Yesterday I started this two part series explaining what I am doing and why (so please catch up there), and went through an extended example from R.G. Price. Today I will finish with the second example, now from David Oliver Smith (channeling Robert Eisenman). And I then wrap the series below with a conclusion explaining what we can and should learn from both. I will sometimes refer back to the examples and discussion from Price in my discussion of Smith, so you will need to read Part 1 to get it all.
D.O. Smith and Overtrusting Cranks
My example from Smith is from The Bible Tells Me So (2022), chapter three. There Smith argues that the Dead Sea Scrolls are Christian texts that refer to the Apostle Paul as the Spouter of Lies. Which warrants initial doubt owing to the fallacy of Suspicious Coincidence (better known as Base Rate Neglect): it would be weirdly lucky that, of the dozens of sects and hundreds of communities in Judaism of the time, the only first-century sectarian documents we find a stash of “just happen” to be from the same sect and even people we want them to be. That’s initially so unlikely you really need very good evidence of it. Otherwise it’s too improbable to assume.
Yet Smith has no actual evidence for this, much less “very good” evidence. Because right away a common mistake across his whole chapter’s argument is:
- Evidence already expected to exist cannot be evidence for your theory.
I’ll just give one example, but there are many across the chapter. His table showing common phrases between Paul and the Scrolls (and that they often cite and riff on scripture) contains nothing remarkable (83–87); with another (91–94) that merely jumbles common messianic ideas with commonalities of exegesis and ethics and problems entirely generic to any sect relative to (or indeed even prior and ancestral to) Christianity. Some of the claims in these tables, however, are actually false. And I will be focusing on a key selection of those below. But don’t forget the other half of the methodological lesson: for a fact to be evidence for a theory, that fact must be unexpected on any other explanation; and to be good evidence, it must be very unexpected. Nothing here qualifies. Everything he lists would be worth listing alongside good examples. But there are no good examples. And that’s Smith’s single most pervasive mistake here.
And by this I mean none of the other stuff on these tables is peculiar enough to only be there on Smith’s specific radical thesis. They are all expected for any person of the era of any similar sectarian bent. Not even the same sect is necessary; any ideological cousin or even predecessor would use the same vocabulary and ideas. To get an actual demonstration of awareness (which is only half Smith’s theory) requires a lot more than that (again, see my discussion of mimesis criteria in Proving History at the end of chapter five); and to go the remaining mile and get the more amazing conclusion—that these are the very same people talking about the very same things—you need even better evidence than that. And Smith doesn’t have that. Instead he fills this chapter with outrageously overconfident assertions of “evidence” that a reader unawares won’t know doesn’t really exist or isn’t peculiar enough to carry the required weight.
But the false facts are worse. So I’ll now turn to those.
I am really disappointed in this, because unlike his usual practice, I think Smith was dangerously lazy in his research and thinking here. I’ll start with the most fatal mistake: dating the dead sea scrolls. Very inexplicably Smith declares these “were written between the 2nd century BCE and the 2nd century CE.” Every expert knows they had to have been written before they were deposited in the caves and abandoned, which occurred during the Jewish War and thus before the year 70. So none can have been written even in the later 1st much less 2nd century. Carbon dates that make later dates possible are relatively rare and thus consistent with expected error. And you cannot build a hypothesis on what is already expected by error. Yes, some serious scholars have made that mistake, but it’s still a mistake. Which is another reason amateurs need to be more cautious: if you can’t tell when an expert is making a mistake, you need to divert more time and resources to making sure they aren’t.
I am assuming Smith did not mean a “literal” between, as in, excluding the second centuries BCE and CE, because that’s false on the low end (many were indeed written in the second century BCE, not “all” of them after). Either way, maybe Smith is only guilty of catastrophically confused or tendentious wording here (he certainly didn’t get any of this from his cited sources). But although that’s its own problem, the real problem is worse—because unlike that, this cannot be corrected and his argument survive: Smith derives his strange conclusion almost entirely from the Habakkuk pesher, by simply assuming without argument that it dates to the late first century, and even indeed refers to the Ananias who served as high priest in 62 AD, executing James in Josephus—a James whom Smith says is the Teacher of Righteousness referred to in the scrolls, and Ananias the “the Wicked Priest” (see instead this mainstream summary of the relevant cast of characters).
Smith’s entire chapter’s argument depends on this. The problem is that Pesher Habakkuk has been carbon dated to the century before that. The probability of it dating to the mid-60s A.D. or any year A.D. is too small to credit. Accordingly, all mainstream scholars believe the Wicked Priest belongs to a historical narrative in the community’s past that could have occurred in the first, second, or even third century BC, and has nothing to do with the Roman era at all.
Unfortunately, Smith relies overmuch here on fringe expert Robert Eisenman. But that guy’s work is rife with wildly implausible literary pareidolia and a bizarre immunity to contrary evidence, to the extent that, in my opinion, he is probably insane. Which may have gotten worse over time, similarly to Jerry Vardaman (an analogous case I document in Hitler Homer). Eisenman’s ideas are so rambling and crazy he was literally shouted off the stage at an academic conference once by several sober colleagues in the audience—and I know this because I was there. No one should be taking anything this guy says without stern triple-checking skepticism. And here Smith’s failure at that kicks the legs out from under his whole theory: Smith has gullibly just believed Eisenman’s crank efforts to deny or obfuscate the carbon date of pHab (without even mentioning that has happened), and then bought into a whole crazy theory built on top of Eisenman’s own red string board—for Eisenman’s the one who first argued this is all about Christians and Paul. Everyone else laughs this off, well they should.
Not knowing your source is a crank, and not checking whether anything they are saying is true or even arguable, is a common amateur mistake. This may be because amateurs are confused by cranks with actual credentials, falsely believing a relevant PhD and cv or even prestige (just as with Vardaman) immunizes them from being full of shit. Nope. Sorry. You have to check first. Yet Smith didn’t even read his own academic source (Doudna, 455–56), who warns that Eisenman’s redating claims have not held up and are probably false. For pHab the 95% interval maxes at 2 AD, which means the probability is below 2.5% that it came later, and a great deal below that for “later by sixty years.” The 68% interval at the most recent and reliable testing tells us the most probable period of transcription is 88–2 BC (Doudna, 474). Paleographic cross-dating (by handwriting style) gets the same result: last half of the first century BC, not AD.
It really is worth noting whom Smith is gullibly trusting here. Eisenman teamed up with the infamous amateur Joseph Atwill (yes, that Joseph Atwill) to try and contest the carbon dating results for this text (because the evidence, as it actually is, refuted him) and to insist instead that there was a decent probability that this pesher did date to the early first century—albeit to less than a one in six chance, an actual mathematical consequence of his argument he kind of avoids telling anyone, because he wants to rely on the possibiliter fallacy that any nonzero chance he is right entails he is right. But he’s not. Even with a 95% confidence level you can expect 1 in 20 results to be outside a given range by error alone, so finding one that is, across hundreds tested, is expected, and therefore cannot support a belief in a rare erroneous date. But cranks loathe probability theory. It is the enemy of all tinfoil. Which is why amateurs should not let themselves be snookered by their bullshit. They need to understand probability theory.
All of which was patiently explained to Eisenman by an actual scientist (painfully pointed out again by Doudna). Which means this is very much like young earth and flat earth and indeed shroud of Turin enthusiasts insisting the science that refutes them “must be wrong,” so then scientists have to patiently explain to them why they don’t know what the fuck they are talking about and can they please go away. Smith didn’t get the memo. He fell for Eisenman’s tinfoil hat. But even if Eisenman were right, that would still entail the probability of this Smith-Eisenman theory about Paul is true will be less than 17%. Because the premise it depends on (the date of pHab) cannot be more likely than that even granting Eisenman’s argument about the carbon dating. So any theory relying on that premise must be less likely still. This is, again, a basic reality of conjunction, just as I explained yesterday for Price. And since Eisenman’s bollocks about carbon dating isn’t even correct, the relevant probability is even less than his imagined one-in-six chance (surely below even a 2% chance).
Which is the second lesson here:
- When your entire argument relies on a crucial premise, you need to make sure that premise is probable, and establish it before continuing to build on it.
“My conclusion follows if we trust a bunch of cranks refuted by real scientists” is methodology failure 101. Do not do this. And when you catch someone doing this, count it as strike one. They get only two. Third strike and you spend no more time on it. Shelve the book and move on to some other author or subject. Because while “maybe” the improbable thing is true, you have no warrant to believe it is.
So what could Smith do to recover from this? Not much. To reverse the consequences of such a low probability premise you need evidence that’s, say, a hundred times more likely on the unexpected date than any other explanation of that evidence, and that simply isn’t what Smith or Eisenman have. Their explanations are all less likely than mainstream ones, not more—much less a hundred times more. While Smith could try to rewrite his entire book with the high chronology model of Christian origins, which places the letters of Paul in the 50s BC and the origin of Christianity in the 70s BC (see How Do We Know the Apostle Paul Wrote His Epistles in the 50s A.D.? along with the scholarship in Historicity §8.1 and Paradigm 57–60), abandoning his belief that pHab refers to Ananias, that still reduces the probability of his thesis to below the probability already attending that model. So, for example, if Smith’s theory is (let’s say) “as likely as” any alternative high chronology model, and high chronology is (let’s say) 10% likely, then Smith’s theory cannot be more than 5% likely. It’s hard to make any progress from there. And as I explained for Price above, once you start stacking these improbable “total rewrites of existing evidence” (or any other “giant leaps of logic”) in your premises, that “less than 5%” quickly becomes “so far below 1% as to vanish under rounding error.” You’re pretty much done at that point.
And that’s what happens here. Because Smith goes on to assert a string of falsehoods as facts, and I can only assume he is getting this string of baloney from Eisenman and just believing it all for some reason. For example, Smith says pHab describes the Spouter of Lies “as creating churches based upon blood” (57). No such passage exists in pHab. There are no churches. The Spouter of Lies is never described as creating such a thing, nor “upon blood” in any relevant sense. Somehow this is supposed to convolutedly refer to Paul preaching a blood atonement in Christ, and therefore preaching that “his congregations should ignore the Law of Moses.” But this doesn’t exist there either. None of those things show up or connect in the text as Eisenman’s crazed mind imagines.
Smith cites 1QpHab 10:9–10 here, which doesn’t say any of that. I’ll use a translation of the commentary here free to access but I checked several (including Lim’s, below) to confirm it’s not being tendentious. This scroll is commenting on the condemnation of military violence in Habakkuk 2:12–13 (“woe to him who builds a city with bloodshed and establishes a town by injustice!” and very specifically it says a city, not a synagogue or congregation, and clearly is referring by blood to violence), which the commentary quotes (pHab 10:6–8), followed by its secret interpretation (pHab 10:9–13):
The interpretation of the matter concerns the spreader of lies who deceived many, building a worthless city by blood and forming a community by lies for his own glory, making many toil at useless labor, teaching them in shameful falsehood. Their toil will be for nothing. Because of this they will undergo firey punishments because they blasphemed and reviled God’s chosen ones.
In preceding and following sections it is clear the commentator has in mind actual (not figurative) military oppression (pHab 9, it’s about “the priests of Jerusalem” who “will gather unrighteous riches from the plunder of the people”; 12, “murder in the city and violence in the land” means the actual city of “Jerusalem” and “the cities of Judah,” etc.)—spilling blood by violence, and for greed and power, and in aid of adorning actual cities, not some convoluted ritual role for blood, nor some figure for churches. There is nothing here that connects to Paul or Christianity at all. Yes, Eisenman piles gigantic stacks of epicycles to “extract” a convoluted different meaning here, but that’s all made up. The evidence as it is does not contain any of this. So we cannot claim it’s here.
This is like Price “changing” the evidence refuting him into evidence supporting him by rewriting all the evidence with convoluted theorizing. But once again that goes in the opposite direction: the improbability of his every conjecture stacks against the conclusion, not in favor of it. If we need, say, five conjectures to reinterpret all the words and senses and contexts in this entry of pHab, and each is even an admirably 30% likely (relative to plainer explanations), not only is Smith’s then-resulting conclusion less than 30% likely (which means: not likely, and therefore we should not believe it), but it’s less than 0.30^5 = 0.30 × 0.30 × 0.30 × 0.30 × 0.30 = 0.00243 or one fifth of one percent likely. Which is so unlikely it vanishes to zero under rounding error (Bayesians might note that this can be avoided with an argument from relative likelihoods, but that is not an available escape here). So why is Smith telling us this dubious conclusion is a fact? Why does he not mention that this is an extremely tendentious and dubious understanding of the text rejected by almost every expert alive? Does he not know that? Did he just believe Eisenman? Sure, “every expert alive” can be wrong. But you need to admit to your readers that’s what you are claiming. And then you’d better have some kickass proof. Yet assertions are not even “a” proof, much less as would kick any ass.
Smith’s whole chapter is like that, a litany of factually false claims or unproven claims asserted as facts. I clocked one to ten errors like this on every page. And that’s just not excusable. You can’t just make a bunch of wild statements as if they are established facts and not even argue for them. That’s quintessentially bad method. It’s most pernicious because the reader is being told these are facts. They thus have no idea which sentences are actually asserting completely dubious epicyclic interpretations. Price at least was clear which he was doing. Smith was not. And that’s bad.
Readers won’t know what’s left out either. For example, Smith’s bizarrely convoluted narrative seems to flatly contradict Paul’s eyewitness repeatedly, without explaining why that’s okay or even that it’s happening. For example, Paul says he was never known in Judea until after he converted, and was an avid harasser of the church before he converted. This was almost a credally accepted fact. But Smith says Paul started a member of the community and then rebelled against it. That simply doesn’t track. It wildly deviates from all available evidence. Which makes Smith’s theory even more improbable. Smith also depends on many other dubious facts, such as that James was called the “Just” at any time prior to late second century mythology, and “therefore” James is the Dead Sea Scrolls’ “Teacher of Righteousness,” when that is the least likely evidence-based identification in the literature (see Harkins and Chilton and Painter and Davies).
But as just another representative example of this bad reasoning, Smith is duped by Eisenman’s claim that pHab refers to Paul preaching that the Gentiles need not adopt Torah. Note that Paul never preaches that Jews should abandon Torah—the first that ever shows up as an idea is Hebrews, and as Paul never has to defend himself from being associated with such a teaching, we can be sure it did not exist when he last wrote. But regardless, neither teaching shows up in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Contrary to Smith, it’s not even in the Damascus Document, which only describes violators of the community’s own special interpretation of the Law of Moses and what to do about them. It never mentions anyone preaching the abandonment of Torah, nor even preaching rejection of their interpretation. It only refers to breakers of the law. That’s it. Smith cites CD 1:14–17 as if it does, but that describes “scoffers” who mocked or broke the law in the time of Nebuchadnezzar, hundreds of years before, and not some current Jewish leader arguing believers could abandon Torah and still be saved or Gentiles could join up without it. Indeed CD describes those people as long dead and no longer an active concern. The DSS fragments of the CD are too damaged to contradict this. So there is no factual reality for Smith to refer to here. But his readers won’t know that. That’s bad.
So when Smith goes on (gullibly trusting Eisenman) and quotes pHab 5:11–12 as referring to the Man of Lies as one “who rejected the Torah in the midst of all their assembly” (a thing Paul never actually argued), the reader won’t know that “the Man of the Lie that had rejected The Law in the midst of all their company” refers to that community’s specific interpretation of the law, and to the Man not heeding it when arriving there. There is no reference to this man preaching that anyone could be saved without following Torah, or even that anyone should “reject, spurn, despise” Torah rather than their interpretation of it. It is just saying he refused to follow their law on his visit. And they are using a common phrase for anyone who breaks the law (e.g. Isaiah 5:24, Jeremiah 6:19 and 14:19, Amos 2:4). There is no description here of a Torah-free gospel being taught. Nor is any connection made to blood here (at all, much less as permitting abandoning Torah). These things can only be invented by unevidenced epicycles. Which is changing the evidence; not building on it. For a proper methodological treatment of this section see Timothy Lim, The Earliest Commentary on the Prophecy of Habakkuk (80–84). Eisenman’s exegesis is rank crankery by comparison.
And that’s the merest sample. There is more. The stack of all the improbabilities across Smith’s chapter weighs a ton and a spool. I can’t honestly justify fisking the scores of errors that plague Smith here. He’s well past strike three. Book gets shelved. I’m moving on. But as with Price, I will end with how Smith, too, could be on to something: a far more credible case can be made that these are texts from the same sect precedent to Peter (not Paul) snaking it in a new direction, even using the history and ideas it built up. So we could be looking at the texts of the very sect that Christianity was spawned out of, from the generation or two prior. But even that conclusion is unprovable; just tantalizingly possible, but at least closer to 50% rather than zero. And it doesn’t get any of the other conclusions Smith wants to argue in his book. So he’d have to throw most of that away and start over.
Conclusion
Amateurs have a high rate of failure. That’s why training and experience matter. Getting a relevant PhD literally reduces your failure rate, by skilling you in the relevant background knowledge that can catch more errors and develop better contextual estimates of priors and likelihoods, and by burning away mistaken modes of reasoning through thousands of hours of professional advice and criticism. Which includes training you to avoid handwavy arguments and rely on well-tested and careful methods of fact-checking, wording of points, and citing evidence and sources—and stating when confidence must be low, rather than replacing that caution with overconfidence. One of the most important outputs of this is supposed to be teaching you to tell when you are misusing a method you saw someone else use but didn’t understand why it was valid in their case and thus might not be in yours.
The rate of bad arguments (and even outright crankery) from PhDs tells us the vetting process is not so reliable that you can just “trust” all this has happened and therefore an expert “can’t” be making any of the mistakes they were supposed to have been taught not to. You do still have to check. And checking means more than just fact-checking (did they correctly describe provable facts, and, crucially, did they clearly demarcate facts from inferences or conjectures) but also logic-checking. And logic-checking requires understanding logic, and especially in empirical sciences like history, probability logic. Why do methods work when they do? Why do they fail when they do? The answer is always in how they are moving from one probability to another. And when you are falling victim to literary and cognitive pareidolia, this means being able to identify when that’s happening to you—and thus know when you are building a genuinely sound argument from and to a probability, and when you are not.
In R.G. Price’s case, he relied on too many improbable theories, a whole stack of wild theories, to get the one wild theory at the end to work—and didn’t realize that reduces rather than increases the probability he is right. I suspect he mistook valid backgrounding, and valid methods of stacking coincidences to make them unlikely rather than expected, as warrant for rampant epicycling, and ignoring multiple comparison and conjunction fallacies. He also didn’t correctly apply knowledge of ancient Greek and literary composition theory, as an expert would always know to do.
In D.O. Smith’s case, he overtrusted what he should have known to be cranks, and by not acting more skeptically and carefully, got snowed into someone else’s red string board, on a premise he didn’t realize was scientifically too improbable to carry the argument. Which reduced the probability of his cognitively elated idea about Paul and Qumran below the probability of that dubious premise, which was already pretty low. He then failed to logic-check anything his crank sources argued, and gullibly ended up just repeating their illogical bullshit as if it were a body of established facts. More competence would have skilled Smith in spotting, on his own, the fallacies here that would have made him suspicious of his sources’ reliability, and thus begun a cascade of logic- and fact-checking that would have unraveled the whole conspiracy theory he was being seduced by.
We need to all be on our guard against these mistakes because we are all prone to make them in every aspect of our lives, in deciding what to believe, in deciding who to trust and distrust, in deciding what’s happening in the world politically and economically and culturally. It’s not just about an obscure method applied to obscure topics in an obscure field of study. The mistakes we are seeing here are common across all human thought—and that means across everything you yourself think about. So you need to learn these lessons. That they are being taught here with fringe biblical studies stuff is incidental to the lesson. It’s just the example from which you can learn, to adapt the same principles to things more momentous and less obscure.
For more on probabilistic logic see my category tags critical thinking, historical method, and Bayes’ Theorem.
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Personally I think the articles were a little too harsh with calling them amateurs, which might be true, but I think it is somewhat unnecessarily exclusive. Because even if the conclusions are wrong they could be addressed on the book’s or individual’s level without castigating the amateur category as a whole… Regardless, informative articles as always.
I disagree.
We live in a post truth era when everyone is claiming expertise doesn’t matter so everyone can have “their own truth.”
That is destructive. Indeed, it leads to societal psychosis.
We have to stop the bleed and forcefully explain why being an expert vs. an amateur matters, what it is about expertise that makes that difference, and thus why amateurs need even more skepticism and checking to trust the results of.
The fact of the matter is that these errors were in fact caused by these scholars’ being amateurs. And all amateurs need to be cautioned accordingly. Or else all we’ll get is tons more bad literature and bad arguments drowning the field of publication and wasting millions of hours of human labor and attention.
The person you profiled here probably thought he was on solid ground because he thought he could rely on the conclusions of a credentialed expert in the field. Probably the most reasonable thing to say is that amateur writers and their readers should be twice as wary of any wildly divergent conclusion from the mainstream they come up with or read, and should do the due diligence of checking the arguments they come across. Also it is important to become (very) fluent in the language you’re analyzing if you’re gonna examine hidden metaphors and coded language like Mr. Price did.
Yes, but you’ll notice: The underlying failure is still the arrogance.
After all, if you’re non-expert, why should you choose the one guy you like and assume he’s right? You know you’re not an expert. You check the credentials, you check what other folks say about them, you investigate a little, if it matters to you… or if you, say, are talking about it in public.
And once you have realized that you are reading and liking a fringe expert, not only should that inspire the diagnostics in your brain to make sure you’re not being emotionally manipulated, but also you should be able to say, “I’m not an expert so I actually have no ground to ignore all these other experts, but I do find this compelling”.
In line with what Richard is saying:
No honest amateur minds being called an amateur.
If you do great work despite being an amateur, that’s something to be proud of. And the feedback from experts helps you there.
And if you consistently do good work, you’ve become an expert.
Honest amateurs are eager to prove that what they’re doing holds up.
I think it’s there are hierarchies which are justifiable and hierarchies which are not. Hierarchies that are fair, that are based on genuine competence are needed in society and trust in those hierarchies is needed.
I.e if we don’t have a society where people trust doctors, but instead listen to the president telling them to drink bleach if they have Covid, things go downhill pretty quickly.
Likewise, if you have a society where people don’t trust or respect teachers, it´s no great surprise that Education is a bit of a mess, high social status of teachers is actually one of the strongest correlates with PISA results.
Priests are an example of a hierarchy, which is based on nonsense, same with Freudian literary critics, there´s no point listening to either as it´s just based on politics, defending dogmas etc.
History has a justified hierarchy as the discipline ha a well established method, refined over many years of development that has lead into new insights across a range of periods. Someone who is an amateur is unlikely to know as much as someone with a PHD, and interestingly, in the UK, if you write a history book, that meets standards you can get it recognised as a Phd, often alumni have a right to have their books submitted for consideration for a PHD for free and some universities will do it for a fee.
I am skeptical of all hierarchies, but it is definitely the case that if we are meaning differences in expertise… yeah, that’s a contingent, possibly temporary, specific “hierarchy” that non-narcissists and non-idiots happily abide by.
I think being cautious about trusting hierarchies is fine and I think authorities do need to demonstrate that they are needed. Chomsky´s example of parental authority being justified, is a good one, i.e parents are obviously justified to have a decent, though not absolute authority over kids, i.e grabbing their arms to stop them running into traffic.
I think academic authorities are ones that can be justified, though with lots of controls to prevent abuses of power, as nobody can be an expert in everything. People also do have different kinds of talent and knowledge, I don´t think my opinions on physics should matter as much as Roger Penrose´s . I think you also need people to verify what level of skills or expertise someone has in a field and a system of certification. It´s important, of course, to teach the public at large the basics of why science is better than religion and tbh, I think this is one thing that is done fairly well in the UK.
I also think that the authority of teachers over schoolchildren is justified, again, I would never want anything like the Victorian era education system (which a lot of politicians love), but it´s impossible to get education to work, unless there is a certain level of respect of the people teaching you, based on the fact that they´ve done a relevant qualification and their job is to help students learn. That respect can be lost, i.e if the teacher does something horrendous, but it doesn’t work if parents and children just feel they can have dismissive attitudes, and too many parents in the US, UK and Spain feel that way and it´s hurting education. I say that agreeing with people like Ken Robinson, that there’s a lot we could do to make the education system more personalised and more flexible.
You also can’t run any large organisation, be it a school, be it a factory, be it a hospital without discipline and without enforcement systems. I think we can do better than the ones we have at the moment, and I think industry should be run more democratically. You can´t expect people to always behave well if they´re let to their own devices, i.e there are people who won’t take safety measures seriously.
Broadly agreed… however, I would note that, even in schools, challenging hierarchy as often as possible is often very helpful. Letting children be free thinkers who don’t listen and obey but rather understand, in a Deweyan perspective, can be really profound in terms of unleashing their potential. So even when you can see a very clear case of care and a biological reason (the gap between the cognitive abilities of children and adults), it’s often good to at least test whether the hierarchy is necessary. Oftentimes, we find that it’s not.
I think that the rights of the child are very important and I think all countries should adopt the UN charter of the rights of the child into their domestic law (and make sure they are implemented) and that importantly includes a right of the child to be listened to, which is important, both in terms of family law and in terms of education.
I think good education systems do take childrens´ interests into account by providing a wide variety of subjects, including for children that are not academic. I don’t believe in forcing students to study a subject they show no aptitude or interest in either. Of course, children can develop a new interest if their teacher is sufficiently motivating, I think we can all think of times we weren’t particularly interested in something until someone showed us how interesting and useful it can be.
At the same time, in practice, it´s quite hard to run a school if there is constant questioning of the teachers all the time, and often it´s worse than that, it´s assaults, verbal abuse (by parents and students). It´s also quite a common tactic of teenagers to waste time in lessons. Of course, in a school that is generally good and well run, that should be less of a problem and schools do tend to have less discipline problems if students are listened to.
Another big problem is our good old friend the Dunning-Krueger effect. It´s hard to appreciate the relevance of any subject, or be aware of your level of understanding unless you have a certain degree of competence in that subject and it´s something both students and many parents lack.
To think about a problem, you also have to have quite a lot of knowledge about it. I think there’s a lot of evidence direct instruction plus modelling works well at lower levels and you can then do more free inquiry as students progress. That doesn’t mean no critical thinking, far from it, if you´re teaching history, you want to teach source analysis quite early and why it´s important, then give the students real examples to practise on and then do a review, but it will take a while before their ready to investigate big questions.
You’ll notice, though, nothing you just identified requires hierarchy.
If we’re running a totally non-hierarchical book club but someone refuses to read the books and filibusters with another book, we’re going to kick them out of the book club. Ditto if they attack others.
Being able to protect yourself and enforce rules that apply to everyone (as the teacher also needs to be not be attacking people or interrupting students during a presentation) doesn’t require a fixed hierarchy.
I think they do in larger organisations though, human behaviour is rather different in large organisations compared to small groups, say up to the size of a hunter-gatherer tribe.
You can use social pressure to get people to behave in smaller units, where people feel part of the group, it´s less effective in bigger organisations, where people form lots of “mini-tribes” of one sort or another and that´s their primary loyalty and they don’t care what other people think.
Like, you couldn’t have persuaded the South rationally to give up segregation (which is what Barry Goldwater claimed to want to do), the only way you could do it, was to pressure the Feds to intervene. Most Southern Whites thought segregation was fine and dandy and people trying to shame them to end it, only egged them on. The civil rghts tactics were effective however, in getting LBJ to act.
You can also easily get cliques emerging, for example, you can have departments where professors don’t give a damn about the undergrads and just pass off the teaching to post-docs and design really bad courses. You do need someone to step in, in that case and say “hey stop that shit”, as you can’t expect them to change things without being made to.
Who do you think the spouter of lies is, if it’s any person from history?
No one knows. I link here to discussions that explain the leading theories, all of which are plausible.
The one thing that is clear is that these texts reference a local community memory (something that happened to them and their dear leader, either a generation before or even a century before). And that memory involved certain labeled enemies who were real people (likely major political actors, e.g. the Wicked Priest clearly is an actual high priest, the highest rank attainable in the Jewish system short of king or equivalent), and who were engaged in some kind of abusive taxation and greed and violence, and were deemed by the cult violators of Torah and thus evil (the standard anti-temple rhetoric, “all other sects break faith with God and the law” reasoning, and so on).
There is a likely reference to Romans getting involved militarily in pHab. Unfortunately that could refer to events anytime from the Maccabeean-Roman alliance in the 160s BC to the more direct interventions of Pompey in the 60s BC. They are too vague to nail any of this down, because the authors know the community history, and don’t expect people thousands of years later to have access to it (this cult expected the world to end soon, so “distant future readers” of their reference materials was not on their radar as a thing they had to account for).
There is some question of whether the players even are different people (is The Wicked Priest and the Spouter of Lies the same guy?) but the most common conclusion is that they are collaborators, the Spouter is a defector/traitor of the cult who allied with their opposition, the temple priesthood, but like the Wicked Priest who leads that state faction, the Spouter is someone of considerable station, and not just a rando (they are treated as someone with intercity state authority and as having ambassadorial and administrative status outside the cult).
The Wicked Priest would typically be the leader of the Sadducees and the most common reading is that the Liar is the leader of the Pharisees, someone who heads the Great Sanhedrin for example would be a likely candidate, and they could in turn be a seneschal or procurator of the Maccabean or Hasmonean King (whichever king it was then). It’s clear the cult is completely fringe—they have no allies in the state or anywhere outside their enclave, and see themselves as persecuted by everyone in those groups.
Do people go too far in noting similarities between Early Christianity and the Essenes? Peter was probably Greek literate and not as fringe as members of the Qumran community. Early Christians in general seem to have been more well off and not as sidelined as these people. Do you think the DSS community were simply the more extreme or radical wing of the movement/sect and Early Christians were more mainstream? How much can be relied on the DSS to fill in the gaps of understanding as it relates to early Christianity in your opinion?
That depends on what you mean by “go too far.” Hardly anyone says “Christians were Essenes.” While most would agree with “Christians might have descended from or been influenced by Essenes.”
Part of the problem here may be that “Essenes” has a fizzy meaning itself. Our sources describe no fewer than nine different sects of Essenes, and there is no reason to believe that’s a complete list. Sources also suggest a relationship between Essenes and Samaritans. So what even an “Essene” is is not easy to nail down. Much less what it would mean to relate Christianity to Essenism. In my account (element 33, chapter 5, OHJ) Christianity appears to have been under diverse influences, so it shares components of many sects, not just one; though of all the sects documentation survives for, Essenes are the closest. One could say “not identical,” but of course, no Essene sect is “identical” to “Essenes” because every Essene sect is itself divergent in some way. So it’s not a simple question to answer.
Per Wise,
( Wise, A new Translation, The Dead Sea Scrolls, 2005, pp31)
There is tons more evidence in his book for his conclusion so if you want more then read his book.
The Dead Sea Scrolls are the greatest archaeological discovery in the history of Jewish-christianity because they support a paradigm shift in christian history. The Teacher of Righteousness is likely the anointed one that Paul is referring to who was hung on a tree, aka, crucified around 70 BC. And Paul became his successor, one of “two anointed ones” who became “a light to the nations”. Mark 6:14 captures that sentiment.
Therefore, Paul and the Teacher of Righteousness (TOR), —real flesh and blood human beings anointed by God, are represented via high symbol and allegory as “Jesus Christ” and John the Baptist, respectively.
The church refuses to see it because they are too focused on superman Jesus and his supernatural powers to realize that the same spirit in John the Baptist returned as Jesus Christ. Esoterically understood as the same spirit in the TOR returned in Paul the apostle ( Paul explicitly writes, “I no longer live but Christ in me.”). Moreover, the “signs and wonders” of the Gospels actually perceived through a religious conscience is Paul leading humans from ignorance and sin to virtuous living and faith and hope in a future world.
The DSS are the greatest archaeological discovery in the history of western civilization.
It is true that Kittim can mean Romans, and does in pHab (because it says even more specific things fixing that identification). As already noted in my article, that dates the text to sometime after 160 BC and most likely to around the 60s BC or shortly after. Which agrees with the carbon date and the handwriting date.
The rest is hyperbolic or speculative.
Test
What was the test?
Previous comment disappeared after posting, just wanted to test the system.
A comment of yours posted and then disappeared?
Or you submitted a comment and it never got out of the moderation queue?
Either should not happen without a reason. So more details could help me diagnose what happened for you.
Confirmation bias may be the most powerful force in the universe and it´s always good to have people check your work to avoid it, and if they notice something that is biased, recognise it and try and correct your thinking.
I find conjunction fallacies also to be one of the most common that people make and I think it´s likely to do with the way we think in stereotypes to try to simplify the world. They’re very easy to make, I think we´ve all caught ourselves making them at least a few times.
I think it´s interesting too, to analyse which errors are domain-general ones and which are domain-specific. One very interesting phenomenon is that often when people realise something is a logical error (something that should be domain-general) in one area, they don’t recognise it when they see it in another area of study.
One example that comes to mind, is Francis Pryor who is a very important Bronze Age archaeologist, he did some truly pioneering work, he excavated a really cool site, called Flag Fenn in East Anglia (UK) and he did some really neat work in terms of developing archaeological techniques (i.e better preservation of wooding artefacts, he made the use of pollen samples more systematic and doing massive area excavations to understand field patterns better.) That achievement should never be taken away from him.
However, he has some really really crazy views on the emergence of Anglo-Saxon England. He hasn’t published anything in any peer reviewed journal, to my knowledge, on this topic, but he made a TV documentary for Channel 4 and wrote a popular book on the subject (Britain AD) arguing that the Anglo-Saxon invasion never happened and instead England adopted Germanic culture by a process of acculturation.
I´m sorry to say that it´s complete nonsense. Some errors are just not knowing the historical sources well, i.e he says “well, of course Bede´s account is much later and may be unreliable”. That´s true, but there are sources like the Gallic chronicle that are contemporary, that say that Britain had been invaded by the Saxons, to give an exact tuote “Britanniae usque ad hoc tempus variis cladibus eventibusque latae in dicionem Saxonum redactae auxilium petunt” (The Britains having suffered various disasters, having been brought under Saxon domination, asked for assistance).
He also argues as there isn’t much evidence of fighting in East Anglia, that the invasion narrative isn’t tenable. Sadly, and he should know this being an archaeologist, that is complete nonsense, for starters, this is a case where absence of evidence doesn’t mean evidence of absence, it could have been that the fighting was mostly small skirmishes, or that people scavenged the battlefields really well for iron etc. IMO, there is a fair bit of evidence to suggest that the Romano-British authorities signed a foedus pact with the Saxons and that would mean the Saxons simply had the right to settle there and didn´t need to fight any battles and just took over the existing settlements.
The anthropological evidence is just terrible and this is the weirdest part, as he knows anthropology very well. It´s very very unlikely, that a bunch of people would voluntarily decide to adopt a non-prestigious culture at the time and it´s even more unlikely they would change language, without some external pressure, i.e like the Romans invading Gaul and making Latin the prestige language. I can’t actually think of a single example where a people changed their language without external pressure.
He deals with the Saxon shore forts really badly too. There are actually quite a few that have survived (one, Pevensey castle, a site you must visit if you can, was actually reused as a castle by William the Conquerer, just after the Norman invasion and it´s got some really nice Roman masonry). He argues essentially, that because they were often trading zones, that they didn’t have a military purpose. Just looking at the walls, that´s utterly laughable, but also Roman military sites almost always had markets, or towns springing up around them, most of the Hadrian´s wall sites do, and you can understand why people would be keen to sell their wares etc to the soldiers and officials living there.
I think his beliefs are genuinely held and I think some of these errors stem from being used to dealing with a period where there are less sources (prehistoric archaeologists tend to have very vivid imaginations, for understandable reasons!), most of it is confirmation bias and probably the motivations you link to about beliefs in conspiracy theories apply here too.
My understanding was that we have contemporary documentation for a huge amount of what happened, including the formal actions of kings referring to previous events which almost certainly weren’t completely fabricated. Am I right about that?
It´s true that the early Anglo-Saxon period is very poorly documented, Britain was probably the place where the dark age was most severe (at least in the beginning,) however there is the Gallic chronicle of 452, you have evidence of Saxon raids before that (Ammanius Marcellinus in the 4th centuries). The Saxon invasion is also mentioned in a 5th century hagiography. You also have Gildas, a Welsh monk, who wrote about the Anglo-Saxon invasions in “De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae” or “The Ruin of Britain”. This book is typically dated from the 5th to 6th centuries, generally it´s thought to be later as there is evidence Gildas died in 530.
Bede is later, in the 8th century and most people think he was using Gildas as a source. Bede has quite a lot of the more legendary elements, like Hengest and Horsa being the leader of the Saxons, he may have had a copy of the Gallic Chronicle or was told things about it orally, Anglo-Saxon scholars visited Frankia and Vice-versa. Bede is an important source for the Christianisation era and for the history of Northumbria, but as ever, he needs to be taken with a pinch of salt.
The Ruin of Britain basically blames the Christian Romano-British rulers for their defeat to the then pagan Anglo-Saxons for having been sinners and its purpose is to warn against moral depravity. As a source, it´s not without problems, but I think it shows without doubt the Anglo-Saxon invasion happened, otherwise Gildas would have written “Those filthy rulers adopted Barbarian customs”. Some of what Gildas says is plausible though, i.e he says that the Saxons were allowed to settle on the island and that may well preserve a memory of something that happened, there were similar pacts with the Franks and the Goths.
You have the Anglo-Saxon chronicle, which is a really important source Anglo-Saxon history, from the beginning til early Angevin England, but has the same kind of problems as Bede, when it comes to the very early period and it almost certainly used Gildas as a source and likely used Bede´s work too (it was started in the 9th century in Wessex under Alfred) as well as various legends that were floating around and simple lists of Saxon kings.
The genuine question, r.e the Anglo-Saxon invasion is whether it was a fairly small warrior elite, or whether there was a mass migration. In archaeology, there was a bit of backlash against “migration mania” in the later 20th century (especially regarding the Bronze age and , but I think recent genetic evidence has shown the older archaeologists were actually right about this, most studies done on British people´s DNA, show that common markers in Germany, are much more common in the English population than the Welsh population or the Scottish population and that basically the further East you go, the more common they are.
It´s worth noting too that, to my knowledge, England was the only place that was de-christianised in that period. Christianity survived in what is now Wales and Cornwall and Romano-British missionaries, like St Patrick, converted Ireland. Everywhere else in the former Roman Empire remained Christian and generally most Germanic rulers ended up adopting Christianity and I think there must be a reason for that.
Okay, so sparser than I thought, but still, I can imagine Richard running the Bayesian calculation on all of those sources being in the condition we have them had there not been an invasion.
It’s also a hypothesis with bad prior probability. Acculturation and cultural diffusion are really powerful forces, but for them to happen in such a way that you really substantially displace the original culture rather than just have ideas be absorbed syncretically, force or fraud or economic hegemony are almost always involved.
What’s frustrating is that this is such a common problem in the field: people seeing an interesting idea based on our modern understanding and overapplying a conceptual tool we now have. I bet it is actually a very meaningful, live question how much acculturation and trade vs. invasion is a driving force for the change because it always is because reality is complex. But that’s less interesting and ego-galvanizing (and makes it harder to get a big documentary crew to investigate) than “I’ve upended the consensus!”
Absolutely, I think there´s no reason really for the Gallic chronicle to be lying, or the pre-invasion ones, or Gildas. It´s worth noting that the Saxons raided Gaul quite a lot too.
And I could concede to Francis Pryor, that yes, you do get some cultural changes without invasions, i.e building styles do change without them, religious beliefs can change without them. The thing is, you have all these changes going on at the same time, which is incredibly unlikely without an invasion. Some people have tried to argue that there were already Germanic people living in Britain (not like as Roman soldiers, but well established for centuries), that´s complete nonsense, unfortunately as the tribe names are all Celtic, the Roman city names are all derived from Brythonic (the ancestor of Welsh, Cornish and Breton) and English is really similar to Frisian, spoken in exactly the part of the world the invaders came from.
The Norman Conquest, is an interesting case of where there was an invasion by a warrior elite (different context somewhat, 6 centuries later) and where they changed the culture significantly, but it was no way near as complete as the Saxon invasion. It´s a case where it was largely the elite being replaced and there wasn’t really mass migration. French was the language of the aristocracy for a long time, the first King to grow up speaking English with his family, rather than French, was Henry IV (1399-1413). However, English was never seriously threatened and bilingualism under the Norman descent aristocracy was common, albeit there is a huge quantity of French borrowings in English. The Normans also kept quite a lot of the English system of government, England was already quite centralised for a medieval state and they actually kept the same feudal arrangements (it´s a myth that serfdom was introduced by the Normans).
Funnily enough, literally just today I was watching Chinese Cooking Demystified and their video on what Sichuan cooking may have looked like prior to the pepper… their answer being “There was no ‘Sichuan culture’ prior to the introduction of the pepper because there was such a severe madman genocide in the area that the population was decimated and it was reconstituted heavily by incentivized settlement”.
And they ended up
discussing similar methodological and historical concerns. There’s skepticism about some of the commentary about the guy who probably did the genocide, Zhang Xianzhong. There’s arguments that the Qing dynasty probably let him do some crazy nonsense to fight their enemies for him, that the other battling warlords may have been able to Zhang as a scapegoat, that famine was almost certainly killing a lot of people, etc. But there’s just so much attestation not just of him being a lunatic even at the time but afterward about the state of Sichuan… and, yeah, it sure as hell sounds like a quite active genocide to me, comparable to the aftermath in Rwanda or Cambodia. And while there is a risk of regurgitating Qing propaganda… Zhang has also been the subject of revisionism because he was the head of a peasant revolt, and so there’s a desire to recast him as a revolutionary hero.
Point being that, even when we really clearly have a cultural black hole thanks to very obvious force and quite good documentation (down to a census figure for the taxable male population after the Qing gained control), there’s still a revisionist sentiment.
And yeah, the Norman conquest to me is so telling in this discussion. Even accomplishing the cultural change they performed required really substantial force and control of state apparatuses. The idea that the Saxons somehow accomplished much greater cultural saturation without much more extreme force is quite silly.
And that’s what I meant about Pryor as well. Acculturation can sometimes rapidly change one aspect of culture: religion, or clothing, or food. But all of it, near-simultaneously? No, that’s going to require force, almost always.
Totally, an interesting counter example to what Pryor says, is that the Anglo-Saxons later became quite influenced by Irish culture. Christianisation in the Anglo-Saxon world happened from two sources, the South was converted by missionaries from Rome, the North by missionaries from Ireland and Scotland (Irish missionaries kind of went island hopping round the North of Scotland, then came to Northumbria).
One of the results of this contact, was what we call “Insular Art”, often called “Celtic art”, too, of which the Book of Kells is a great Irish example and the Lindesfarne Gospels are a great Anglo-Saxon example (it´s one of my favourite art forms too!) You also get “Celtic Crosses” popping up all over England, first in the North, but also further south. The Irish were more literate than the English were, early Anglo-Saxon texts were basically short runic inscriptions, on the whole.
Exactly. Cultural affectations like that are borrowed, and can be eagerly so, but rarely literally entirely cultural and institutional transplants.
In particular, I suspect Pryor’s framing is too cultural and informal in its focus and ignores the role of institutions (in this case active military leadership and their incentives).
Shouldn’t it be “He trusted those whom he should have known to be cranks?” (or “who”? if you want to adopt more standard convention?)
You’ll need to quote the sentence you are referring to.
“In D.O. Smith’s case, he overtrusted what he should have known to be cranks, and by not acting more skeptically and carefully, got snowed into someone else’s red string board, on a premise he didn’t realize was scientifically too improbable to carry the argument. “
Second to last paragraph. (You may also have meant “overtrusted arguments that he should have known to be sourced from cranks”).
Maybe somewhat off-topic, but have you ever found it strange Peter and the Twelve allow for the possibility of other people receiving revelation from the Lord? Usually religion starters like to keep that ability for themselves to give themselves more power over their community. Is there perhaps precedent for this or an explanation for this? I know one explanation would be, if more people can have access to revelation this would help spread it faster by giving them a “stake” in the movement, but this comes at the significant cost of the founders’ ability to influence the movement, and in fact we know this became a problem later and was perhaps one of the reasons for the invention of the historical Jesus. Do you reckon the founders reckoned the decreased power was worth the cost to get the movement to take off, even if it risked creating a dissident like Paul? The more important question is, where did they get this idea from? Was it from the Mount Sinai theophany? The relevance to this article is I am not aware of the DSS community having an idea like this (democratic revelation). In fact to my knowledge they had a strict top-down structure and a single Teacher of Righteousness to whom God made known “all the mysteries of the words of his servants the prophets” (1QpHab 7:5).
This indeed became the problem that Paul struggled against: to be “allowed” to “count” as an apostle, by closing the apostolate with him (1 Cor 15:8, Galatians 1–2). People continued claiming election after that, all the way into the second century. The “orthodox” sect fought that by inventing historicity and thus fixing apostolic pedigrees, while denigrating “new revelations.” That was all a political change in how the sect organized itself and fought its competing factions. (See chapter 7 in Paradigm.)
When it all started, it was apocalyptic: the end was coming in mere years. This led to not thinking about a closed hierarchy or building a control system. The result was “other Jesuses” (2 Cor 11) and “other gospels” (Gal 1) exploding everywhere, and the original innovators struggling to get ahead of that.
So the tl;dr is: you you ask didn’t occur to them until it was too late. Everything that ensued across the next hundred years is then a direct result of that oversight.