand what you mean here, exactly:

“We can remove all durations of time, until time is a dimensionless point, representing “zero” amount of time. Although that is still a location of time, …”

What is a location of time (what is that)? Time itself? The point? Maybe I read it correctly, and you mean that “nothing” has a location on time.

2.) “That there would be something is logically necessary.” This seems like the biggest weakness of the argument. You say “nothing” can create the universe (or multiverses). How? Something (space-time and other logically necessary things) allowed “nothing” to exist. It just seems like you’re moving the goalpost. At the very least, it doesn’t attack the problem of Ex Nihilo Nihil.

3.) Proposition 3. There seems to be a big problem here. Nothing is entangled with time and space now (potentially not space-time as we know it). This potentially adds on A LOT of logically necessary things, unless time and space don’t mean anything. We’re kind of in a pickle here, though. Does Nothing imply the existence of time? If so, what is time if it’s not what we know it as.

4.) You say this in defense of proposition 4:

“This entails that the assertion ex nihilo nihil, ‘from nothing, comes [only] nothing,’ is false. Because that is a rule, and Nothing contains no rules.”

Is the rule ex nihilo nihil a physical law or a logical necessity? This is where some nasty equivocations are made. It may vary well be that from Absolute Nothing come nothing because you’re not talking about Absolute Nothing. You say that Absolute Nothing is impossible. You’re talking about Nothing, which is different. To be fair, you later question this rule and say there’s no evidence for it.

5.) “It won’t do to say ‘but we don’t see that rule being violated anywhere now,’ because we do not observe Nothing anywhere—everywhere there is something (an expanded spacetime, with contents and properties, governed by now-existent physical laws)—so none of our observations apply to Nothing.”

That’s assuming that Nothing is restrained to our universe, which is unclear. If we only look in our universe, then we will find things of space and time. How can we definitively say that Nothing isn’t outside of the universe? You’re saying that we CAN’T say definitively that nothing comes from Nothing, but we CAN say definitively that Nothing doesn’t exist… anymore? This would mean that time is not past eternal (or else Nothing would never have existed). Notice that even if Nothing exists outside of our universe (or any universe), there’s no rule that says it can’t affect our current universe, so the problem holds.

6.) I feel like I’m losing the thread here:

“And by definition nothing exists when there is Nothing to stop that Nothing from becoming something else.”

Don’t time, space, and everything logically necessary exist? But nothing rules over this Nothing? So time exists, but it’s nothing? Later, you say:

“Of course, what could then come to exist includes time, space, contents, and properties.”

We already said that time and space always necessarily exist. Now, Nothing produces time and space?

7.) The last problem with Proposition 4 is that we don’t know if it is logically possible for Nothing to cause something. We say that no rule applies that says that it can’t be something, but we don’t know if it’s logically possible.

ANL.) The argument for non-locality is lacking. It boils down to one of your necessary conditions for existence being spatial presence, which is an unmotivated premise. Why would this be a necessary condition? Further, how are you so sure that universes don’t exist with no space? You say it’s necessary, but it just doesn’t follow yet.

8.) Proposition 6 has the same hole as Prop. 4. How do know it’s logically possible? Same problem with Prop. 7.

9.) “By definition Nothing contains no rules, properties, or powers.”

Not by your definition, which includes rules like space existing and properties like location.

10.) As you stated, we can’t use the probability space like you did. Even so, assuming you used the Method of Exhaustion fairly, I seems you haven’t considered its many consequences. I’ll introduce more versions of Proposition 8, which have similar follow-up propositions to 9 and 10.

Proposition 8.1: If every logically possible thing that can happen to Nothing has an equal probability of occurring, then every logically possible number of CREATED universes can BE IMMEDIATELY DESTROYED with equal probability.

Proposition 8.2: If every logically possible thing that can happen to Nothing has an equal probability of occurring, then every universe can be

Proposition 8.3.alpha: …, then every logical number of created universe can collide with universe alpha (any given universe alpha).

Proposition 8.3.alpha.t: …, then every logical number of created universe can collide with universe alpha at time t (any given time t).

And why not keep adding possibilities? By the method of exhaustion, we find that we should expect our universe to go through drastic change constantly. Since we don’t, we have at least two reasonable conclusions: This is poor speculation over an undefined probability space and/or it’s logically impossible that our universe experience such things. (There may be more reasonable solutions.) The second conclusion is certainly not proven.

That’s a bit too brief to be useful rhetorically.

I’m more interested in the book it references at the end: Bede Rundle, Why There Is Something Rather than Nothing (Clarendon 2004). It’s too expensive for me to check into, so I can’t tell its value or if it shores up the argument made in the video, but it would be worth looking at if I ever get a chance.

But overall, the video is arguing a slightly different thing than me, but does overlap. In a sense they are providing the sub-argument for my argument. Where I point out that it is logically impossible to have nothing in the sense of “no” zero-point of spacetime (since that would be a contradiction, to say there is “no” “no” spacetime, a double negative that would entail coherently a positive spacetime; so a zero-point of spacetime is the least thing that can ever exist). I make a more extended argument for this in my other article The Argument from Non-Locality.

There are philosophers who have made similar arguments in formal venues (see What If We Reimagine ‘Nothing’ as a Field-State? for a scientific formulation; for philosophical formulations and attempts to rebut them that, IMO, don’t really hold up: The Puzzle of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?)

What do you think of this argument? It seems somewhat similar to yours, at least in spirit…

Why is there SOMETHING rather than NOTHING? Why is there anything at all?

Yeah. That’s how logical necessity works.

It is logically impossible to lack a potential and any actual thing negating it.

That’s the entire point. See the field-theory example for more.

These are illogical statements.

I already explain here why “absolutely nothing” logically entails all potentials: it is logically impossible to have both no actuals and no potentials. So the condition you are proposing being logically impossible, we can rule it out. This is shown even when framed as field theory (see What If We Reimagine ‘Nothing’ as a Field-State?). There is nothing “surreptitious” about this. It’s explicitly discussed in the article.

As for nothing being “nothing in a mind,” that’s logically impossible. If there is a mind, there is something, and so the state then described cannot be “nothing.” My argument follows from subtracting all actual things. That includes minds (necessarily). This is also explained in the article, already.

On the separate question of whether it is even possible for a mind to exist when nothing else does, see my followup articles: The God Impossible and then The Argument from Specified Complexity against Supernaturalism.

… not to mention that his nothing is obviously the idea of nothing in a mind… which clearly presupposes a mind, and any abstract notion presupposes a mind that has abstracted it from whatever concrete … and just like any idea it can disappear without a trace, while the mind is always there in the beginning… so…

so you are saying that it is perfectly safe to say that Nothing already contains any potentiality because there is nothing in Nothing that would restrict it from containing any potentiality to become whatever… ( the assertion that it can become anything even without having the potential to become it, because this is less restrictive, is exactly like saying that it already does contain the potential to become anything)…
… it’s perfect… i love it.. this is much freedom..
… of course now you have to explain where does the law saying that nothing can become stuff that it is not restricted to become, comes from…
… and you’s gonna say that of course this law is already there because there’s nothing in Nothing that restricts that law from already being there…
.. .but i gonna say that you’re assuming the law of Nothing containing all laws that it is not explicitly restricted from containing…

and we can go on like this forever… i love it…

I’ve written a lot on the subject in those six years.

For the most recent, which answers some of your questions, see:

What If We Reimagine ‘Nothing’ as a Field-State?

But in short, that nothing must have some properties is logically entailed by its description. The only way to get those properties to go away (the only way to subtract them without creating a logical contradiction) is to add things (barriers, forces, something) to keep nothing stable and thus stay nothing. So there is no “nothing” more nothing than I describe. Any attempt to define one leads to logical contradictions (nothing exists and at the same time something exists controlling what will happen).

This would not be the case if we could prove that it is logically necessarily the case that when nothing exists nothing can ever happen. But no one has produced such a proof despite thousands of years trying. Precisely because that is not necessarily the case, when “nothing” exists that won’t be the case—because only necessary things can still exist when nothing exists. Everything else is contingent. Hence “nihil ex nihilo” is a contingent property (not a logically necessary one) and therefore won’t exist when nothing exists. Something has to cause whatever force or power maintains “nihil ex nihilo”; and something is not nothing. Nothing is what remains when you remove even that.

That said, one can redefine nothing to be logically impossible, such that nothing + logically necessary things is something. But that’s just semantics. You can replace everything in my argument with that and it does not change the outcome. Just redefine nothing as “something” in the sense of “nothing but any logically necessary properties of nothing.” The conclusion still follows. It cannot then be objected to that there could be something more nothing than that, because semantically you just defined that possibility out of existence (since it is logically impossible for nothing to lack logically necessary properties, a nothing that lacked those properties is logically impossible and therefore can never have existed).

One might then try to semantically say that this means there has always been something. But that gets us back to Ockham’s Razor: what is more likely, that this (the simplest state possible, lacking all contingent things) is where things began, or that some inexplicably gigantically complex thing just always existed for no reason (whether it’s a god or a multiverse or an amorphous chaos or whatever). Obviously the former is the vastly simpler and thus a vastly more likely explanation.

This holds even if there wasn’t a beginning, because then you need an existential reason why that past eternal series exists rather than none or some other, and the answer is the same: if nothing existed to choose what would exist, then what would exist would be selected existentially at random. The conclusion of my article then follows.

I am not even sure if this thread is still active. It appears this occurred almost 6 years ago now. But I am very interested in your description of “nothing.” Yes, I am a Christian but I am not going to attack you for not being one. Your argument is extremely well put. I also notice that I am out manned by intellect by the millions of miles haha. My question though is this: You described nothing even absolute nothing as even something while it was completely desolate of any such “thing” it’s what makes it nothing because its not something. Wouldn’t the fallacy be that even though you describe nothing you are giving assuming its attributes based on its opposite something? If the argument by definition is just the opposite of something then your entire premise is based off in fact the necessity must exist. I’m not trying to make the “necessary argument” I am just saying that your argument hinges on the fact that it requires something to truly have nothing. If something does not predate the nothing then what are you actually describing? Your argument is compelling truly I mean that so compelling I found it hard to follow and fathom. But its a linear regression based on the premise of “something” making it also necessary that the opposite of nothing must exist. By the same counter argument if logically nothing is impossible a linear progression from eternity past to nothing to something also is relevant. You have opened the door to actually disprove your thesis. The entire premise hinges on the understanding of something making that something the most important aspect of your nothingness argument. This then would make you have to account for the definition of the opposites of what your describing and also include it into understanding and stance you take. Something existed in order for nothing to Be…. Respectfully I hope this message reaches you.